WHAT CAN MR. WELLES ACHIEVE?
MR. SUMNER WELLES has arrived in Europe and begun to carry out his mission of exploration. Geography to some extent determines his route. Italy has become the normal gate of entry into Europe for the few Americans who now have occasion to visit this bellicose continent, and Signor Mussolini and Count Ciano are therefore the first European statesmen with whom President Roosevelt's emissary has made contact. That, on the whole, is fortunate. Italy is the only Great Power in Europe which remains a non-belligerent, and Signor Mussolini has made it clear enough that if opportunity arose he would accept with some enthusiasm the role of mediator. He would pretty certainly welcome partnership in that task both with Mr. Roosevelt and with the other great apostle of pacification, the Pope. Mr. Myron Taylor's presentation of his letters of credence to the Holy See on Tuesday has obviously a close association with the contacts Mr. Welles had been making simultaneously with Italy's political chiefs. In both quarters information is being acquired, opinions ascertained and the possibilities of useful action sounded.
Do any such possibilities exist at all ? If not, Mr. Sumner Welles has crossed the Atlantic to no purpose, for it is idle to suppose that the President has sent him here to glean information out of mere academic curiosity. In fact they do exist. They are slender, the prospect of their realisation is remote, but the tendency to declare it futile to hope for anything at all from Mr. Sumner Welles' activities has been overdone. He is not here as mediator. He is not here as " postman " to carry messages between belligerents who have no direct contacts with one another. He is here primarily to discover whether the private aims of Great Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other are as completely irreconcilable as the public declar- ations of their spokesmen indicate. If they are, then there is nothing for Mr. Welles to do but to turn south- wards, exchange regrets with Signor Mussolini and set sail for home. But if under seal of confidence Mr. Welles received impressions which to any sensible degree narrowed the gulf between the belligerents the possibility of the slow construction of some bridge across the chasm would be created.
There is only one capital where that can happen. British Ministers have declared this country's attitude repeatedly, never more clearly or decisively than in the speech the Prime Minister delivered at Birmingham last Saturday. The words he used then reflected both in their resolution and their moderation the mind of a united nation, and it would be out of the question for him to vary them in any essential in his discussions with Mr. Welles. Since nothing emerged from the speech which Herr Hitler made on the same day, except that he was re-adopting God, the Prime Minister's statement of aims forms the only starting-point of discussion. Mr. Welles has certainly read the Birmingham speech and he can expect to hear nothing different, though he may possibly hear something further, when he reaches London. His purpose therefore must be to discover in Berlin how far Herr Hitler would be prepared to go— not at present in public, but for the confidential inform- ation of Mr. Roosevelt—towards satisfying the Birmingham requirements. There is no predicting the Fiihrer's mood. He m.zy be utterly intransigent. If so that ends the Welk mission so far as its primary purpose is concerned. B it that, on the whole, is unlikely. Herr Hitler neither expected nor desired war with France and Britain. Ile would never have invaded Poland if he had believed the consequence would be what it has been. There is little doubt that he would still prefer peace to war on terms that would save his face, and equally little that he would greatly prefer America's friendship, or at any rate the restoration of normal relations with her, to her present undisguised hostility. Whenever peace comes Germany will have shattering economic problems to face and American loans and credits will be essential to her. That fact will form a background of some importance to Mr. Welles' Berlin conversations. The statement he will hear may be by no means identical with the maledictions launched from the Munich beer-hall platform last Saturday.
How might Herr Hitler be expected to counter the various points in the Prime Minister's programme? We are fighting, said Mr. Chamberlain, against German domination of the world. Herr Hitler, must, of course, repudiate the aspiration and declare that all that Germany wants is Lebensraum—in a region where it will not conflict with Britain. On that discussion might be developed, unless Lebensraum is given an interpretation —the permanent domination of Poland and Czecho- Slovakia—which Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Welles would no more tolerate than the Allied Prime Ministers. That is the first decisive criterion. It must be the subject of one of Mr. Sumner Welles' chief questions. And it seems improbable that Herr Hitler will give to it an answer that will end the conversation. He is in a difficult situation, but he can hardly want to bang doors where America is concerned. If Mr. Welles got what could be construed as anything like a satisfactory reply about the two conquered States he would no doubt be content, for it would be no part of his business to raise in Berlin the stipulation on which Mr. Chamberlain laid such necessary emphasis, that there must be " tangible evidence " that any undertakings regarding Poland and Czecho-Slovakia would be carried out. That belongs to a nearer or remoter future.
There is every reason to believe that the Nazi leaders mean to erect a peace façade for Mr. Welles' benefit. That will make his task not easier but more difficult, for he would be going beyond his brief if he cross-examined them to the point of exposing the hollowness of their professions. It would pay him better to pursue various essential questions undetermined for the moment, and dwell on the theme Mr. Chamberlain touched on when he spoke of the readiness of Great Britain to help a Germany that had genuinely changed her ways to overcome the economic difficulties that must inevitably face her. There obviously is a starting-point towards constructive schemes in a sphere in which American co-operation is indispensable and would no doubt under suitable conditions be proffered. If men like Dr. Schacht still carry weight in Berlin—and Herr Hitler cannot dispense with them completely—the importance of that possibility will not escape attention. It may even be that Field-Marshal Goering, with the knowledge he has, as executor of the Four Years Plan, of the economic and industrial outlook in Germany, may be capable of giving the future its proper weight in relation to the present.
However that future may shape itself, the foundation of British policy must be, as the Prime Minister declared, the increasing intimacy of Franco-British relations. So that, in quarters where the Federal Union doctrine finds favour, is added the necessity of associating Germany with her present enemies in some federal bond. The ablest statement of the case for that has been made by Sir William Beveridge in a recent pamphlet. If it does not convince, at least it stimulates discussion and thought on the vital question of the structure of post-war Europe. Too much time can easily be wasted in discussing peace- aims when no one knows in what conditions peace may ultimately be made, but, whatever the conditions, the necessity of devising some plan in which Germany can be an equal without being a menace remains. Mr. Sumner Welles cannot ignore that. He can hardly hope to avert the intensification of the war, but in various ways his visit may affect its course and issue.
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