GERMAN ADMISSIONS
By STRATEGICUS
T is a pity that only one or two newspapers gave space to the I broadcast of General Diethmar on Monday night. The Ger- man army spokesman gave his fellow-countryman an indication of the true background of the fighting in Russia, and his statement is notable for its unusual gravity. It is now well into the eighth week since the battle of the Don bend began, and the Russians are fighting as stubbornly as ever for the defence of Stalingrad. "Battles of such tremendous magnitude," as General Diethmar said, "are not being decided by a few blows," and this may be taken as a masterly piece of under-statement. It is impossible to say what is the precise position of the city after this long-sustained onslaught. The Germans claim that they have taken the main railway station ; 'but they have made so many claims which have proved false, or premature, that this latest cannot be credited. What is beyond any doubt is the unprecedented weight, persistence and fury of the attacks ; and, as a German correspondent says, the "German soldiers have become silent after what they have gone through. They all want one thing—rest."
That is a remarkable admission to be made from the German side ; but it is perhaps even more remarkable that the men can be driven on to attack, again and again, in face of so amazing a resistance. The position of Stalingrad is not favourable for pro- longed defence, since it stands on the west bank of the river, and soldiers who fight with their backs to a great river are at a dis- advantage. But from this it may be gathered that the Germans have not only tet conquer the city but also to clear a considerable area on the east bank before their position will be tolerable. It is this that explains the repeated attempts to cross the river, even more than the necessity to cut off, the source of immediate rein- forcements; and no one can ignore the implications of the morning frosts that are already a familiar experience.
The time to round off this offensive has therefore come. Indeed, it is overdue ; and it is for this reason that Kleises units have been brought up from the south and others transferred from the north. But this concentration has its penalties, and Diethmar is driven to repeat the statement which was so ill received when the Prime Minister made it not many months ago in connexion with the disaster in the Far East. It is, of course, profoundly true that the army which aims at being equally strong on every sector gener- ally succeeds in being equally weak on all. But how odd it is to find. a German army commentator making that explanation at this precise moment! It is adduced to explain the extraordinary pressure on the northern and central sectors of the Russian front ; but clearly it implies much more than that. It must be taken to mean that the armies on those sectors are suffering heavy losses and giving ground in payment for the successes in the south.
It is not only on the central sector that the Russians are attacking. They have been pressing hard for some time in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad. Here the objective is to disengage the Leningrad communications with central Russia and relieve the siege conditions before the city is subjected to another winter. The point of the thrust is a little to the south-west of Schliisselburg ; and it is upon that obstinately held pivot that the leverage is being exerted. There is some indication of a converging attack from the Leningrad defensive area. The Russians have gained some success, but they do not appear yet to have come within sight of their objective ; and here, once again, is being demonstrated the amaz- ingly formidable character of the Germans on the defensive. This is universally true ; but nowhere has it been more remarkable than on the Leningrad sector, and if Leeb requires a monument it can be seen there. For unlike the other sectors attacked, this offers, and from the first has offered, a vulnerable flank to the attack ; and although the Russians have gained many striking successes on this sector the pivot which holds the cincture firmly about the city has defied all assaults.
About Rzhev the resumed attack has made some ground, and un- official German reports speak of the town being encircled by six great armies. The picture is a little too highly coloured for perfect verisimilitude ; but it serves to confirm that the town is cut off. This has been suggested by other reports. But it is a comparatively minor thing merely to encircle the town: it is the capture and dear- ing of the railway towards the west that will alone count as more than a local gain. But Diethmar describes the drum-fire of the artillery preparation and the tremendous weight of the infantry assault as if he were preparing the nation for a considerable Russian success. If we did not know what the German troops can endure, the description of the assault would convey the impression of an inevitable collapse. But, after the sufferings they bore during the last winter and the pressure they have borne on several sectors, it is only the words of the German general that suggest such a possibility.
"To what enormous pressure our forces and the command have been subjected," says the Daily Telegraph report, "can only be known by those who appreciate the magnitude of the actions and tasks with which we have been confronted in these areas." He goes on to enlarge on the "tremendous responsibility which lies on the commander in important defensive battles, for he is moving on delicate ground where the issue depends on whether or not he has over-estimated his forces or perhaps been late in giving the vital reinforcements necessary." This is perhaps the most suggestive part of his broadcast ; for it seems to imply that the reserves available are insufficient to prevent the taking of considerable risks. Can this mean that the strategic reserve is dissipated, or merely that the command is driven to take the risks in order to keep it intact? It is impossible to be sure ; but the general tone of the speech appears to suggest a stringency that is incompatible with the existence of an untouched reserve. As experience has shown what risks Hitler has continually taken with impunity, and his amazing tenacity in keeping to his plan to put Russia out of action, in at least some limited sense, we cannot be certain that it does not mean simply that the risks are being taken in order to retain the power to strike again, probably In the centre.
But one conclusion is certainly well-founded. The Russian battles are putting the mightiest army in the world through a period of strain which it did not expect and cannot bear without anxiety. Diethmar appeared to admit that the battle of Stalingrad could not produce a decision, and in that he spoke justly ; but he pointed out that every battle is playing its part in deciding the issue. On what this issue finally depends there can be no reasonable doubt. It will, and must, turn upon reserves. It is, of course, obvious, as I have frequently pointed out, that reserves, like supplies, that are not available are not effectively reserves at all. An army can in this way be deprived of its strength by cutting its essential communica- tions. Its effectiveness can be further weakened by facing it with elaborate defensive systems. In both of these ways the Germans have achieved remarkable success. They have seized most of the nodal points of the Russian communication-system. The battle of Stalingrad revolves round the struggle for communications that supply the Russian armies and industry with their essential motive- power ; and at the moment much headway has been made in that direction. They have also, over a great part of the front, established an "eastern wall" that has so far to a great extent neutralised the offensive power of the Russians.
It is depressing that, at this moment when the Russians have entangled the bulk of the German armies so that they cannot dis- engage, and are compelling them to suffer enormous losses and undergo serious risk, the United Nations cannot take effective advantage of the chance. But it is unwise to place the blame for that on our having " safe " men at the top. " Unsafe " men can hardly be considered preferable. But the question remains whether we are doing all that we can. On the anniversary of the triumph of the Royal Air Force is it not pertinent to ask whether our air- strategy is beyond criticism? Theoretically, it should be possible to block the enemy communications and so render their productive, capacity useless. The junctions towards the east are well known and, in spite of the enormous recuperative power of every com- munication system, repeated visits could block them.
A great deal has been done in this direction, and the strain on the communications and the transport, which the Royal Air Force has also attacked, has been such that the enemy has been driven to use sea-traffic wherever possible. Probably the matter turns on the allocation of industry to the various types of aircraft and to the general supply of bombers. This is a matter for the decision of the High Command ; but it is of great consequence. Logically, it seems more important to wreck the communications that enable machines to be transported than to destroy the factories that build them. Without the former the latter can be rendered ineffective. The Germans have apparently been compelled to fall back on the analogous strategy in default of being able to destroy the Russian armies.
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