THE WAR SURVEYED : SHADOW OVER SCANDINAVIA
By STRATEGICUS
0-1E events of the week have cast the shadow of the war over Scandinavia. Finland fights as dauntlessly as ever ; but it seems clear now that Russia has secured the initiative, and the difficulties of defending so long a frontier must increase. Until the new offensive in the isthmus began, at the beginning of February, General Mannerheim bad been able to hold that front comfortably and strike effective blows on other sectors. It seemed to matter little that he was always fighting an enemy much superior numerically. He contrived, by a most skilful use of the ground, and a superb handling of his small mobile force, to exact losses which, relatively and absolutely, are immense. At the beginning of last month, however, the Russians brought up fresh troops and, attacking more skilfully than before, began to break into the forward zone. With charac- teristic contempt for losses, the Russian commanders con- tinued to fling in fresh troops day and night, supporting them with extraordinary artillery concentrations and an unlimited number of tanks. Even the most perfect defen- sive positions promise no more than to delay the assault and economise troops ; and, after fourteen days of this heavy offensive, readjustments had to be made in the Finnish positions.
That process has been carried out at least twice ; and at the moment it is difficult to say how the front lies. Koivisto has been abandoned ; and Vipuri has been evacuated. The front, in fact, has been swung back, pivoting on Lake Ladoga at Taipale, until, from running almost north to south it now runs east to west. The difficulty of the moment is to give any exact value to the change. It may mean much, it may mean very little. What it does seem to mean beyond question is that the Russian pressure is now so heavy and continuous that General Mannerheim will no longer be able to use his small army as if it were ten times the strength. He will be compelled to keep a growing proportion of his troops in the isthmus ; and, when the season is ripe for engaging the whole front, crisis may quickly merge into disaster.
No army in the world can continue to fight against such odds. If the Finns had double the number of divisions and arms of all sorts, with a country so extraordinarily cut up by lakes and forests, they might prolong the struggle for some time. It is unprofitable to speculate how long. But it is at least clear that the reinforcements should have been available a month ago. With a sufficiency of heavy artillery, anti-aircraft guns and aeroplanes, the outpost zone might have been held longer. With an adequate number of volun- teers, the defenders could have been rested and so used to better advantage. In default of such help, dangers which seemed strangely remote a month ago cannot now be dis- missed from the mind. It is the unfortunate fact, however the crank may ignore it, that technical developments, on the whole, assist the attack more than the defence ; and the attacking troops have a moral accretion of strength in the conviction that they control the situation, whereas the defending troops tend to conceive themselves to be in a position of inferiority. And we must not ignore the tendency of advance and retreat to increase in pace. At a most critical moment in the last war Foch begged French to stand firm before Ypres because of the terrible impetus a withdrawal may gather. The suggestion was unnecessary since we had no idea of falling back ; but the warning governs all similar situations.
The Finnish situation has undoubtedly deteriorated. The necessity of adequate and immediate help has been empha- sised repeatedly. There will not be many further oppor- tunities for it to be still in time ; and it is difficult to think that any Government is in doubt of the true position. But if this is the case the war is beginning to involve Scandi- navia. With the fullest sympathy for Sweden and Norway, one cannot but wonder if they have acted with complete wisdom with regard to this small heroic nation that, in effect, is defending their frontiers. While they remain out- side the war, it is true, they are able to send volunteers and supplies to Finland. No one can doubt where their sym- pathies lie ; and we have to recognise, as they are rather bitterly realising today, that they have no military establish- ment for the actual world in which we live. They cannot fail to see the perils by which they are surrounded. If they went to the aid of Finland, they might be attacked by Germany, and though an invasion from the sea is not the simplest of all operations, and they could count on the help of the Allies, they quite naturally wish to keep their countries out of the war.
During the last week they seem at length to be concerting a policy ; and it is high time. The Altmark ' incident suggests that Norway has lost touch with realities. Surely it cannot be maintained that a warship can remain in terri- torial waters as long as it pleases, when it is not allowed to remain in a neutral port longer than twenty-four hours? Some of the Norwegian statements are better forgotten ; but was it not her representative who, in 1927, protested that the right of peaceful passage could not be " applied to war- ships in time of war "? Indeed, it would seem compara- tively easy to quote unimpeachable Norwegian authority against her recent action, and still more against her defence of it. Moreover, the right of reprisal is admitted by inter- national law, and it is under that provision that we are now stopping Germany's exports.
The Altmark ' incident had a touch of colour in it that inevitably went to everyone's heart ; but the completeness of its appeal was due to something quite different, which neutrals would do well to ponder. It must have seemed, until that day, that the neutrals were prepared to allow Germany to go to all limits. This, to a great extent is their own affair. If they choose to submit to every kind of in- fringement of international law, to the destruction of their shipping and the murder of their nationals, it is their own affair—up to a point. The Altmark ' incident showed that there is a limit beyond which the invasion of neutral rights is a deprivation of Allied, of common rights. For some time now there has been a weakness in the blockade owing to the practice of enemy vessels entering Norwegian territorial waters at the northern Finnish frontier and then steaming at their leisure through them into the Baltic. The squadron reported at present to be operating off Petsamo may be looking into that matter, though, in the case of merchantmen, interception before they reach territorial waters appears to be the only way of dealing with the problem. But, pre- sumably, the ' Deutschland ' steamed home that way ; and it would be interesting to know whether Norway thinks this, and the use of her waters by German submarines, covered by international law. The Allies are bound to ask whether such a reading is right or tolerable.
The best way to answer such questions is for the neutrals to deal with the matter themselves. They know, beyond any shadow of doubt, that the Allies stand as certainly for their independence as do Germany and Russia for their sub- jection. But the Allies are bound to ask if an interpretation of territorial waters can be correct if it confers an immunity which international law refuses to a neutral port. There are signs that the Scandinavian nations are beginning to act together as they did in the last war. Their plight is admittedly unenviable ; but no one can help them if they refuse to help themselves. Their desire to keep their people out of the war is not only intelligible and right: it is their bounden duty. But the war is now washing up to their doors. How long will they be safe and free if Finland falls?
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