AUSTRIA AS VASSAL' H ERR HITLER, having achieved his army purge,
is to address the Reichstag on Sunday on his future policy. Meanwhile he has anticipated an essential part of his statement by action. It may be said that what has taken place in Austria is not his action but Dr. Schuschnigg's. That would be merely to toy with words. The Cabinet changes announced in Vienna in the early hours of Wednesday were in all essentials decided and dictated by Herr Hitler in his interview with the Austrian Chancellor on Sunday. About that there can be no question. Austria has capitulated under menace. The story that Herr Hitler had his generals in an adjoining room as a stimulus to his guest has been denied. Whether it is true or false is immaterial. What happened at Berchtesgaden is completely clear ; all that is obscure is why a rumour gained currency that victory in the struggle staged there rested with Dr. Schuschnigg. The first step in Germany's eastward drive has always been, necessarily and inevitably, the domination of Austria. It might be mere assimilation, Gleichshaltung, it might be nominally voluntary reunion, Anschluss, it might be naked annexation. The last of the three would be the line of greatest resistance, and Herr Hitler has clearly never contemplated it except as a desperate last resort. There are easier ways, and the easiest is the attainment of the Anschluss by way of an intermediate period of Gleichshaltung.
Half that road, at least, has been travelled in the past week. Austrian independence is nominally not infringed. It is indeed formally reaffirmed. For an independent Austria with all its motions determined by Berlin there is clearly much to be said from the German point of view as a matter of practical convenience. But to make that a reality the elements in Austria most favourable to Germany, that is the Austrian Nazis, must have the path to power laid open to them, and the foreign policy of the country must be in the hands of a man no more disposed to question Herr Hitler's decisions than Herr von Ribbentrop. That, up till this week, has notoriously not been the case. Only one party, the Fatherland Front, has been permitted in Austria, and Dr. Skubl, the Police-President of Vienna, has had charge of the police and security throughout the country and so dis- charged his responsibilities that Nazi ebullience has been held well in check. At the same time Dr. Guido Schmidt, as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, has remained strictly subordinate to Dr. Schuschnigg, who retained in his own hands the ultimate control. Now, under the pressure exerted at Berchtesgaden, a prominent Roman Catholic lawyer, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, with pro- nounced Nazi sympathies, becomes Minister for the Interior, responsibility for public security being trans- ferred to that office, and Dr. Schmidt is elevated to the position of Foreign Minister, Dr. Schuschnigg hence- forward concerning himself no more with foreign policy than the head of a Cabinet necessarily must. As to. what the pressure was whereby these vital concessions were extorted, there can be no reasonable doubt that the method always favoured, the threat of a Nazi rising in Austria, with German intervention as a natural conse- quence, was successfully employed.
That, on paper, is the situation. What it is in reality can hardly be discovered yet. Herr Hitler's Reichstag speech on Sunday may have some bearing on it. Not a great deal is known of the new Minister,of the, Interior, who must be regarded as the key-figure. He, may be a patriotic Austrian, unreconciled to seeing his country',, independence reduced to fiction. He has pledged him- self to carry out the law—and the law allows only one party, not the Nazi party, to exist in Austria—and he may intend to make good his pledge. Dr. Schmidt may, in his new Position, contemplate a change in Austrian foreign policy in regard to Germany only, not in relation, for example, to Czechoslovakia and other members of the Little Entente. That can only be revealed as the new Cabinet in Vienna settles to its work. Dr. Schuschnigg is still Chancellor and Dr. Mildas President, and to both of them the independence of Austria matters more than anything in political life. But no one with the history of the past five years before him can base any hopes of substance on such possibilities. It is wise in this case to look realistically at the situation as the Berchtesgaden interview has left it. And realism compels the conviction that the outlook is profoundly sombre both for Austria and for the Continent whose destinies Austria's fate must so critically affect. If, in fact, developments show current fears to be exaggerated the relief in every capital will be-immense. But false opti- mism now will only rob judgements of any stable basis.
For the external effects of what is little less than a political revolution in Austria are unmistakeable. Domi- nation of Austria, it has been' said, is and always has been the first step in Germany's eastward drive. Is there a second step, and if so, what is it ? About that there can be equally little misconception. Czecho- slovakia has been the target for German threats for the past three years, and a glance at the map will show the strategic effect on Czechoslovakia of the Germanisation of Austria. She will have hostile territory for hundreds of miles along her southern as well as her northern frontier—if indeed Austria, which is now conspicuously friendly, does change her attitude. And the technique in regard to Czecho- slovakia resembles significantly that employed in regard to Austria. There is in Czechoslovakia a German-speaking minority, with which Berlin keeps in constant touch and which it is profitable to mis- represent as seriously oppressed. An outbreak by the Sudeten-Deutsch would give the same excuse for German intervention as a Nazi rising in Austria would have done if Herr Hitler had not found it possible to achieve his ends by menace and stop short of action., There is no capital in Europe in which the events of Sunday at Berchtesgaden and of Wednesday at Vienna can have caused so deep disquiet as in Prague.
That the situation is fraught with larger and more dis- turbing possibilities is manifest. Czechoslovakia stands in a very different position from Austria. Austria is, after all, closely associated by language and history with Ger- many. Neither of these ties binds Czechoslovakia to Berlin. Austria, moreover, is militarily powerless. Czechoslovakia is not. She is well-armed, and-she would certainly defend herself with vigour against external attack, and with the greater hope in that France is bound by pledges recently and publicly renewed to oome to her help in the event of an attack by Germany. Russia is bound equally. She would probably honour her pledge ; France certainly would. There can be no mis- understanding therefore of what a second forward move by Germany would involve. And if there are any who think it would be possible for Britain to see France locked in a new conflict with Germany and stand aloof itself, they must be as blind in their understanding of the past as in their estimate of the future. We are not faced with a decision on that vital question yet and we need not assume it as certain that we ever shall be. But Europe today is full of unknown factors that keep every- thing in flux. What can Russia, with her preoccupations in Asia, do in Europe ? Is Italy's strange acceptance of the vassalage of Austria due to her own inherent weakness or to a promise of fresh German support for her adventure in Spain ? Can and will King Carol keep Rumania loyal to the Little Entente ? What is the future of Poland, divided domestically and perplexed externally ? Some of those questions may be easier to answer after the Reichstag speech.