THE PROGRESS OF M. POINCARg.
POINCARE may say that he is as fixed as the 13-1-• earth was once supposed to be. Eppur si muove —nevertheless he moves. If events henceforth are wisely managed at the British end, if America plays the part which we believe she wants to play, and if Germany does not do something mad, there may be within the next few weeks a solution that will satisfy British prin- ciples and scruples without leaving the French either offended or humiliated. The " ifs " are certainly formidable, but we are more hopeful than at any time since the Ruhr was occupied.
The new amenability of M. Poincare is based chiefly on alarm. Parliamentary elections are on the horizon —not- further away, in- fact, than -next May—and no doubt he remembers from time to time with a qualm that the French .electorate is expecting the goods to be delivered. But what goods has M. Poincare so far got to deliver ? In- domestic policy he has almost nothing and has scarcely tried to have anything ; it is upon his foreign policy that he has banked. 'And his foreign policy is summed up in the occupation of the Ruhr and the subjection of- Germany. Yet now that the French " victory " has been won, now that Germany has given in and -passive resistance has ceased, reparathins are not merely no nearer, but are further off than ever. What will 'the French electorate make of that ? The present French Chamber and Senate are meek followers, but a whole electorate is an unknown quantity and has a nasty habit, as we have just been reminded in this country, of upsetting all predictions and voting in a stubborn and self-interested -way.
Nor is it only in France that spectres rise up-to trouble M. Poincare's dreams. In America within the last few months there has been a most remarkable change of opinion about French -policy. The operation of the principles for which America joined in the War plus an energetic and clever French propaganda were enough to make many, if not most, Americans strongly approve of French policy at 'first. They saw in the occupation of the Ruhr nothing but an attempt to collect a just debt by the only means that remained possible. But to-day representative Americans of all parties see in M. Poincare's acts not only unwisdom, but illegality, and unless M. Poincare can do something to change that feeling in America the traditional friendship between the two countries is likely to become a frigid thing. America will, of course, still be extremely polite, for she does not concern herself (unfortunately) in European affairs sufficiently to discharge rude Notes, but instead of continually cultivating the ancient friendship she will, in Orlando's words to the melancholy Jacques, "desire that we may be better strangers." Belgium is always trying to pull France round to a different frame of mind, and Italy seems to be ready to oppose her at any moment. In Great Britain the disappearance of the friendly Mr. Baldwin may be followed by the rise of the appreciably less friendly Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.
But enough of -the spectres. Let us look at the more pleasant subject . of the path of safety to which M. Poincare is tending. The signs that he recognizes con- cession and accommodation to be necessary are cumu- lative. Last month, at the instance of Great Britain, he consented to drop the ultimatum which he had proposed to send to Germany during the crisis over the renewal of Allied military control. Last month, again, he refrained from causing the Reparation Commission to complete the Diisseldorf agreement which he could easily have done had he wished. -Last Saturday he received Herr von HOseh,' the German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, and thus formally reopened negotiations with Germany. It may be said that there is nothing in that, because M. Poincare always declared that he would reopen negotiations when passive resistance in the Ruhr had ceased. Yes ; but the German Government called passive resistance off as long ago as September 25th and M. Poincare did not move. Something else besides the formal end of passive resistance was evidently required to make him move, and that something is the facts of the situation which are proving too strong for him.
M. Poincare at last recognizes that the prostration of Germany which his policy aimed at and achieved is, after all, only a link in a long chain. He cannot present himself to the French electors as a bay-crowned con- queror and say " Behold the victor 1" The only answer will be " What have you won ? " Although the fight is over the debtor has, after all, to be raised from the ground and put in a position to pay something, or at all events to earn something. Otherwise Germany, instead of being a harmless buffer, will be a festering sore spreading septic poison all around.
Having satisfied 'ourselves of M. Poincare's change of mind we have now to look at the means by which bene- ficent results may accrue from it. The direct negotiations between the German industrialists—backed necessarily if not directly by the German Government itself—and the French Government may or may not have a satis- factory culmination. For our part we attach more importance to the two Committees of experts, to the appointment of which, under the Reparation Committee, M. POineare has consented. America will have unofficial representatives on these Committees, and the American Govenunent has allowed it to be known that, though the representatives are unofficial, they have the blessing of Washington. It may be objected again that M.
Poincare has never really unsaid what he previously said about the limited functions of any Committee acting under the Reparation Commission. He has never withdrawn his words about inquiry being confined to the " present capacity " of Germany to pay. True ; but it is very noticeable that M. Poincare never repeats those words. All the messages from Paris and Washing- ton encourage us to believe that the investigations of these two Committees—or, at all events, of one of them, 'for one is sure to be much more important than the other—will be conducted on the widest scale.
This is only common sense. Even if it were possible to inquire into the capacity of Germany without refer-- ence to all political questions, including the occupation of the Ruhr itself—and we are sure it is not possible— America would not consent to any such thing. Americans are not tolerant of polite diplomatic fictions ; they are not used to them and they do not want to be. The American representatives will certainly insist that the Committees shall get to the bottom of the whole matter- or they will not go on sitting at useless conferences. We hope very much that at least one of the Committees will have an American chairman. An American chairman would be sure to 'be both impartial and judicial.
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