22 OCTOBER 1910, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE NEED OF THE HOUR.

THE need of the hour is to get rid of the present Government. Their policy as set forth in the speeches of the predominant partner of the Adminis- tration, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is to buy. Socialist support by Socialistic legislation. Such legis- lation, which must enervate the body politic almost as much as pure-bred Socialism, is coupled with a reckless and ill-considered system of finance,---a system which in effect, if not in name, levels a blow at the economic heart of the nation. If, then, we do not soon get rid of the present Ministry, they will produce material disasters so grave as seriously to impair the condition of the working classes, and to destroy any chance of obtaining that better distribution of wealth which all reasonable and patriotic men desire. Socialistic revolutions may be unjust to the richer classes, but this is not their great evil. That, as history teaches us, is to be found in their effects upon the poor. Yet such a revolution we shall have if our public affairs are much longer directed by men of the stamp of Mr. Lloyd George, and are inspired by the spirit of acrid and ill-considered Jacobinism which is breathed into his public utterances.

If the need of the hour is to get rid of the present Government, we must remember that he who wills the end must also will the means. Now there is only one practical way of doing the work, and that is to make the Conservative and Unionist Party strong enough in the House of Commons to accomplish the required transfer of political power. The need of the hour, then, is a concentration of the conservative forces in the nation. How is this to be obtained ? It is our firm belief that it will not, nay, cannot be, obtained if the Unionist Party proceeds on its present lines, for on those lines it cannot count upon the support of the whole mass of conservative opinion in the country, and nothing less than this will do. We do not wish on the present occasion to say a word about the abstract merits of Tariff Reform, but we are convinced that Tariff Reform reached its high-water mark, or at any rate something very near high-water mark, at the last Election, and that if the electors are once more appealed to purely on the question of Tariff Reform, the present Government will get a new lease of life. They may, and probably will, lose a certain number of seats, but not enough to give the Unionists a majority, with the result that they will remain in power, though somewhat weakened ; that is, even more under the thumb of the Irish and Labour Parties than now,—a. result which every true Unionist must regard with the utmost anxiety.

That the opinion we have just expressed is no mere whim of the Spectator is shown by two letters from Conservatives, one of them a strong and active Tariff Reformer, which we publish in our issue of to-day. Mr. Geale, who tells us that he is by conviction " a full Tariff Reformer," says that there is a general consensus of opinion against the so-called taxation of food, and that in existing circumstances it is impossible for the Unionists to fight against that consensus. He therefore urges, as we have urged repeatedly in these columns, that " Mr. Balfour will be well advised if he now goes to the country and states clearly and boldly that the Unionist Party will, if elected, guarantee not to bring in any scheme involving the taxation of food without first consulting the people who elect them." Our corre- spondent who signs himself " X.," and is a Lancashire Conservative, is equally emphatic. He endorses our declaration that Lancashire cannot be recovered for Unionism while there is any fear of the policy of the Tariff Reformers being carried out in regard to the taxa- tion of food. Lancashire, he declares, is conservative to the backbone. In his opinion, she shows her conservatism by her unwillingness to have any change in our fiscal policy. As long as the voters in Lancashire think they can indulge their conservative proclivities without bringing about the taxation of food, they will vote Conservative. For this reason they voted Conservative at the by-election in which Mr. Winston Churchill was turned out, for they knew that a by-election could not result in the taxation of food. When, however, as at the General Election last January, to vote Conservative might result in the taxation of food, they would not run the risk. Therefore " X." tells us, like Mr. Geale, that if the Unionist leaders want victory at the polls, they must give assurances to the Lancashire Unionists that by voting for Unionist candi- dates at the next General Election they will not be committing the country irrevocably to the taxation of food. In other words, the Conservative leaders must guarantee that the country shall see the tariff when it is ready, and have the opportunity to vote on it either at a General Election or a Referendum.

