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which may be summed up in the question, is there a will to fight ? Internally, the first essential is that the Vietnamese- should not only possess independence, but should also be aware and proud that they have it. Far too many report& insist that this awareness and pride are lacking today. Despite the French declaration of last July, many Vietnamese are still doubtful how much real independence they now have or ca count on in future; the Bao Dai regime, it would appear, has not created a real national spirit; and great numbers of Viet* namese, uncertain how the struggle will. finally end, are giving no avoidable hostages to fortune by coming out against th Vietminh. Next, there is a crying need for land reform and relief of agricultural indebtedness. The Vietnamese peasan who for decades has groaned under a system which deprived the majority of a large part of their crop and leaves vast numbers too little even to exist on between harvests, does no see the threat of future enslavement lurking behind Communist methods of " land reform "; for himzwhat counts--and nothin could be more seductive—is the Communist promise to free him from his burdens here and now. If an effective national, spirit is to be created among the peasants who are the majority of the population, the Vietnam nationalists must undertak genuine reforms which deal with this long-standing and grievou problem—and deal with it promptly. Finally, Vietminh method of terrorisation must he effectively countered, and both peasant and the better-to-do must be assured (as they are far fro assured today) of safety for life and limb if they support th forces of law and order. This problem is also deep-rooted. is primarily a problem of retaining military contrbl of area now under Vietnamese rule, and secondarily a problem o effective policing. Until at least a beginning has been made with all these matters, the internal political situation in Vietna, will remain weak; and since time—much time—is needed to deal fully with them, it is already dangerously late.
The external political factors are even more disturbing. Th United States has sent a dozen B-26 bombers (and is sendin more), together with some 250 technicians to service them o the ground and train the French and Vietnamese in the maintenance. But this relatively minor step has caused suc great anxiety that President Eisenhower has been compelle to reassure American opinion by insisting that his Administra tion is doing its utmost to avoid deeper involvement. The ma burden thus continues to rest on France, for whom Indo-Chin means a considerable financial effort, as well as a heavy dra on trained man-pOwer among her military elite—the ye officers and N.C.O. s who would form the cadres which coal increase French and Western security in Europe. So seriou is this drain, so grave are its consequences in the NAT structure, that it is not surprising that some French circles argu that for this very reason the Communists want the war in Indo China to go on indefinitely. The argument is fallacious; Communist victory in Indo-China would be a major triumph and among other things would enable Communist pressure t be greatly increased both in Europe and elsewhere; but in Franc the desire for a settlement on almost any terms that appea reasonable nevertheless remains strong and widespread. - In fact, no peace consonant with the real interests of th free world can at present be made in Indo-China. In existin conditions any kind of peace—even an armistice—would b fatal to Vietnamese morale, resistance, and independence. Th whole of Indo-China would quickly fall to the Communists, Nor would the evil stop there. The entire position of the Wes in Asia rests today on the fundamentals of power. From Egyp to Japan, surrender in Indo-China would be taken to mea that the West has neither the will nor the ability even to hol its own, much less to win in the end. A major political an strategic realignment wholly disadvantageous to the West woul follow, and follow swiftly. Such developments would be in tolerable. They must not happen. Given the necessary will they cannot happen. But to prevent them, the struggle in Indo China must be sustained, and the country held. The respon. sibility rests squarely on the Bao Dai regime, on Washington and on Paris.
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