The Berlin Failure
By ERNST FRIEDLAENDER
Hamburg All this may seem pretty much confused. But then, what would have been full success in Berlin ? That is where the difference lies. For the Federal Government nothing but complete Soviet acceptance of something like the Eden plan would have been satisfactory; that is, free elections first, followed by the free formation of a German government, a freely negotiated peace treaty and complete freedom of action, particularly as far as foreign alliance§ are concerned, for a united Germany. The German Socialists, on the other hand, have always been prepared to sacrifice something which they do not want to happen anyway—the European Defence Community. Socialist spokesmen have repeatedly said during the conference that the Western Powers should not insist on EDC, that they should forgo EDC. They have hinted more or less clearly that success in Berlin depended on abandoning EDC in exchange for free elections.
The German Socialists however have not come out openly in favour of German neutralisation. That is where the con- fusion began. Molotov did not ask for the abandonmenrof EDC only. He did ask for the complete neutralisation of Germany, which excluded not only EDC, but also German participation in NATO and, in fact, any conceivable form of German alliance or coalition with the West. He proposed small national armed forces for Germany, sufficient only to suppress internal revolt and to deal with local frontier clashes. What Molotov really demanded was a neutralised and defence- less Germany, a Germany at the mercy of the Soviets. It has therefore always been a gross over-simplification to reduce all this to the question of EDC. Molotov's proposals seemed a kind of modern Monroe doctrine for Europe.
Molotov's second'plan, since it clearly perpetuated Germany's division for a period of fifty years, was as disappointing to the German Socialists as to the supporters of the Federal Govern.
ment. Moreover this plan disclosed more than anything else that what had brought the Soviets to the conference table was not the desire to re-establish German unity in freedom, but rather the intention to disunite the West by every possible method—by stirring French sentiment against Germany, by thus postponing European action and increasing American impatience to the point of withdrawing American aid and American troops from Europe, by creating Western disagree• ment over the Chinese problem. Even the extension of the Berlin conference over weeks and weeks, its continuation into committee meetings of experts or the mere agreement .on the date for a second conference of Foreign Ministers to deal with the German problem, would have been a success for the Soviets. To prolong .uncertainty means to paralyse Europe, What was true before the conference and has been true during the conference, may also be true after the conference. It iS much better to break up the conference without any result on the German question than to hide the lack of results behind a smokescreen of useless further palavers.
At the present there seems, no hope for Germany's unity in freedom. It seems impossible to isolate the German problem from the rest of the world conflict, Thus the only realistic policy is to admit failure for the present openly and unequivocally. This is less cruel to the German people than to hold out false hopes which must be followed by still greater disillusionment. • _ Although the conference is still dragging along as this article is being written, it may be permitted to look beyond it.
Naturally there will be disappointment in Germany among all those who had hoped for some kind of success, for some progress toward German unity But it is most unlikely that this disappointment will, except for a very small minority, take the shape of anti-Western feelings. The history of the con- ference shows all too clearly who was responsible for its failure. Molotov's extremely uncompromising attitude in Berlin and his cynical treatment of the German problem have not won any new friends for the Soviets in Germany. This is also true of the Germans in the Soviet zone. There are some indications that the Germans east of the Elbe are in the majority even more realistic, more prepared to face facts than the Germans in the Federal Republic.
Thus, there is no doubt that German foreign policy will continue on the path of European integration and that German popular sentiment will be behind this policy. It has always been a fallacy to say that Germany could pursue either her own unity or European unity. As time progresses, it will become more and more evident that a policy of Western strength and of European integration also works in favour of German ire-unification. The Berlin conference is a failure, but it , cannot be denied that without the policy of European integra-, tion it would not have taken place at all. Geirnany will remain European-minded also in the question of defence. There should be no misinterpretation: Germany prefers her participation in a European army to any kind of national German army. It would not be true to say that the Germans were in favour of EDC because they cannot get into NATO, and that if they were admitted into NATO they would gladly renounce EDC. German public opinion strongly favours a United Europe, economically, politically and also militarily. Every setback in European integration would be extremely disappointing to the Germans.
This means that once again all eyes are turned to Paris. What are the French going to do after the Berlin conference ? That is the question. True, there will no longer be any alibi in the way of immediate hopes for a settlement with the Soviets and of ensuing postponement of action. The end of the Berlin conference must clear the way for an early decision on the EDC in Paris. But what decision ? Before the conference it was generally believed that failure in Berlin would work out in favour of ratification of EDC in Paris. But the outcome seems as doubtful as ever. The Western stand in Berlin in favour of complete freedom for an all-German Government to accept or to reject EDC has clearly shocked French political circles. Even Robert Schuman has come out against Bidaulf in this matter. There are French fears that a future united Germany might turn away from the West and renounce EDC. It will need considerable persuasion to convince France that these fears are wholly unjustified. In point of fact, the West runs no risk in granting' freedom of decision to Germany. But then, there is French distrust, there are all the old French arguments against a tete-a-tete with Germany and a new one in addition. The Franco-German problem is bound to dominate the political scene once more during the weeks to come. So much is clear.
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