TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE POSSIBILITIES OF COMPROMISE.
THOUGH the lists are set, the knights mounted and accoutred with their lances in rest, waiting only the trumpet's blast, there is still room for a compromise, or perhaps it would be better to call it an agreement, winch will eliminate from the crisis the chief elements of danger to the nation's interests. No doubt it takes two to make a compromise as it does to make a quarrel. Therefore whether the opportunity for an agreement will be taken will depend upon the willingness of both combatants. All that outsiders can do at the eleventh hour—and remember that in a serious quarrel it is at the eleventh hour that compromises are made—is to point out how and where the opportunity exists. We have on previous occasions shown, though we confess that it has been preaching to deaf ears, that if the Government could be pledged to ask at the earliest possible moment for an endorse- ment of their financial policy at a, General Election, the Lords might without any dereliction of duty pass the Budget provisionally, subject to the knowledge that the country would. be at once given the power of rejecting it. This plan was also urged in a letter by Mr. Henry Hobhouse which appears in Monday's Times. Mr. Hobhouse, we may remind our readers, was for many years the Liberal Unionist Member for East Somerset, and the excellent work done by him in Parliament gained him, to the satisfaction of all who knew him, the honour of a seat in the Privy Council, while his devoted public work in Somersetshire has won him the distinction of being chosen Chairman of his County Council. After a very wise and clear summary of the present situation, and after pointing out that no one who values the Constitutional peace of the country can desire to see the two Houses embark on an acute and bitter controversy, Mr. Hobhouse makes the following suggestion. Let the Lords pass the Budget as it stands on the formal undertaking being given by the Government "(1) that the opinion of the electors should be taken early in the new year; and (2) that no steps should be taken to set up the new machinery of land valuation before the General Election. Such an agreement would leave both sides free to act in accordance with the declared will of the people. If the Liberals maintain a majority at the Election they can at once proceed to provide all the necessary machinery for carrying out their financial policy. If, on the other hand, the Unionists are returned to power, they will not find the nation permanently committed to a new financial departure, and they will be able in their next Budget to repeal such of the new taxes as on calm reflection they disapprove of. The gain to the nation in avoiding an acute Constitutional crisis and serious financial chaos would be so great that moderate politicians on both sides might well be grateful to the statesmen who secured such a solution."
"Here is the opportunity ; what will you do with it ? " is the question which we venture to address before it is too late to the moderate men on both sides. Before we give our reasons for believing that the course suggested will not prejudice the true interests of either party to the present controversy, or place their views in an unfavourable position before the electors, we should like to say a word as to the machinery by which the compromise might be arrived at. In the first place, it is to be noted that Lord Lansdowne's Motion is so worded as not to slam (he door in the face of a compromise. It states a fact, and an undoubted fact,—namely, that the people have not had an opportunity of expressing an opinion on the Budget, and that in matters so novel and so important they ought to be given such an opportunity. Why should not Lord Crewe or, the Lord Chancellor, as representing the Government, tell Lord Lansdowne and the Unionist Peers that though the Government cannot for a moment accept any claim put forward on the part of the Lords to control the finance of the country, they are at the same time not only willing but anxious to prove that the electors fully endorse their policy. "If the question of getting an endorsement for the Bill is all that is between us," he might continue, "then we will pledge ourselves if the Bill is passed to advise his Majesty at the very earliest oppor- tumty in January to dissolve Parliament." He might go on to point out that it would, of course, be understood that the Lords by passing the Budget would in no way commit themselves or the Unionist Party to any endorsement of its clauses. The passing would, in truth, be merely a provisional act to tide over the time between now and the elections. No attempt wiz:pia be made by the Government during the seven or eight weeks before the Election to carry out the disputed parts of the Budget—i.e, the laud clauses and the new licenses. .A11, then, that would be required would be for Lord Lansdowne to accept this understanding, and advise the Peers to pass the Budget provisionally and subject to its immediate sub- mission to the people for endorsement. The Budget would, in effect, be referred to the people, which is what the Lords desire. So much for the proposal in the abstract.
