TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT.
THERE has never been a moment during these two years when it was more necessary for English Liberals, and indeed, for all reasonable politicians, to keep their heads cool and their hearts free from the exultations and rancours which disturb the judgment. We are not out of the wood yet. On the surface of things, it would seem that Lord Beaconsfield, influenced either by the Cabinet, or by some views on Asiatic Turkey, or by causes as yet unrevealed, has agreed to a compromise with Russia, by which the Treaty of San Stefano, though injured in one or two provisions, is substantially maintained, or rather is made better for Russian interests. Under the Agreement furnished to the Globe, Bulgaria is divided into two halves, each of them so weak that they must rely upon Russia for protection, and both deprived of the entrance to the 2Egean which would have enabled the Bulgarians to enter into a close alliance with Great Britain and Greece. We could have landed troops there in five days from Malta on any emergency, but Lord Beaconsfield, to gain the applause of the foolish politicians who think that humiliation to Russia means strength to England, has thrown away the splendid position we must under the Treaty have enjoyed. But with that grand exception, the Agreement, if carried out, would, like the Treaty of San Stefano, prepare the way for a great and beneficial change in the Turkish Empire. The Sultan's authority over the European provinces would be so limited that their claim to independence would, in any happy conjunction of events, seem irresistible, and at all events could not be resisted. The Ottoman Power would not be ended in Europe as it ought to be, that is, at once and finally, but it would be so reduced that its extinction would be a mere question of time. It would be weakened also in Asia, for Kars would be gone, and the Sultan would be visible to his Asiatic subjects as a defeated man, unable to keep his hold over the heritage of Islam.
This, we say, is, on the surface, the state of affairs. The Agreement, taken by itself, would produce these results, and of the genuineness of the Agreement no serious politician enter- tains a doubt. The Duke of Richmond and Sir Stafford Northcote tried very hard in Parliament to avoid the necessity of admitting the truth, but they also avoided the direct denial with which, if it were not true, they would have at once put down all impertinent questioning. The Agreement, drawn with a certain solemnity of form as a binding memorandum, exists, and as it exists we are not surprised either at the pleasure of Liberals or the despairing rage of the Mahommedan party. The Liberals see many provinces rescued from Turkey, though not enough ; and the Mahommedans see that their clients get nothing, and that their paeans over Lord Beaconsfield's chivalrous devotion to the sanctity of Treaties are almost as ridiculous as their music-hall war- chants. Pleasure and chagrin are, therefore, quite natural, and we only wish we could feel quite certain that they were not a little premature. But we are not confident upon that point. As we read the situation, Lord Beaconsfield has acceded to the Agreement with great unwillingness, and only upon conditions, made probably with his own Cabinet as well as with Foreign Powers, which are only vaguely known, or rather are un- known, which Europe may not approve, and which the English people may, in the last resort, reject. An English protectorate of Turkey, even in the form in which alone Liberals could con- sent to discuss it, that is, a Protectorate beneath which the Sultan would be a Grand Mogul ruled always by an English Resident, is a very serious matter, and some such Protectorate is understood to be a vital part of the Agreement, without which it may be overthrown. This is one great difficulty in the way of a final arrangement, and there are a dozen others. The Agreement does not bind Congress, and there are Powers in Congress who want stipulations for themselves, and who, if England gives them moral support, may refuse their adhesion, and throw all negotiation into confusion. The burning ques- tion of the Bulgarian fortresses is not formally settled under the Agreement. The still more dangerous question of the Russian occupation is avowedly left open. The future position of South Bulgaria is defined in the vaguest style, and admits of the province being as independent as the Canadian Dominion, or as completely dependent as the Mauritius or Trini- dad. The " military question,"—the contiguity, that is, of the Russian Army and the British Fleet to Constantinople—remains as before, and just enough has been done for Greece to make Greece and Turkey alike restive, without giving either of them a strong motive for acquiescence.
Of course if the British Government and that of Russia have come to a solid understanding, all these difficulties, except the one of the future British position in Asia, can easily be got over. Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortschakoff have only to desire an accord heartily, and all difficulties, including Turkish obstinacy, will rapidly disappear. No resistance to the two Powers if united is possible, unless Germany is on the side of resistance, and Germany has no possible interest in resisting. Her Government evidently desires peace, and without her full consent Austria cannot stir alone, even if she wished ; and the notion of the Hapsburgs, in alliance with Turkey, crushing the wishes of their own Slav subjects seems to us absurd. But we seek in vain for any evidence of a cordial agreement, or indeed agree- ment of any kind. We distrust profoundly all the specific statements of the correspondents as to the details of negotiation, but they can hardly be all in error, and all in error in the same way, as to the general drift of affairs, and they all unite in saying that " the Congress dines, but does not march." According to one authority, it is all Lord Beaconsfield, who is asserting everywhere that Turkey must be maintained. According to another, it is all Austria, which is frightened and sulky at the turn things have taken. According to a third, it is all the Czar, who insists on everything being sent to him for his previous approval ; and all these may be wrong. But of the general impression that there is a hitch somewhere there can be little doubt, and a hitch may be fatal to the Agreement. No doubt such hitches have occurred before in the history of Congresses. The regular course indeed of those assemblages is utter confusion for a few days, each Plenipotentiary trying his strength and endeavouring to ascertain the weakness of his opponents ; then a violent melee of opinions, protests, and proposals; and then, under the influence of some strong man, or of some unexpected event, a compromise hit on, accepted, and carried out. We do not want to croak ; and a sudden resolution in the German Cabinet, or a new idea in Lord Beaconsfield's mind, or an explosion in Constantinople, may bring about the necessary accord, which does not require friendliness among the Plenipotentiaries any more than a compromise in a law-suit requires friendliness among lawyers. Still the accord is not secured, and any emotion, in the minds either of Liberals or of the friends of Turkey, based upon a belief that all is settled, is premature or ill-advised. We think, on the balance of evidence, that accord will arrive, because we think that Lord Beaconsfield is attracted by some Asiatic design, and that the Sovereigns of Eastern Europe are seriously moved by internal troubles; but we cannot feel, and therefore will not express, the certainty which, whether regretful or joyous, seems to have come over the country.. Lord Beaconsfield is like Napoleon III. in more respects than one, and among others in the respect Tennyson sang about, and until he is back again, and back again with some arrangement which he can represent as victory, every- body may be living in a fools' paradise of placid ex- pectation. The Plenipotentiaries of Europe have been brought together in Berlin ; but the settlement of the Eastern Question, even for the moment, will not, we fear, be effected in ten days. If it is effected before the winter, and upon bases which allow' a reasonable hope that the Christians of Turkey will thence- forward be free from the attacks of Bashi-Bazouks, we shall congratulate the country upon a great escape.
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