THE POLICY OF RUSSIA IN TURKEY. T HE Russians remember Plevna,
though the English do not. That brief sentence contains, as we believe, the most reasonable explanation of recent Russian policy in Turkey, which without the idea conveyed in those words is very nearly inexplicable. The permanent objects of Russia are not secret ; they have been pursued steadily for a century at least, and they can never be abandoned until they are attained. So long as Russia remains an undivided whole, no Russian Government, even if it took the form of a constitutional Monarchy, or of a Republic, could rest content, or even quiet, until it had established itself in peace and for ever upon the shores of the North Pacific and of the Mediterranean. Without a safe and open port in the North Pacific, connected by railway with Moscow, the wonderful possession which we call "Russia in Asia" is comparatively valueless both to the Romanoffs and their people ; with it, that region may become one of the greatest white colonies in the world,—far greater than Canada, equal perhaps to the United States as they were fifty years ago. European Russia is getting overcrowded, and there is room in Asia and main- tenance for fifty millions of peasants, if only they can have quick communication and an outlet to the main waters of the world. European Russia, again, needs entrance to the Mediterranean. Without it the great Russian people have no full control of their own export trade, most of which cannot pay for a long railway journey, or—what they value nearly as much—that great position and rank among the civilised and active Powers of the world, which they think their due. It follows that a Russian Government, whether despotic or liberal, ambitious or pacific, will always try to obtain Port Arthur, or a port like it, and the control of the Dardanelles as well as of the Bosphorus. They wish for Constantinople for traditional and, in a way, " religious " reasons, but for their permanent ends Constantinople is worthless without the Dardanelles. If another Power held Gallipoli the Russians would have the Sea of Marmora, for a, second dock, but they would be shut out from the open water just as they are now. They want, and in the end will have, a clear road, such as is enjoyed by every other independent nation in the world—even Persia and Siam—with the exceptions only of Switzerland and Ecuador. They cannot abandon these objects, nor should we in their place, and to study Russian policy without remembering them is only to arrive at a mental impasse.
Well, they have within the twelve months made immense strides towards both, and the question is why they do not go a little further and a little faster. They have their grip on the Far Eastern port, it may be Port Arthur, it may be all Corea with its natural dependency the Lisa-lung Peninsula, and they are, if Bulgaria remains faithful, in a position to throttle Constantinople ; but they were also offered Armenia, and the question arises why they did not take it. We know quite well that "it was not offered them" in any public way ; but we believe it was offered them informally, but effectively, and whether it was or was not, does not signify a straw. Circumstances offered it to them. They must have known perfectly well that Lord Salisbury could no more declare war on them for occupying Armenia than he could cut the Armenian Patriarch's throat with his own hand ; and except Lord Salisbury, who was there likely to interefere ? Not France, which is for the moment a dependent ally ; not Germany, which has no means of reaching the Black Sea ; not Austria, which, if she ever fights Russia, will not do it to preserve an out- lying province to the Sultan, for which she must fight, if at all, without allies. Except as owner of Constantinople, what is the Sultan to the Hapsburgs ? The Russians had, in fact, free hands as far as Western Europe was con- cerned, and the question is why they did not choose to use that unexpected advantage of international position. The popular answer, which is also their own answer, that they were afraid of a European Conference which would end in the creation of a second Bulgaria upon their Armenian frontier, is no answer at all. Europe at large does not trouble itself about the destiny of Armenia, is not even pitiful when Armenians are massacred wholesale, and the English will be contented if the massacres are prevented for ever. They might fight to rescue a perish- ing Christian people from the Turk; they would not fight to secure to that people more or less independence of St. Petersburg. Really independent, Turkish Armenia can- not be ; and the difference between government by a Russian Viceroy, or through an Armenian dependent Prince, is not sufficient, even in the eyes of fanatics of freedom, to justify a serious war. Russia could have kept Armenia had she rescued the Armenians ; and we believe she had two reasons for shrinking back, neither of which do Russians choose to allege. One was that she desires no fresh quarrel with Turkey, until the hour arrives when she may seize Constantinople and either the European or the Asiatic gate to the open water, but rather desires to see Turkey still further weakened by anarchy, misgovern- ment, and that gradual waste of pecuniary resources which will very soon destroy Turkey as a fighting Power. For —and this is the true, second, and ultimate reason of refusal—the Russians do not, like the English, regard Turkey as a dead Power for battle. We instinctively reason like the people of a maritime State, and recognise that Turkey cannot defend her coasts ; but the Russians fight by land, remember Plevna, and think the contest might prove a very serious one. The Khalif could not evacuate Armenia, except under compulsion of defeat, without offending every Osmanli in his dominions, he can still summon three hundred thousand of the bravest soldiers in the world, he has still by his side the hard- fighting and hard-hearted General who defended Plevna, and he has still, to all appearance, enough of munitions in his arsenals for a long campaign. If a new Plevna, were formed in Armenia the new Plevna must be carried, and with the Osmanlis fighting, as they would think, their battle of Armageddon, that might prove a very serious business. The struggle would be in a distant corner of the Russian Empire, the troops must be drawn from the huge garrisons now encamped in the West, and the Russian Generals, whenever far from their true base, lose men in a hardly explicable proportion. Many writers attribute this to cor- ruption, the supply departments stealing the soldiers' food and clothing ; but we fancy acute Anglo-Indian doctors, without rejecting or accepting that theory, would give a different additional explanation, and declare that with any troops but the English and German, a huge standing camp involves inevitably frightful sanitary dangers, such as, for instance, have repeatedly crippled unusually large armies of Sepoys. Lord Hastings was on one memorable occa- sion practically defeated by his own foul latrines. Be that as it may, the fact is certain that an Armenian Plevna might involve a greater exertion than Russia, with the Triple Alliance looking on, feels at all inclined to make. Her Generals probably exaggerate the meaning of the lesson of 1877, when the Romnania.ns were called in by a nearly exhausted Emperor ; while her financial officers know that the disastrous effects of such a protracted struggle can hardly be exaggerated. Armenia is worth a good deal to Russia ; but in the present circumstances of Europe, it might not be worth, or at all events might not be deemed worth, five or six years of financial exhaustion, and a, large expenditure of her best-trained men.
We do not pretend to be in Russian secrets, least of all the secrets of her frequently puzzling military organisa- tion ; but this account seems to us more reasonable than most of those put forward. We cannot believe that Russia was insensible to the advantage of gaining a long step forward on the southern shore of the Black Sea, or indifferent to the loss of prestige which she must suffer through her desertion of the cause of the Asiatic Christians of Turkey. We quite admit that to Greek Christians the Armenians are heretics, and that the race as a race are not popular, their traders being a little too acute, and their pursuit of cash a little too vigorous and persistent. But still, the Russians do not massacre Christians themselves, and strongly object to their massacre by Mahommedans ; they enjoy adventure, and they regard new provinces as new sources of wealth and strength for the Empire of which they are inordinately proud. We suspect strongly that had Armenia been obtainable by a decree of the Czar, as most Englishmen appear to think it would have been, the signal for mobili- sation would have been given, and Russian agents would have declared all over Asia that while the English pitied the Eastern Christians, Russia, and Russia only, rescued them from the oppressor. There must have been some serious obstacle to the adoption of so very enticing and profitable a policy, and we think we have suggested accurately what it was. It is by a fleet, as Mr. Gladstone saw, not by an army, that Turkey is always and easily to be held in cheek.
Previous page