Since, we live not in an academic Utopia, but in a world peopled by practical politicians, we must at once Consider whether party men on either side would be likely to accept such a compromise as that sketched above. The first criticism which is sure to be made on the scheme is that Mr. Asquith and the Liberal Government could not possibly be expected to do so. It would, we shall be told, be too unfavourable to them. It would deprive them of too large a share of party capital,—namely, that derivable from accusing the Lords of having usurped financial con- trol for themselves and. of having thrown the country into a condition of financial chaos. The Government could not part on the eve of a General Election with two such excellent political and platform assets. We admit the force of the argument up to a certain point, but in spite of that, we do not think it by any means final.
If the Liberals were as absolutely confident as they pretend to be that they would win at the General Election, no doubt they would reject with scorn the proposal we are making. As a matter of fact, however, a very large number of the best-informed Liberals are by no means sure at heart that they are going to win, or, at any rate, to win with a large majority. But if they are to come back with a small majority, even though it may be a majority sufficient to keep them in power, they will be in a most dis- agreeable position. The Budget will remain to be passed. It will be the first charge on their energies. But if it was a difficult job to get the Budget through when the Government had a majority of 240 or more, what would it be if their majority were brought down to sixty—which is by no means impossible—and this figure were only attainable through the co-operation of the Nationalists ? Conditions such as these would make it absolutely impossible to pass either the land clauses or the license clauses through the House of Commons. The Nationalists, holding the trump card, would never agree to tha licensing clauses, and in all probability would refuse then sanction to the increased Whisky and Tobacco Duties. But even if the Nationalist opposition could be bought off in 801119 way or other, the present Budget would still not go through the Commons. The voice of the moderates was not very loudly heard last summer for the simple reason that the majority was too large for them to be able to effect anything by threats of revolt. The situation would be entirely changed in the case of a majority of fifty or sixty. In that event the moderates could, and we are sure would, insist on their views as to the land clauses being considered. In fact, the notion that a Budget so contentious as the present one could be rushed through the House by a couple of Resolutions is utterly chimerical, unless, of course, which no instructed student of politics believes possible, the Liberals were to come back to power with an undimim imbed majority. To put the matter still more plainly, the Temperance Party and the Land-tax Party, and also what we may term the official section of the Liberals, would feel immensely relieved at the thought that their return to power with a diminished majority would not be rendered nugatory by the appalling difficulty of deciding what to do with the Finance Bill. With the Finance Bill out of the way, they might get on well enough. With the Finance Bill cumbering the ground, the prospect of power with a small majority becomes a positive night- mare. No doubt with the more extreme men—the followers of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill, the men who believe, or pretend to believe, that they are going to sweep the countay—these considerations will have little weight. To the ordinary Liberal and the majority of the Cabinet we believe they will appeal with no little force.
We must now consider how the matter would strike Lord Lansdowne and his followers. Here it will no doubt be suggested that the measure of satisfaction felt by the Liberals with the proposal we are advocating must be the measure of the Unionists' dissent. By proving that it would suit the Liberals have we not proved that it must be condemned by the Opposition? If the Opposition is to be regarded as moved by purely partisan motives, we admit that there is something in this contention. We are sure, however, that Lord Lansdowne and the majority of the Peers, whatever their opponents may say, do not look at the matter in this light. They feel as patriotic men that they cannot take the responsibilityof assenting unconditionally to legisla- tion so bad and so dangerous as that contained in a large part of the Finance Bill. They must make sure that the final decision is referred to the people. If they could secure that reference by an immediate Dissolution, they would, we believe, be content. We would go further and. say that even the keener party men should be content, and need not feel that they had in any sense given themselves away to their opponents. No far-seeing party man on the Unionist side can help feeling considerable alarm at the prospect of the Unionists obtaining possession of office with only a small working majority, if their very first act must be to raise sixteen millions of money owing to the fact that there is no Budget in existence. Picture Mr. Balfour as Premier with a majority of, say, thirty over the Nationalists and Liberals combined,—and. that, in our opinion, is by no means an impossible result. In such an event, who can doubt that he would be infinitely stronger if the money had been provided for carrying on the work of government, and all that he had to do was to pass a short Act repealing the land clauses and alterinc, the License-duties in degree ? That would be a possible task. The making of a new Budget at a moment's notice would be a work at once difficult and odious. With a Budget "in being" the Unionists would be relieved of what must always be a most unpopular duty.
