TOPICS OF . THE DAY.
THE GOVERNMENT'S CHANGE OF FRONT. THE Government are going backwards with steady and well-marked steps. Compare the policy of Lord Salis- bury at the Conference, and even the speech of Lord Salis- bury after the Conference,—at the opening of Parliament (and here already there was discernible something like reces- sion),—with the official speeches of Friday week and of last Monday night, and you will find yourself in a totally differ- ent moral atmosphere. After his rash speeches at Aylesbury and Guildhall, Lord Beaconsfield had to retreat " in order to leap the better ;" but as far as we can judge, if matters go on for another month or two as they have gone on for the last month or two, he will soon be able to make that better leap of his, and by a fortunate spring at a well-chosen moment will be able to fasten himself and his pro-Turkish policy, like Sindbad's Old Man of the Sea, on the back of the wretched British elector,—a burden not easily to be shaken off again. Seriously speaking, no one who cares to see the policy of Great Britain in the East freed from the reproach to which it has been so long fairly open, can compare carefully and intelligently the speeches made at the opening of the Session by the Leader of the Lower House and the Indian Secretary and the Foreign Secretary, with the speeches made within the last eight days, without serious alarm for the issue. Of course, there is no immediate danger of England's being dragged into the conflict as an ally of Turkey. Probably, if we were to canvass the present Cabinet, there is not one of them who would admit that he wished to see such a result, and hardly more than one who would wish it in spite of re- fusing to admit that he wished it. Lord Derby's language on Thursday night was on this point satisfactory enough. But the actions of a Government unfortunately are not determined by their abstract wishes half as much as by the " logic of events." If they allow themselves to exhibit openly anti- Russian feeling in greater and greater degree, even before the war breaks out,—if they take less and less account of that great and noble outbreak of British conscience and principle which occurred in the autumn, by which they were at first so much impressed,—if they lay more and more emphasis on English "interests," as distinguished from English duties, and revel in the unworthy stentorian cheers which their big- mouthed flourishes of rhetoric elicit from the dense Tory benches behind them,—then, as the war goes on, it is but too likely that there will come a day when the Oriental statesman who threatened Russia in November, will see his chance of irretrievably committing the country to his own policy, and before the nation can well judge of what it is about, we shall find ourselves involved in a policy of mischievous intention, evil tendency, and pernicious example, destined to stain our national reputation for ages, and to render us responsible for the perpetuation of an ini- quitous Government and for the misery of the millions of its victims. Now the Government have, in the last week, given all the three indications we have mentioned of rapid drifting in the wrong direction. They have held up Russia to blame for the very attitude which a few months ago they admitted to be the principal leverage on which they had relied for bringing-about a better condition of things in Turkey. They have depreciated and minimised the meaning of that out- burst of British conviction which a few months ago led them to change their policy as decidedly and as rapidly as the man at. the helm puts down the wheel when he sees his ship running full on a rock. And they have reverted to that magniloquent and somewhat braggadocio tone concerning British " in- terests " which is a kind of threat in itself, and too often the prelude to menaces which can be met only by defiance, and thence lead by short and easy stages into war.
Let us illustrate each of these symptoms of definite retro- gression from three Ministerial speeches of the last eight days. First, as to the reproaches against Russia. We are strictly correct in saying that, at the opening of the Session, , no one of the Ministers appeared to repudiate more warmly the charge of an anti-Russian feeling, or to ap- proach nearer to the language of one inclined to use positive coercion against Turkey, if the attempt at moral coercion should fail, than Sir Stafford Northcote. We are quite aware that he repeated dutifully the formula of the hour, But his speech at the opening of Parliament gave everybody the impression that he, if any one, was heartily with Lord Salisbury throughout his policy at Constantinople ; and that if all the efforts of United Europe were to fail in persuading Turkey, it would then be necessary to take stronger mea- sures. Now what did Lord Salisbury say immediately on his return to England ? He avowed in the strongest way that the only motive-power with which he had been working at the Conference was the fear inspired by the preparations of Russia. He was not himself favourable to any English policy of coercion, and he had never been sanguine as to his success at Constantinople from the first day of his mission, but the one motive on which• it was possible to work in procuring concessions was the fear of Russia, and the hope of gaining for Turkey at least a great moral protection against Russia, if she could but be persuaded to accede to the terms pressed upon her by all Europe. Such was Lord Salisbury's language on the opening of Parliament in February. And any one who heard Sir Stafford Northcote• on that same night would have inferred at once that he had heartily concurred in the lines of Lord Salisbury's thought, and that he went at least as far as Lord Salisbury in regarding the Russian policy as one not unreasonable in itself, and at all events lending us something to work upon, without venturing on our own account into the dangerous policy of menace and dictation. But what did Sir Stafford Northcote say yesterday week ? Why, he declared that it was the attitude of Russia, the mobilisation of her army, and the march of that army towards the frontier, which rendered all the efforts of the Conference idle, and made it excusable for Turkey to- reject what Europe demanded. No words could have been more explicit, and none, we venture to say, could have been more like a direct attack on the language held by Lord Salis- bury on the opening of Parliament. The following were the words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on Friday week. After inveighing against physical coercion, Sir Stafford North- cote went on :—" There is, no doubt, another kind of coercion, which, when it is successful, is much more effective. There- is