GOVERNMENT

The alternative to Croslandia

W. A. WEST

Professor West is at the Faculty of Urban and Regional Studies at Reading University.

To say that the reform of local government is basically a question of the allocation of functions is to state the obvious. Nevertheless, it is a statement that is worth making because one has the feeling that many of the solutions which have been pro- posed have been too much concerned with structure and too little with function. No one would suggest that the Report of the Royal Commission or the more recent White Paper has ignored the functional aspect of local government, but it is still possible to think that the structural aspect may have had a mesmeric effect.

Because of this predilection we have heard a lot about the evils of fragmentation and the benefits of rationalisation and co-ordination. But (apart from central government's manifest preference for dealing with a few major authorities rather than a large number of small ones) the dispersal of jurisdiction amongst local bodies should vary according to each particular function; an area which is appropriate for one service is not necessarily appropriate for another. Greater size alone rarely results in greater economy and efficiency in all directions, and efficiency is not likely to be affected by leaving some services with a large number of small local authorities; but democracy may be better served that way.

In the past there has never been any particular logic in the division of powers between Whitehall and the local authorities. It has been partly the result of historical ac- cident and partly a response to political pressure. For example, in the last twenty years such services as electricity, hospitals, valuation for rating and some parts of higher education have been moved from local authorities to central agencies of one kind or another. If one were starting -with a clean sheet of paper, it is at least arguable that such services as employment exchanges would be considered appropriate for a local . government agency rather than for a central government department. On the other hand, a case can be made for allocating housing (in this country historically regarded as essen- tially a municipal function) to a national agency—as in many countries abroad.

The local authorities in their evidence to the Royal Commission expressed a desire to reduce the central government's control over their activities, but although the mere existence of the control is probably irksome it must be recognised that many of the con- trols are virtually obsolete. The power to supersede a defaulting local authority has been used once only (for civil defence, in Coventry); there have been no cases of grants having been withdrawn. The govern- ment have had to invoke legislative in- tervention in order to impose the com- prehensive school system on the local educa- tion authorities.

The main method of control used by the central government—certainly in the field of housing—has been by the exercise of its loan sanction powers. As this is really an instrument of national economic policy, it is difficult to see how any government could agree to give this up in tow. Nevertheless, control has often been over-zealously ex- ercised and there are a large number of more or less detailed controls which could have been jettisoned long ago. On a smaller scale than loan control, but nevertheless just as ir- ritating and frustrating to local authorities, is the 'ministerial confirmation' requirement for compulsory purchase, slum clearance and other schemes. The White Paper has nothing to say about this: it would be in- teresting to know whether it is proposed to give the new authorities a completely free hand here—and if so whether they would have a free hand in relation to the com- pensation payable, the most controversial and contentious aspect of such schemes. But this, of course, is at the edge of another area of silence in the White Paper—the financial structure of the reformed local government system (although we are promised a Green Paper on local government finance in general).

Another significant area of silence ex- ists—about the extent of local authorities' powers. Many of the duties imposed on local authorities were created to meet particular problems at particular points in time. Sometimes such statutory controls prove to be ineffective, sometimes they become obsolete. No permanent machinery exists whereby a constant assessment can be made of the continued validity of administrative controls. A body on the lines of the Law Commission (or perhaps a specially strengthened part of the Law Commission) would have a valuable function here.

There is yet another lacuna in the Report of the Royal Commission, and it is one which has been only partially filled by pro- visions in the White Paper. This relates to safeguards against oppressive action by public authorities. The White Paper's om- budsman proposal is a big advance on the Royal Commission's total silence; nevertheless it is still inadequate. The White Paper proposes to provide a watchdog but to lock him up and give the key to the poacher; and—if I may strain the analogy further—it gives him no teeth. Access to the om- budsman should be a direct right of the

citizen; and what is needed is an adequate judicial remedy (by way of damages and in- junctions), which can be provided only by a proper system of administrative law.

There is an even more ominous gap in the White Paper. It contains nothing at all to allay the misgivings which many of us have about the dangers to our rural areas inherent in the proposed reforms. It is only by having powerful and active preservation safeguards built into the new structure that any security can be achieved in conserving the coun- tryside. This protection is provided more or less fortuitously by the existing structure. The Government offers nothing in its place.

The Report of the Royal Commission con- tains much of value; the existing local government structure with its deep roots in history retains much of its validity; the city- regional concept meets many of the needs of today and of tomorrow. Is there an amalgam of these—irrespective of whether it looks tidy on paper—which would provide an effective, logical and convincing solution to the problems of local government? In my view, there is.

Starting with the local authorities— borough and district councils—more or less as they exist today, direct responsibility can be allocated (together with a rate-levy- ing power) for such services as libraries, community centres, halls, open spaces, hous- ing improvements, refuse collection, local sewers and drains, registration, licensing.

Then, City Regional Authorities should be established. These need not be of uniform size but would have a minimum population (perhaps a quarter of a million). The whole country would not be covered by City Regional Authorities, as this would lead to an entirely unnecessary artificiality in many areas. The City Regional Authorities would be made up from persons appointed from the constituent local authorities immediately following the local elections; but the persons appointed would not in any way represent their appointing bodies, they would have completely independent power for their full term of office, which would be the same as that of the local authority councillors. This proposal is intended to recognise the ex- istence of the political party system (a sub- ject which constitutes another area of silence in the Royal Commission Report and the White Paper). The City Region would be responsible for main sewerage, refuse disposal, the larger parks, clean air, fire service, passenger transport, perhaps educa- tion up to but not including higher educa- tion, and social and health services.

Finally, at the top of the scale should be the Provincial Councils. These should consist of representatives elected at the same time, in the same way, and for the same period, as Members of Parliament. The ordinary elec- tor would merely have to put two crosses where he now puts one. Their size would be on the lines recommended by Redcliffe- Maud and they should be financed by a block allocation from the national ex- chequer. They would also be responsible for channelling grants to the city regions.

These Councils would be responsible for planning and transportation and employ- ment exchanges. So far as the land in each province which does not come within a city region is concerned, there would be a good

case for putting it under the Provincial Councils' direct control (by means of a

system of regional offices). A direct interest and experience would be provided of the intermediate services and the maintenance of rural areas.

The Provincial Council could also be the appropriate area for the ombudsman and for the administrative courts, although both of these institutions should operate on a na- tional basis. The Provincial Council should be the confirming authority for orders and schemes within their areas; but the central government would have to exercise the ultimate control on matters affecting national policies.

Water supply and National Parks are special cases and would probably need ad hoc authorities. The police service and higher education could be transferred to cen- tral government control. Housing provides particular difficulties and a case can be made for allocating it to each of the different authorities (including the central govern- ment). On balance, the Provincial Council may well be the most appropriate body to take over the housing function under the structure which I have proposed. But this, and also education, are services which can only be looked at in the context of possible changes in national economic policies.

These proposals do not provide an answer to all the problems; for example, the extent of central government control is a particular facet of enormous difficulty. In allocating functions between the various authorities (including the central government), it must be remembered that finance is a crucial issue—and that certain fundamental decisions can completely change the balance, and therefore the nature, of the structure. Education and housing are two highly ex- pensive services (in education the emphasis is on running costs and, in housing, on capital costs). A decision to transfer these services to the central government or to ad hoc bodies completely supported from the national budget would virtually leave local author- ities in a position to become financially inde- pendent of the central government.