But though we hold Lord Lan.sdowne's view of the function
of the Peers to be sound in principle, it does not prevent us from holding also that that principle would be perfectly well maintained for all practical purposes if the compromise we have suggested in another column were adopted. That compromise is, shortly, that the Bill should be passed by the Lords provisionally and on the understanding that a Dissolution takes place at the earliest possible moment in order that the electors may be given an opportunity to approve or reject the novel principles of the Budget. If they endorse the Budget, then the Lords of course yield, and no harm will have been done by their action. If, on the other hand, the country rejects the Budget, it will be easy for the new Parliament to annul its objectionable features. The fact that those objectionable features will have been in nominal operation during the Christmas holidays—it will hardly amount to more than that—will have done no injury to the State. Very possibly neither side will agree to the compromise, for when men get to a certain point in a quarrel what they want is a fight and not an agreement. If, however, either side expresses itself as willing to accept the compromise, then, in our opinion, a very grave responsibility will rest upon the side which rejects it. What Lord Lansdowne's view of the matter may be we do not know; but this we can say with the conviction of certainty. There is nothing in either the words or the spirit of his Motion which would in any way prevent his agreeing to the proposal we have made. He would not have to change his position by a hair's-breadth.
Though we earnestly desire a compromise, and should regret extremely to set the country plunged into s bitter Constitutional contror fray, we are bound in the interests of truth to say that a gri at deal of nonsense is being talked about "tragic issues," and about the terrible things which may happen if the fight takes place without any agreement to limit the issues. Even if the present Government were to have a great and unexpected victory, and were to come back practically as strong as when they went to the country, the very• worst that could happen would be that we should be face to face with the fact that the country bad declared that the House of Lords had no right to reject a Money Bill. In these circumstances, of course, the House of Lords, like the rest of us, must bow to the will of the people. The first effect of this decision would be, however, that those who, like ourselves, uphold a Second House possessing the right to see that the people are consulted when great and novel issues' are raised, would feel it.their prime duty to do all in their power to secure the establishmant of a Second and revising Chamber on a democratic basis. Such a House would, of course, have infinitely greater power than the Lords,—would, in fact, take the position of the Senate in America or in Fratice. Such a prospect, we need hardly say, has no terrors for us, and it is really childish of the Government to threaten us with the abolition of the House of Lords if it should be proved that the country does not wish the Peers to exercise the right of seeing that new and doubtful legislative departures are sub- mitted to the popular judgment. We are not in the least afraid of the Liberals wanting to abolish the House of Lords, though we own that we are sometimes afraid of their insisting on keeping the House of Lords in existence for fear that if it is abolished the nation will demand a much stronger and more efficient check on the action of the Lower House.
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