THE FUTURE OF THE VOLUNTEERS.
WHAT is to be the future of the Volunteers ? The question has once more been raised by the tardy publication of Major-General Ellice s Report on the Brighton Review. It is a concise, pregnant, business-like document, remarkable alike for the quantity and quality of the comments crammed into a few words. Rightly considered, it may serve as a fresh starting-point for the Auxiliary Forces, whose defi- nite place in our Military system has not yet been ascertained. Marking the degree of efficiency which the Volunteers have reached, the Report indicates the method most likely to aug-
ment their public utility. It is now thirteen years since General Peel ventured to issue his Circular to the Lords-Lieu- tenant "permitting the formation of Volunteer Rifle Corps, as well as of Artillery Corps and Companies in maritime towns." From that humble -beginning the Volunteers have passed through many stages, until they are now a costly force. The nominal effective has been well maintained since 1860, capitation grants have been made, Acts of Parlia- ment have been passed, the Army List has been increased in bulk, and last, yet not least, rifle butts have arisen throughout the length and breadth of the island. Ever since 1860 reviews and sham-fights have been held with more or less frequency. Quite recently the training of the officers has received special attention. But neither at the beginning nor at any time since have definite relations with the Regular Force been devised. They are nearly as much outside the Military system, such as it is, as they were in 1859. They figure on the muster-roll, their numbers are cited in Parlia- ment; but they have no place in the line-of-battle, no connec- tion with anything except the Treasury, no obligations save those which are optional,—a contradiction in terms. In a certain emergency they may be suddenly called out, and placed under the Mutiny Act ; but if that emergency rose to-morrow, all the essential work of fitting them into the public force would have to be begun. At present they are isolated bodies, roving like the wind where and when they list, and almost how they list. They are well clothed, well armed, badly equipped, and indifferently officered. But they are full of zeal and public spirit, and they are there. That is much ; but in the space of thirteen years this is all we have been able to do with 150,000 men.
If we turn to the Report of the Quartermaster-General, who commanded at Brighton, we find ground for believing that they are worth a definite place in what is called the Reorgan- isation of the Army. They performed simple manoeuvres to the satisfaction of a Major-General high on the Staff. Their discipline was "undoubtedly good." They arrived and de- parted "in good order and without confusion ;" they were silent in the ranks, and under proper control. It must be remembered that they went through these manoeuvres under great disadvantages, operating on ground "almost impracticable for troops," acting under officers who had never seen them before, and hampered by crowds of idle sightseers who bid the guns and the skirmishers. They were also clad in a score of varied uniforms, a further element of difficulty. Nevertheless they have secured the discriminating words of approval we have cited from a keen and observant critic. But what is his conclusion ? He has no hesitation in express- ing his opinion that "if trained for a short time under com- petent officers, to give the men confidence in themselves and in those placed over them, they would become excellent sol- diers." Of course it may be presumed that if the Volunteers were wanted, they would be placed under competent officers, and would get the training that would make them become ex- cellent soldiers. What is the fair inference ? That inchoate troops of such high promise, troops that have achieved so
much when subjected to a sort of happy-go-lucky treatment, troops who, if "trained for a short time," would constitute a formidable addition to our little Army—that for these men a definite and fixed place should be found in our Military sys- tem. Major-General Ellice has offered his suggestions, but though sound, they only indicate a provisional arrangement, altogether dependent on voluntary action. Yet if the advice he tenders were adopted, it might serve as a bridge from the provisional and uncertain to the solid and permanent. Despite the disadvantages attending reviews like those which occur at Brighton on Easter Mondays, he frankly I admits that "all concentrations of Volunteers under competent officers should be encouraged." At the same time, he is of opinion "that it cannot be too strongly impressed on the Volunteers that it is their duty to seek every opportunity of being brigaded with Regular troops and taking a part in the Autumn Manceuvres." We may remark in this sage counsel a decided approach of the Regular soldier towards the Volunteer, a disposition, rarely or never
before shown, to get at him and bring him within the fold, as far as the composition and character of the force will permit. The Volunteers will certainly respond to a stimulus,-
never before so frankly administered, and make a correspond- ing move towards the Regulars. And it will improve the drill, bearing, and efficiency of every regiment which acts on the Quartermaster-General's advice. But when that is done, as far as it can be, the main question will still be unsolved. Where is the place of the Volunteers ?
At one period of the Session the place appeared to have- been found. Mr. Cardwell adopted the principle of localisa- tion, and made a great show of his Brigade Centres. Even' now he continues to tell us that certain Line battalions are to- form part of local brigades. But what are the facts ? Except in some instances, perhaps in none, the local centre will never see its Line battalion. The grand scheme of Localisation' dwindles down into resuscitation of the old Depot system. It- is the depot, not the battalion, which will be quartered in the Centre. It is a Recruiting Agency which has been established, not a localisation of the Army. We are quite ready to- admit that the Line battalion could not be permanently stationed at its nominal local head-quarters, but it might reside there during some portion of every year. Now, the determination not to localise the Line bat- talion, except in name, destroys all chance of fitting the Volunteers of a Brigade district into a brigade. A Depot battalion will not attract Volunteers, nor will it serve any very useful purpose even as regards the Militia. But a Line bat- talion would have exercised a most beneficial influence. It would present a model, it would enable Volunteers and Militia to form part of a solid brigade ; it would keep up the Military spirit, and furnish a standard of excellence. Moreover, a nucleus would exist around which a complete organisation might grow ; so that, in time of need, or for purposes of experiment, every section and company would have an assigned place. The Military training of officers, both in the Militia and Volunteers, would be immensely facilitated, and all would work up to the requirements of a definite scheme. Why are not the several forces composing our Home Military array fitted together into an effective ma- chine, proximately ready for early action ? Because the statesmen and Military authorities do not believe the possibility of invasion, and do not recognise the wisdom of being prepared. They are like the foolish virgins. They have very good lamps, but they are not lighted. Robinson Crusoe made an admirable boat, but he could not launch it ; and we are in the same position. We have, in a state of partial manufacture, the material of a redoubtable army ; but it is hard and fast, wanting the essential characteristic of an army, means of orderly locomotion.
We make bold to say that the way out of the difficulty lies in the development of Mr. Cardvvell's plan ; lies in the organic formation, within definite limits, of all the forces to be found there ; lies in gradual attraction of the Volunteers within the framework towards and finally to settled habits— we had almost written obligatory observance—of drill at stated times. The obligation, such as it is, presses more strongly on the present than it did on the first muster of Volunteers, because the original enrolments costlittle or nothing ; the existing troops cost a considerable sum. The nation has a right to look for solid results from the expenditure of half a million per annum, five- sevenths of the cost of the Militia, upon the youngest branch of the Auxiliary Forces. We believe they are ready to answer national expectation, and it is for the Military organisers, animated by a lively and adequate sense of public duty, to de- vise the means whereby the greatest effectiveness can be secured. But the most obviously pressing want is that complete organisation which shall allot to every corps in the realm its place, and pat an end to the prevailing laxity and isolation. The true policy of every country, England included, is obliga- tory service ; public opinion will not go that length ; but there is no reason why we should not make the most of the splendid material furnished by pure patriotism. Let the Volunteers take the advice of Major-General Ellice, as a step towards a more regular recognition.
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