the line of moral coercion, which, if pursued under favour- able circumstances, may lead to a happy result. I say when• it is pursued under favourable circumstances, but if there are any unfavourable circumstances to moral pressure, it is when military coercion is threatened at the same time, and when moral pressure is thus neutralised by the spirit of opposition in a proud nation,—and I may say a gallant nation,—when. they are called upon to yield not merely to arguments ad- dressed to their common-sense, but to threats of military force. . The Conference might have been far more successful than it actually was, if it had not been that the presence of the a Russian army, and the attitude which the Russian army maintained during the negotiations, complicated the posi- tion, and made it the more difficult for Turkey to give way." And again he returned to the same point. He remarked that, after the Conference had failed, Russia had inquired what was next to be done ; well, says Sir Stafford Northcote, "that question was asked, and it was obvious at once that there was considerable difficulty in answering it as long as the attitude of Russia was maintained. It was evident that the position of the Russian army, which was a cause of difficulty during the Conference, would continue to be a cause of difficulty." We do not know what Sir Stafford Northcote means by moral coercion. It usually means the overpowering motive due to love of approbation and fear of shame, motives which are, no doubt, often coercive on those who have been brought up in the midst of the society which awards the approbation and inflicts the shame. But as the Turks have not been brought up under the shadow of European sentiments,—as throughout these negotiations even their own Government has never once given the least indication of either coveting European appro- bation or fearing the shame of European disgust,—as time after time they have displayed almost cynically precisely the opposite state of mind,—we think any statesman who counted on " moral coercion " of this kind for its reforming efficacy on Turkey, was living in one of the most inexcusable fools' paradises which the imagination of man ever invented. But that is not the point we insist on. We cited these remarkable passages in Sir Staf- ford Northcote's speech to show that he reproaches Rus- sia now for causing the failure of the Conference, though Lord Salisbury on the first night of the Session said frankly that any chance of success there was, was due solely to the chance of working on the one effective motive-power there was,—fear of Russia. The one chance for success insisied upon in Lord Salisbury's speech of two months ago, was the
one cause of failure in Sir Stafford Northcote's speech of Friday week.
But that is not all. We all remember how much impressed Lord Derby was by the outbreak of feeling in England in August and September,—how he telegraphed to Sir Henry Elliot that it had changed the whole situation, and might involve us in the " humiliating " position of being bound by contract to go to war for Turkey, and yet unable to do so, on account of the loathing felt in England for Turkey's crimes ; how he threatened to recall Sir Henry Elliot, if Turkey would not make a truce at once ; how imperiously he demanded " reparation for the past and security for the future,"—which reparation and which security he has never to this day obtained. Well, what is Lord Derby's language now, as to that autumn agitation ? He called it on Monday an agitation " got up," and then went on to say, in his usual cold fashion, "I cannot but think that it did considerable mischief, because it gave a false impression abroad as to the feelings and opinions of the English people." That is the plain language of regret, and of regret not only for the agitation which had occurred, but for the effect it had produced in persuading the nations of the Continent that England would not act as they had previously supposed that she would act, --in other words, we suppose, that she would not support Turkey and would not resist Russia. There we. have a most distinct and remarkable retrogression in the expres- sion of Lord Derby's feeling as to the public sentiment of England.
Lastly, note the ostentatious language of the Secretary for War, yesterday week, on the subject of English interests,— language so emphatic that it attracted the attention of almost every speaker who followed him, and had to be to a certain extent toned down by Sir Stafford Northcote's explanations. Mr. Gathorne Hardy made the most utterly and narrowly John-Bullish speech which the Eastern Question has yet elicited from any quarter. If it meant anything, it meant,—In case of war, every nation will scramble for its own interests ; indeed, will be perfectly right to do so, and the devil take the hind- most. But we will not summarise what Mr. Hardy said, but quote his sentences on this subject, that our readers may judge for themselves :—" My own opinion is that Russia, in all these transactions, is setting up her own interests, Germany is setting up hers, Italy is setting up hers, Austria is setting up hers, France is setting up hers, and England would be very much behind in the race if she did not set up hers." But there was no danger,—she would and ought to do so. " There never was a nation which did not consult its own interest, and never will be, until we arrive at a time when there shall be universal peace and men shall never have a quarrel, personal, political, or social." Mr. Hardy did not mince his words. And if the time comes when, in his opinion, English interests are menaced by Russia, we think his speech answers for him that he will feel no scruple at all about embroiling us in a quarrel which is but too likely to lead to war.
We think we have shown, then, that the Government has retrograded visibly and notably on all these three points; that it now openly reproaches Russia for the failure of the Conference, which two or three months ago Lord Salisbury said depended for its sole chance of success on the Russian attitude ; that it has got to the point of avowedly regretting and depreciating the English agitation of the autumn, and evidently wishes itself well rid of the consequences of that agitation ; and that it has begun to flourish about English " interests," as distinguished from all larger considerations, as if those interests were the main key to our future policy. These things are ominous. They mark the drift of events. They point to contingencies which, unless popular opinion declares itself again and still more emphatically, are but too likely one day to embark us in a disgraceful alliance and an iniquitous war.
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