LORD CROMER.
OURpeople have never done a better or more success- ful piece of work than they have done, and are doing, in Egypt. When one remembers the state of Egypt in 1883, and compares it with what Egypt is now, it seems almost incredible that such results can have been achieved in a dozen years. We have done as great things in India, and have done them with magical com- pleteness and success—take, for example, the conquest and pacification of the Punjab—but these successes have been achieved by men with a free band and untrammelkd by worry and opposition, divided counsels, and pecuniary difficulties. It is one thing to make a country flourish when you have absolute power, a settled policy, and the use of a full purse ; quite another to set things to rights when you are not master in your own house, when you feel that at any moment your work may be interrupted and overthrown, and when you have to forego a hundred pro- jects of improvement because there is "a man in posses- sion" at your fireside who will not allow you to spend money even for the benefit of the State. It is absurd to say that we have done so well in Egypt because Egypt is an easy place to govern. Under existing conditions, Egypt is the most difficult place to govern in the world. Let those who talk about the easiness reflect for a moment on the situation. To begin with, "the brokers are in," though the State is perfectly solvent, and these brokers—the Caisse de la Dette—sit on the money-box, and as a rule will not allow the large reserve to be spent on productive works. Next, under various capitu- lations and treaties the Powers have what amounts to a right of veto upon a large section of the administration. At every turn the Egyptian Government, when it seeks re- form, is brought face to face with the necessity for obtaining the sanction of the Powers to this or that improvement. For example, the usury laws cannot be effectively amended because the chief usurers are Europeans, and Euro- peans are tried by the mixed Tribunals, and the mixed Tribunals are the Powers, and will not agree to give up any of their functions. Whenever the unanimous consent of the Powers is required the veto is absolute, however great the projected improvement, for France has a fixed rule to ray " No" to all proposals. The third obstacle to a successful government of Egypt is the hostility of the Khedive. He hates our rule, and as far as possible does everything to impede and circumvent our work. In this he is followed, as far as they dare, by the bulk of the Pashas and the official classes who want to rule—or shall we say bleed—Egypt in their own way. Next, the Sultan has certain claims and rights in Egypt as its nominal Suzerain, and exercises these rights as far as he can to hinder and damage our work. Lastly, there exists a certain amount of fanatical Mahommeditu feeling which is indirectly encouraged by the Sultan to thwart our efforts. To summarise, we have against us these facts :—
(1) Our inability to control the finances.
(2) The right of the Powers to interfere in many important matters.
(3) The hostility of the Khedive and the Pashas. (1) The hostility of the Sultan.
(5) The jealousy and dislike of the fanatical portion of the Mahommedan population.
Yet in spite of all these adverse factors we have triumphantly vindicated our moral right to stay in Egypt by converting a bankrupt State into a country of overflowing surpluses, and by changing a disordered, cor- rupt, and retrograde Administration into an Administration which is sounder, more efficient, and more progressive than that existing in any Oriental country controlled by a European Power,—India alone excepted. Again, we have vindicated our moral right to continue the occupation by raising the condition of the mass of the people from one of virtual slavery and degradation into one of freedom and prosperity. We found the peasantry of Egypt overtaxed, ground down by maladministration, and vir- tually without the protection of law in the affairs of private life. At the present moment injustice and oppression, both as regards taxation and the course of justice, have ceased to exist. The fellaheen can now get justice both against the official and the rich man. Last, but not least, we have so much improved the public works that Egypt now enjoys the blessings that nature has placed at her disposal. Fifteen years ago the hydraulic engineer who visited Egypt had to regret the waste and incompetence that deprived her of half her natural wealth. Now, though he may point out that still more might be done by great schemes such as the Assouan Reservoir, he has to admit that all the facilities close at hand are fully employed. There is no waste of natural resources that care and forethought can prevent. What has been the secret of this success ? To what cause are we to attribute the fact that, in spite of obstacles so many and so great, we have conferred such lasting benefits upon Egypt? We believe that the answer is this. First, the honour is due to the characteristics of our race. We have a natural gift for governing dark subject peoples well. Next, we have placed a really great man in Egypt and have trusted him implicitly. Lord Cromer is not a man who likes laudation, and one shrinks from encumbering him with congratulations. It is, however, in this case a clear public duty to point out that our success is directly due to him. The resurrection of Egypt from its grave of disorder and corruption is due to him and the wise, patient, persistent, and statesmanlike methods he has employed. No one but a man of great character as well as great intellect could have accomplished what he has accomplished. Fortunately for us and for Egypt Lord Cromer possesses the best characteristics of our race. He is the ideal governing Englishman personified. Without a trace either of humbug or arrogance he has the instinct of rule and dominion. He has nothing of the "prancing pro-Consul" in his composition, but he knows that firm- ness, courage, perfect loyalty alike to subordinates and superiors, and the absence of any dread of responsibility, are the things needful in the ruler