In the case we are supposing the Unionists could fairly meet the complaints of aggrieved taxpayers by pointing out that their opponents, not they, were responsible, and that they had inherited, not made, the Budget. If, how- ever, they had suddenly to improvise a Budget—which must, for consistency's sake, if they were solely responsible for it, be on different lines from the present Budget—it would be they who would incur the odium of the new taxes. We are assuming, we may say in parenthesis, that it would be quite impossible for the Government to intro- duee their tariff at six weeks' notice. A tariff, as we know from American experience, takes a great deal of time and trouble to construct, and in our case the difficulty and complexity of the problem would be enormously enhanced by having to consult the Colonies. A Tariff Reform Government could not possibly produce their full scheme for another year. Till then they must have a makeshift Budget on the old lines. That being the case, it would be very much in their interests to find the ground covered subject to the amendments we have named. In a word, it is of the greatest importance to the Tariff Reformers to find a scheme of taxation "in being" for which they are not responsible to fill up the interval between their accession to power and the preparation of their tariff proposals. "Are we really then to suppose that the proposal of the Spectator would suit everybody and be objected to by no one ? " That will be the ironic question which is sure to be put to us. Let us say at once that we do not suggest for a moment that the scheme is a panacea, or that it will suit all palates. In such matters it is best to be perfectly frank, and place all the cards on the table. It is obvious that the brewers would not like to run the risk of the agree- ment we have suggested, and we must, we fear, expect them to use every endeavour to prevent a compromise being reached. They are, of course, quite aware that in order to get the License-duties knocked on the head, all they require is to reduce the present Government majority sufficiently to make the Government depend on the Irish vote. That accomplished, they would regard themselves as safe. They would not need to place the Unionists in power. Granted, then, that the Budget is rejected, they stand to win in any of the following cases : (1) a considerable Unionist majority, (2) a small Unionist majority, (3) a tie, (4) a small Liberal majority. Their only risk lies in a great Liberal majority, and this they hold to be out of the question. It will be seen, therefore, that there is a real, if concealed, divergence of interest between the brewers and the Unionist Party. We venture to say, for the reasons we have given, that it would be bad. policy for the Unionists and Tariff Reformers to let their action be controlled by "the trade." To put- the matter with brutal frankness, "the trade," whatever they may say, will be obliged to support the Unionists at the polls, even though they might grumble at the fact that the Lords had. passed the Budget provisionally, and subject to an endorsement by the people, rather than rejected it absolutely. The brewers cannot possibly do busmess with the other political party. Besides, the Unionists would no doubt say, and say truth- fully, that if they won they would revise the License-duties as unjust to" the trade." It is to be hoped, then, that the Lords, when they consider the point whether they should reject the Budget altogether, or pass it subject to an arrangement under which they secure for the electors the fullest exercise of their right of rejection, will not allow themselves to be influenced directly or indirectly by the consideration of what is or is not supposed to be best for "the trade." As a matter of fact, and if the Lords take into consideration, as they ought to do, the tendency of moderate public opinion, the fact that the brewers are dissatisfied with their action will tell with considerable weight in their favour in the country. The House of Lords is never stronger than when it is taking an independent line, a line not approved of by the Tapers and Tadpoles of the Unionist Party.
To sum up, if Lord Lansdowne were to let it be known that should Lord Crewe make such a speech as we have sug- gested above, he would answer by withdrawing his Motion and advising the Lords to pass the Finance Bill, the Government would be obliged, even in spite of the annoy- ance of their hotheads, to agree to the compromise. Thus an Election would be secured directly on the merits of the Finance Bill, and free from the disturbing elements of the allegation of financial chaos and of attempts to prejudice the issue by declarations—grossly unfair, no doubt, but not therefore, we are sorry to say, impotent—that the House of Lords is claiming to override the will of the people. Lord Lansdowne has it in his power to induce the Liberal Cabinet to accept the compromise we have described, even if, which we think unlikely, the majority of the Cabinet would prefer to fight over a wrecked Finance Bill.
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