TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA AND FRANCE AND THE JAPANESE ALLIANCE.
RUSSIA and France, acting in conjunction, have made - the reply which we felt sure that they would make to our Alliance with Japan. They have informed the rest of the Great Powers that they mean to stand together in regard to future developments in the Far East, and in effect declare that if war comes it will be the war with two Powers which is contemplated in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Of course, this announcement is conveyed in polite terms, and is padded out with the usual diplomatic " common form " about the integrity of the Chinese Empire. Russia and France, that is, begin by the assurance that the objects set forth in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty are objects of which they thoroughly approve, and they declare their determination to make those objects the basis of their policy. They add that " the two Allied Governments deem that respect for these principles is at the same time a guarantee for their own special interests in the Far East." So far nothing could sound better. But it would be very unwise to rely too much on these diplomatic commonplaces in view of what follows. The sting of the Russo-French communiq?ui is in the tail. The last clause runs as follows :—" Nevertheless, they them- selves being also obliged to take into consideration the possible eventuality either of aggressive action on the part of a third Power, or fresh troubles in China calling in question the integrity and the free development of China, becoming a menace to their own interests, the two Allied Governments reserve to themselves the right to concert in such a case means for assuring their protection." This, obviously, can mean only one thing. The third Power whose possibly aggressive action is contemplated. is, of course, Japan. In other words, we are warned that if Japan, whether by reason of what she deems to be the protection of her essential interests or from any other cause, gets involved in hostilities, the war will be a war with two Powers,—i.e., a war with Russia and France. If it comes to war it will be the two-Power war con- templated by the Treaty. In other words, the Russo- French declaration finally and entirely disposes of the fond illusions which have been entertained so widely here that, in spite of the Alliance with Japan, there was little danger of our being involved in dangerous complications. It has been urged that even if Japan got into a war with Russia we might feel quite secure, because the very last thing the French would do would be to come to Russia's assistance. They, it was supposed, would politely tell Russia that they wished her well, but that it would be a cruel kindness to help her, and so bring England into the m'Cli:e ; and therefore, as true friends, they intended to stand aside. The Russo- French declaration, as we have said, puts an absolute stop to all this. It is a clear notice that there can be no single-Power war in the Far East.
Needless to say, we do not wish to express any satisfaction of the " I told you so " order in regard to this aspect of the question, but we may point out that it justifies what some of our readers may have thought was too pessimistic a tone in our comments on the Alliance. We said when the Alliance was first announced that we must make up our minds to that Alliance bringing with it the possibility of war with France, and we pointed out also that the Alliance left our foreign policy at the mercy of Japan. Japan, we declared, might, and probably would, prove merciful, for Japan is governed by prudent and astute statesmen ; but that could not alter the fact that we have placed our foreign relations —not merely in the Far East, but our foreign relations as regards Russia and France generally—at the mercy of Japan. We contend that the newly-made declaration that France and Russia will stand together, and have, in fact, concluded an Alliance as regards the Far East directly intended to balance and hold in check the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, is a complete vindication of our attitude. We may disguise the fact by diplomatic sophistries, and may refuse to look at and recognise the fact, but the fact remains that we and Japan have ranged ourselves opposite Russia and France, and that the will or interests, or let us say the necessities, of other people may some day plunge us into a war which will be fought in the Channel and the Baltic. We do not, of course, suggest for a moment that the risk of war must never be run if vital interests so near home are involved, but we do think that such risks require grave thought and consideration.
We have said, and fully believe, that Japan is on the whole likely to be merciful in the use of the power we have given her, but it is only right that we should also keep before us the possibility that Japanese statesmen— who naturally can think only of the interests of their own country, and must not allow any other considera- tions to weigh with them — may consider that a war involving the Alliance would suit them better than peace. It is often said that we have a great security in 'the financial condition of Japan. Japan is a very poor State judged by European standards, and her credit is extremely low. In fact, financially, if not actually, in great straits, she is very near being so. Therefore, it is argued, peace is of capital importance to Japan. She must keep the peace because she cannot afford to go to war. We wish we could indulge in these soothing reflections. Unfortunately, however, all history shows that financial embarrassments have never prevented a nation going to war. On the contrary, they have often served to urge nations into war as an escape from their material diffi- culties. They could not be more pressed for money than they are, and they argue that war with its thousand chances may solve the situation. This risk is certainly not decreased when the embarrassed nation is allied with a very rich nation. Japan must know that the first act of the Alliance, if war ensued, will be for Great Britain to guarantee a large Japanese loan, and so enable Japan to make the best use of her military resources. Not to supply Japan with money with both hands—provided we got in- volved in war—would be most foolish. If once we are fighting side by side with Japan it would, indeed, be the most economical thing we could do to supply Japan liberally with money, for we know that her skilful, diligent, and honourable organisers would make good use of it. But the clear-sighted and patriotic Japanese statesmen see that as well as we do. They know that war while it lasted would necessitate some- thing very like a common purse by means of direct subsidies and guaranteed loans. We do not, of course, for a moment suggest that these considerations will weigh with the present Japanese Government, but still Japan is a Parliamentary State and subject to Parlia- mentary crises. In any case, the fact that the tempta- tion is there is one which ought to be taken into consideration if and when the poverty of Japan is pleaded as a guarantee for peace.
There is another matter connected with the Alliance which is worth noticing. People often talk as if Germany would be sure to take our side if complications arose under the new arrangements in the Far East, and imagine that though Germany is not actually bound, her interests would draw her into the Anglo-Japanese Alli- ance. In view of this supposition, listen to the words of the Times correspondent at Tokio :—" What Japanese statesmen say of the event is that it restores the balance of power in the East. The alliance of Russia and France is not more certain than that Germany's interests in Europe preclude her from opposing the former Power in Asia. For all practical purposes, there- fore, Russia, France, and Germany form a Dreibund in the Orient, and if Germany's action at Kiao-chau and Russia's in Leao-tong and Manchuria throw a, sinister light upon their Chinese policy, the united procedure of these same three Powers in 1895 suggests that they are not likely to consider Japanese interests seriously in any emer- gency." In view of this, we feel little wonder on being told by the same correspondent that the Japanese were greatly surprised on many grounds by the formation of the Alliance. " The chief source of surprise to the Japanese, however, is that England could be induced to take such a step." We must add, of course, that the surprise is said by the correspondent to have been occasioned not by any notion of the Alliance injuriously affecting England, but because the Japanese did not believe we could be so bold and prescient. We are, however, glad to borrow the words as they stand. We are even more surprised than the Japanese that England could have been induced to take such a step.
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