of men. These are great qualities, and necessary qualities for a man in Lord Cromer's position, but considering the difficulties of the situation they alone would not have brought him success. That has come because he has been able to realise his task in its true proportions, and to lay down one or two simple and in- telligible principles for his own guidance. In the first place, he has always kept his eye steadily upon the main object, —the amelioration of Egypt. Instead of worrying like a pedant and a philosopher about the base of power, and declaring it to be impossible to do this or that until certain essential preliminaries were settled, such as the continua- tion of the occupation, he got to work at once, and used the tools he found at hand. These, however, are general principles of conduct. His success is, in particular, due to his seeing that the only efficient way to rule Egypt was to have an Englishman at hand to say the final word in every department of State. He has never wanted to flood Egypt with English administrators after the manner of France in Tunis. Tunis has only a million and a half of people, but there are eight thousand French civil function- aries besides a large number of military officers. Lord Cromer has always preferred that the English heads should use Egyptian hands. The native Cabinet and the native Bureaucracy have gone on untouched, except to be improved and strengthened, but in the shadow behind every magnifi- cent Ministerial faAteuil stands the Englishman who con- trols and directs :—" Advise the wise it call." This means that our work has been done by a minute staff. ExcPpt in the Irrigation Department, where high technical skill and the inability to take bribes make it absolutely necessary to have Englishmen, there are no visible English officials. But one advantage of a minute staff is that all your men can be picked men. And in Egypt, whether soldiers or civilians, all the controlling men are picked men,—men who can be trusted not only to hold on like bull-dogs, but who are also certain to win when brain- power, whether in the Turk, the Armenian, or the Copt, is matched against brain-power, tact and adroitness against tact and adroitness. We do not know whether Lord Cromer ever expressed the thought in words, but if he had said, "I will have no regiment of poorly paid second-rate Englishmen under me here, but only a few men of the ablest kind in well-paid responsible posts," he would have exactly expressed the principle upon which he has acted. Another reason for Lord Cromer's success is to be found in the fact that he has always used young men. Egypt is the triumph of young men. Except Sir John Scott—it is right that justice should be in the hands of the ex- perienced—hardly any of the men who have made and rule Egypt, either as soldiers or civilians, are over forty. That the marvellous efficiency and vigour shown in the Egyptian Administration is partly due to this fact we cannot doubt. In England men too often do not get into high positions till the power of taking responsibility has been crushed out of them by thirty years of blindly carrying out orders which they have not originated. In Egypt men are giving orders when they are still not afraid of taking responsibility and dare run risks. It is most remarkable to see the results produced by men who are not always "playing for safety." This argument for using young men is not really in con- tradiction to what we have said as to Lord Cromer. The really great men show their greatness in nothing so much as in remaining young in mind and character. Lord Cromer is no exception. Though in middle life, he directs his young men as if he were one of them.
We have no space left to deal in detail with Lord Cromer's Report. Suffice it to say that it is a record of progress and success which is almost bewildering in its completeness. One looks in vain for the weak spot,—the place of failure and discomfiture. That its importance will not be lost upon the public mind is our earnest hope. It would be 9. thousand pities if the advance into the Soudan should distract the mind of our people, and prevent them from considering the Report and its lessons. The side-issue must not obscure the main issue. The main issue is the issue of evacuation. Those who read the Report should not shrink from asking themselves this question, "What are we to say if and when we are asked to evacuate Egypt?" The Report helps them to the facts in the light of which the reply must be given. Tacitly and unconsciously, but none the less strongly, it tells them, "You must throw away all this good work, blot out this noble record of success, if you evacuate Egypt. Possibly it may be your duty or your interest to evacuate, but remember that if you do, the blessings you have brought on Egypt will perish with you." That, if we evacuate, corruption, disorder, anarchy, misery, must, as the consequences of evacuation, fall on Egypt, perhaps gradually, more likely in a storm, is a matter beyond argument. It is as certain as that the sun will rise. But it may be said, "That is a pity no doubt, but not so great a pity as injuring the interests of England by continuing the occupation." In truth there is no such conflict of interests. The risks and dangers would not be diminished by evacuation. Evacuation would mean anarchy. But the interests of Europe will not allow per- manent anarchy in Egypt. Therefore anarchy will mean a new occupation by some one of the Powers. A joint occupation is a dream ; for no sane statesman would try to revive the condominium. Now we cannot let France occupy Egypt. We must, then, reoccupy it ourselves. But such reoccupation would mean war with France. France will not fight to make us evacuate. She would fight to prevent reoccupation. Here, then, is the account. By evacuation we escape for a year or two the enmity of France. That is the gain. The loss is the destruction of our work in Egypt, and the almost certainty of reoccupa- tion and a war with France. How is it possible to found an argument for evacuation on such grounds as these ?
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