Truce in Algeria
TIK agreement between the FLN and the OAS in Algeria means the acceptance of the inevit- able by the European settlers. There seems no doubt that the elements still urging or committing terrorist acts are non-Algerian military outlaws —ex-army officers and Foreign Legion deserters no longer supported by any but a gunman fringe of the civil population. It is quite possible that extremist action may lead to the breakdown of the agreement. Even so, its significance is enor- mous. Above all, it demonstrates the responsi- bility and statesmanship of the FLN. That some of the Nationalist leaders are reported to oppose the agreement is natural. It is always tempting for any revolutionary to appear more intransigent than his colleagues. And OAS tactics ---or at least the tactics of some OAS elements--have been murderous and cowardly far beyond the normal habits of underground resistance movements, so that the bitterness is bound to have risen in proportion. So much the greater, by that token, is the credit due to the Nationalist leadership. Of course, political motives are always mixed and realisation of the economic advantages to Algeria of European co-operation must also affect Nationalist policy. But this realism, too, is states- manlike. As for more immediate motives: it is reported that Moroccan forces are beginning to encroach on some areas along the Algerian frontier, and the future rulers of Algeria must urgently want the internal peace necessary to give them freedom of action in coping with foreign affairs. Meanwhile, even if the accord proves abortive, they have at least openly recognised the rights of the European minority in direct nego- tiation. They have thus shown themselves bigger and better men than many of their armchair sup- porters in this country and elsewhere, who would happily have seen the French settlers expelled or massacred.