The Youth of William of Orange
British Foreign Policy, 1660-1672. By Keith Feiling. (Macmillan. 18s.)
William the Third and the Defence of Holland, 1672-4. By Mary C. Trevelyan. (Longman. 21s.)
MODERN political England dates from the Restoration, and therefore that unsavoury period is full of interest. England and Holland were competing fiercely for oversee trade and colonies, and over against the two Protestant powers were the Roman Catholic France of Louis XIV, by far the strongest and richest country in Europe, and the still powerful but moribund Spain. The problem for English statesmen was to find the most advantageous allies, and Mr. Felling's extremely able book, based on an intensive study of the diplomatic corre- spondence, shows how difficult the task was. Charles II was definitely Francophile. His favourite sister, Henrietta, had married Louis XIV's brother. He himself had been kindly treated as an exile in France. He had strong leanings towards Roman Catholicism. Moreover, as his revenue was hopelessly insufficient he coveted the subsidies that Louis could give. The Cavalier Parliament, when its first loyal enthusiasm evaporated, was reluctant to vote money unless it could control Ministers to a degree that the King thought excessive and tiresome. On the other hand, his Ministers and his people were divided in opinion. They disliked the Republicanism of the Dutch under Jan de Witt and were angered by their harsh treatment of English sailors and traders in the East and West Indies. But they were suspicious of a French alliance that might mean the reintroduction of Papacy.
Mr. Felling 'describes the complications of Charles's first twelve years with rare skill. First we fought Holland, the ally of France. Then we made a Triple Alliance with Holland and Sweden, and thus infuriated Louis XIV against the Dutch. Then Charles, easily persuaded by his sister, signed the secret Treaty of Dover in 1670, and agreed—for a consideration paid partly in advance—to become the ally of France against Holland and to turn Roman Catholic. Finally, to complete the disgrace, we made war on the Dutch by sea while Louis marched his vast army into a stupefied and almost defenceless IIolland in the summer of 1672. The " grand design " failed, just as the German plan of campaign failed in 1914, by a suc- cession of miraculous chances, but Charles II was discredited at home and abroad. Mr. Felling takes a kindly view of Charles's chief confidant, Arlington, and thinks that he was not sorry when the Treaty of Dover proved ineffective, though he could not prevent his master from making it. It must always be remembered that the personal power of the Sovereign was still very great for generations after Charles's day.
By a happy coincidence the Dutch side of this strange chapter of events is admirably presented in a new book by Professor 'Frevelyan's daughter, Miss Mary Treveiyan (now Mrs. Moorman). The great-grandniece of Macaulay is carrying on the historical traditions of her family with commendable success. For it is true to say that her account of the early years of William of Orange under the suspicious rule of the oligarchy, and of the French invasion which he was called upon to stem, is much the best and most accurate in our language. Miss. Trevelyan describes clearly the astonishing system of government by which small privileged cliques in the towns of the Seven Provinces absorbed all powers, under the guidance of Jan de Witt as Grand Pensionary from 1653 to 1672. William of Orange, an infant at his father's death in 1650, was denied the inheritance of his father's position as Stadtholder, but remained loyal and passive though he knew that the populace was mainly Orange in sentiment. It was a hard schooling, but it served him well in later years when he had to deal with English . Party politicians. A man who could remain patient with the Dutch oligarchs could endure any trial.
The weakneas of the Dutch system was suddenly revealed
when Louis XIV with overwhelming forces marched down the Meuse and crossed the Rhine—that famous passage of the Rhine which was, in fact, the easiest of manoeuvres. Each province, each town, thought only of its own selfish interests. The army was small, ill-disciplined, badly paid and worse equipped. The French reached Utrecht and passed beyond it. The States General offered Louis terms that fell little short of complete submission. But the King and Louvois, his War Minister, inflated by their bloodless victory, demanded still more, and then the State of Holland, led by Amsterdam, advocated resistance to the death. A general outburst of patriotic feeling swept the oligarchs away and made William of Orange Stadtholder. The dikes were cut, the sluices opened, so that a broad belt of floods stretched from Maiden to the south of Dordrecht. The French army which might in the summer have swept across North Holland—had not Turenne and Conde been held back by the jealous Louvois—was baffled in the autumn by the inundations, just as the Germans were held up on the her in the winter of 1014 by the Belgians. William of Orange was the inspirer of this memorable defence, which prevailed. He was not a great soldier, perhaps, but lie was a shrewd diplomatist and leader of men. Miss Trevelyan emphasizes the skill with which he set himself to break up the Anglo-French alliance, by offering fair terms to Charles and at the same time playing upon the English popular hatred of Roman Catholicism, so that early in 1674 England withdrew from the war. William had to wait four years for peace with France in this first round with Louis XIV, but he had saved his country from destruction and had made a good beginning in his life-long project of overthrowing the French Colossus with the help of England. Miss Trevelyan has used her Dutch authorities, printed and unprinted, with great skill and discrimination and she gives several useful maps. And always she remembers that a history is meant to be read, and that it can be both attractive and trustworthy. Miss Trevelyan will, we trust, write another book on William of Orange in later life.
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