It is probable that the Government will have great difficulty
witliGeneral Gordon. He has done two things—the keeping of Khartoum and the formation of an army—which probably no one but himself could have accomplished ; but he has obvi- ously no idea of taking anybody's orders but his own, or of adhering to British policy in any way. He again asks for Zebehr Pasha, with the intention, it is stated, of making him Viceroy of the Soudan on £8,000 a year—precisely the plan most opposed to British ideas—and he is prepared, rather than not lave his own way, to surrender the Soudan to the Turks, that is, to the evil Pashas whom he has been fighting throughout his life in Africa. They would, of course, be a shade worse than the Egyptian officials. It is impossible to trust or work with a man so erratic and self-willed, yet if he insists on remaining in Khartoum, and "carrying out his mission," what is to be done with him ? Any other Government would give him written orders, and arrest him if he did not obey ; but he has been accustomed to be treated as a separate man, responsible only to God, and to his own, often marvellous, fancies. Indeed, he
probably received something like a pledge that he should be SO treated, one consequence of which is that Berber will be in ashes just when General Wolseley wants it for a depot.
