THE PROBABILITIES OF WAR.
IF, as seems probable, the Diplomatists—whether from despair, or from a secret wish that the crisis should arrive—have abandoned the attempt to secure Greece her
territories, there will, we believe, be war. The Bourses still fancy that it will not break out, and that this or that concession will be made by Athens or Constantinople, but we see little justification for their confidence. The Sultan may be afraid, and probably is afraid, of the conse- quences of war ; but he has to consider the consequences of a peace secured by surrender, and they may well seem more immediate. If war breaks out, ho may see an insurrection in Roumelia, though that is doubtful till a much later stage ; a rising in Syria, to secure her autonomy—a rising said to be already arranged ; a small movement in Armenia and a great movement in Arabia, to regain independence, and possibly to alter the succession to the Caliphate. Those are serious dangers, even if the Great Powers at first abstain from ad- vancing any claims or moving any troops ; and they will be felt in the Yildiz Kiosk at a moment when the Sultan will be called on to drive back Greece, to bribe the Albanians, to crush Macedonia and the Islands, and to hold down Constantinople itself. Nevertheless, they may seem to the Sultan less than the risks involved in peace. The two powers which still exist in Constantinople other than the Sultan—the Army and the Mussulman mob—will both be for war. The Army, badly paid, badly fed, and disgusted with inaction, will prefer any change to continued and un- pleasant monotony ; while it shares with the populace a bitter contempt for Greeks, and the feeling, still not wholly dead, that if Islam is but true to itself, God will strike in for it. There exists, too, in both classes great pride of caste, great indisposition to surrender ascendancy-- especially over Greeks—and great ignorance of the forces now controlling the results of war. The soldiery and the people think conquest possible ; their hearts are with the few fanatic Pashas remaining—the men who, like Osman Pasha, hold battle to be the only way out of the present situation—and they are, when pushed, very brave. If the Sultan ceded Jannina, to any will legs irresistible than that of the Powers, they might decide to change him ; and Sultans, unless known to be mad, when their disease protects them, do not survive deposition. We think the Sultan, in the last resort, will risk the insurrections which a victory would quell, will trust, as against Europe, to a conflict among the Powers, and will declare war on Greece.
On the other hand, the Greek Government will not give up Jannina. It is still the secret idea of the West, including many diplomatists, that Greece is timid, that at the twelfth hour she will shrink back, and that she threatens war from an astute calculation that the Powers which favour her require that plea for vigorous proposals. That is in part true, but behind that calculation rests, we believe, a feeling that if Greece does not fight she is lost; that Austria intends to rule the Balkans ; and that if Greece withdraws, she will become a mere enclave of the Hapsburg dominion, without
I
even a defensible frontier. That is a prospect which appals Greeks, who are well aware that in Thessaly and Epirus the population are with them, who• have hopes from the Albanians, and who have unexpectedly found more resources in them- selves than they anticipated. They did not expect such a response to their call to arms, and exaggerate, rather than underrate, the military means at their disposal. They know that individually they, are brave enough, and probably greatly over-estimate, as all inexperienced observers do, the weak- ness in Turkish armies produced by peculation and bad arrangements. Those things increase the slaughter, but do not stop the fighting. Tho Greeks, too, who know every
department and personage in Constantinople, are probably cog- nisant of secret allies, and look for help in quarters of which European diplomatists have scarcely thought. Finally, if they retreat, they are not only beaten, but ruined men. Their State has spent its last resources, they cannot avoid a revolution, and they will, for a time at least, be plunged into almost hopeless anarchy. We think they will.fight, though they had rather not, and that in fight- ing they will seek to widen the area of conflagration as much as possible, and to find allies not only in Europe, but in Asia, where they hold many keys. Our impression, taking the whole situation together, and allowing for any final effort that the Powers may make, is that they have practically no option. Whether they will fight well is another matter. The expert's think not. They say the Greek Army is very raw, is not solid enough for the forward movement it must make, and will be beaten, as the Servians were, by the Turkish stubborn- ness, which always costs assailants such vast numbers
of lives. That is the reasonable and sensible opinion ; but then, in wars of this kind, the reasonable and sensible opinion is very often wrong. The Greeks are individually brave, they know the country well, and they may develops General who can utilise their special faculty,—the ability of the soldiers to understand what is required of them. A single victory in the field would change their whole position before Europe, and perhaps bring them irresistible allies ; while defeat could but leave them as surrender would, ruined and disheartened. We think their chance a perceptible one, and that the stake being the enfranchisement of millions from an uncivilised domination, they will do well to try it.
Previous page
