Sir Austen Chamberlain and the Rhineland
THE assonance of Lugano and Locarno inevitably arouses, in advance of any other feeling, deep regret that the meeting of the British, German and French representatives at Lugano should have done so little to advance the policy which is associated with Locarno. Much soothing syrup has been ladled out in communiques, but there has been little evidence, for which all thirsty souls were waiting, that the spirit of Locarno and of the Peace Pact directed the private discussions of Sir Austen Chamberlain, M. Briand and Herr Stresemann.
We have been told in effect that they regarded one another as good fellows, and liked and trusted one another more than ever ; but the tokens of trust are still to seek. Not that respect and liking are negligible things.
We gladly acknowledge their existence, especially as at the moment there is nothing else for which to be grateful. The periodic meetings by statesmen involved in the work of the League are decidedly something to the good. Although we hoped for much more, we need not be blind to what is always good in the progress of the League, even when that progress seems to be at its slowest.
We may hope that the economic experts, who are to determine the full amount of reparations, will be appointed without too much delay, but unfortunately we have a slighter hope that it will be possible to keep the purely economic question separate from the political question of the occupied Rhineland. France seems to be as set as ever upon squeezing Germany in one matter in order to make her yield better terms in the other. If her present mood prevails, there will be cross-bargaining all along the line. And yet we think we cannot be mistaken in saying that to the vast majority of Englishmen this interdependence of two strictly unrelated problems is odious. We can recall few political occasions on which the voices of ordinary men in Great Britain were more united ; they say that Locarno and the Peace Pact have altered the whole situation, and that unless France and Great Britain show quickly that they mean to act very solemnly on the meaning of those instruments, they might just as well never have been devised.
One wonders whether there is, as has been suggested, a fresh invisible tug-of-war between M. Poincare and M.
Briand. It seemed at first that M. Briand was in a genuinely conciliatory mood. It was reported that he was willing that the occupying troops should be with- drawn from the Rhineland directly the Governments had embodied in an agreement the recommendations of the experts. In other words, M. Briand appeared to be willing to accept the Germans' promise to pay the final amount that might be agreed upon, without waiting for the funding of the debt. But then we read in the Temps an article which seemed to be irreconcilable with that policy. According to the translation in the Man- chester Guardian the TeMps said, " The conversations at Lugano have never lost the purely general character they had ' at the beginning. . . . The evacuation of the Rhineland has not yet been decided upon even in principle.
Although Article 431 in the Versailles Treaty has been interpreted by many people to mean that Germany could demand the withdrawal of the occupying forces when she had " undertaken " to pay the total sum of reparations, we admit that it would be useless to dispute the contrary interpretation of the British legal adv'isers. What these advisers say in effect is that Article 429 of the Treaty (which provides for the evacuation of the Cologne area aster five ., years, the Coblenz area after ten years and the Mainz area after fifteen years) would be meaningless if Article 431 were taken to mean that Germany was entitled to evacuation on a mere " under- taking " to pay. What the Treaty-makers had in view, we are told, was the possibility that there might be a complete withdrawal within a shorter period than fifteen years if Germany had already paid the full amount of reparations. Of course, we all see now that such a thing is utterly impossible. But when the Treaty was being made everybody was recalling the unexpected quickness with which France was able to pay her debt of 1870.
Quite apart from the legal meaning of the Treaty in regard to the Rhineland, however, there is admittedly room for much adaptability and generosity of policy.
In Annex 2 to Part VIII. of the Treaty it is provided that " Subject to the provisions of the present Treaty this Annex may be amended by the unanimous decision of the Governments represented from time to, time upon the Commission." Moreover, the intention of the Treaty- makers was plainly declared in 1919 when M. Clemenceau; President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George issued their joint declaration that they did not contemplate occupying the Rhineland " until the Reparation clauses were completely executed." They gave their reasons—which were certainly sound—for• this concession : they held that proofs of good will from Germany would be a suffi- cient guarantee of payment.
When Sir Austen Chamberlain discussed all these subjects in the House of Commons he undoubtedly meant, while underlining the letter of the law, to indicate that Policy was capable of a much better way, After all, that is only common sense.- There is a story of a money-lender who astonished his friends by remitting a debt which was patently due to him. When his friends expressed their surprise, he said, " Well, I don't want this to be the last transaction between us.!' That is an accurate enough analogy for a wise policy on the part of the Allies. Unless Germany is, made to feel that her restoration to the family of nations and her member- ship of the Council of the League entitle her to treatment consonant with her new position, her grievance will fester into a sore. We shall have not only no peace, but less security than there is now.
Our complaint is that Sir Austen Chamberlain has continually put the emphasis on the wrong thing. He has 'failed to represent what his countrymen really feel, as he did in the House of Commons when he was more impressive about the letter of the law than about the political divergence from it which he recommended. As a result he was misunderstood as usual, and Germany " went off the deep end." What is this mental stickiness which persistently makes him unjust both to himself and to the obvious feelings of his countrymen ? British policy is corrected and saved- from time to time by the warm-hearted incursions into foreign politics of the Prime Minister.
Friendship with France is essential, but that should not preclude Sir Austen from requesting France plainly to remember that Great Britain has accepted vast risks' in the hope of building up France's sense of security. What we fear is that if we dawdle on indefinitely in the Rhineland some mischief-maker may rise to power in Germany who will maliciously take Prance at her word and entice her into keeping troops there in order that America may become still more estranged from Europe and all her ways. We do not say that such a sinister stroke would succeed. But it is one of the dangers towards which we are visibly heading.
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