We want to argue this point without heat or without party feeling, for we recognise not only its tremendous importance, but also the depth of conviction with which Tariff Reformers hold their views on the Fiscal question. At first such sincere Tariff Reformers are inclined to be disgusted, and to consider that we are asking them to make an immoral bargain in order to secure office. Accordingly they tell us, and we cannot help admiring the spirit in which they speak, that they are not going to purchase office by abandoning their convictions, and that if the Unionist Party cannot get into office without a sacrifice of principle, they had much better remain out of office for good and all. We need hardly say that in the abstract we entirely agree with such a declara- tion, and that any other would be utterly unworthy of Unionists and Conservatives. To purchase power by the means which they suppose we are suggesting would be utterly immoral. If, however, they will look a little closer at the proposition which we and our correspon- dents place before them, they will see that we are not in the least asking them to abandon Tariff Reform. We should of course be delighted if by some process of conversion based on conviction the Tariff Reformers should give up Tariff Reform ; but we know that is impossible, and do not dream for a moment of asking for it. Mr. Geale, indeed, would be horrified at the thought of such abandonment, since he is himself a Tariff Reformer by conviction. What we ask is something entirely different. It is that while the Tariff Reformers shall not abate one jot or one tittle of their fiscal views, they should temporarily, and for the purpose of getting the present Government out of power, agree that votes cast against them and their semi-Socialistic schemes shall not be used to obtain Tariff Reform until the voters shall have had placed before them a tariff in the concrete, and not merely in the abstract, and shall be asked to express their opinion thereon. It is surely unreasonable to say that to ask for such an endorsement of the tariff when it is framed is to ask for the abandonment of Tariff Reform. It is not even asking for any great delay in its accomplishment. Is it possible that so tremendous a revolution in our fiscal system as the estab- lishment of protection for home industries and preference for Colonial products, involving the taxation of food, can be accomplished in a hurry ? If the thing is to be done well, and with a view to permanent establishment, every Tariff Reformer must admit that it must be done thoroughly, and in consultation not merely with the various trades affected, but also after careful negotiation and balancing of details with the various Colonial Governments, including the Government of India, for there the necessary adjustments will be specially delicate and intricate. In our opinion, and we believe it must become the opinion of most thoughtful Tariff Reformers if they will only look at the problem in an unprejudiced spirit,-it is essential that these difficult and often perplexing negotiations should be conducted by a powerful Government,—a Government which is not in any risk of being upset by a snap vote in the House of Commons. The Colonial Governments especially are pretty certain to say: "If we commit ourselves to a line of policy which will prove unpopular with certain very important interests in our country, we must feel sure that the new tariff arrangements when once adopted are to be permanent." They would there- fore, we believe, greatly prefer that they should be sub- mitted to the country and obtain the endorsement of the electors. Without such endorsement there will always be an uneasy feeling in the Empire that the people have never endorsed the tariff, and at the next opportunity may repudiate it, and thus introduce confusion into their domestic affairs. To put the matter in another way, a strong Government is much more likely to be able to draw up a just and sound tariff than a weak Government, which will be at the mercy of, and so obliged to make compromises with, the repre- sentatives of pushing and selfish interests, who care much less for Colonial Preference than for the immediate protection of their own trades. A weak Government will be liable to be blackmailed over the preparation of a tariff. A strong Government could snap its fingers at such attempts. But even the most enthusiastic Tariff Reformer will agree that a far stronger Govern- ment is likely to be obtained if there is a real concen- tration of conservative force at the next General Election than if the Unionist Party again goes into battle divided. The very most that can be accomplished if the Tariff Reformers insist upon the electors saying " Yes" or " No " to their full scheme, including the taxation of food, is a majority of, say, twenty over the Liberals and Irish com- bined; and such a majority would, we believe, find it impossible to construct and carry a tariff. More probably, however, the present Government would be left with a " mixed" majority of seventy. On the other hand, the abandonment of the proposal to tax food, and the admission that the voters have a right to see the tariff and pass an opinion on it before it is put into operation, would, we believe, cause such a revulsion of feeling amongst the voters that the present Government would be swept away, and the Unionists installed in power with a large majority.

It may perhaps be argued that the fallacy in our proposal is that, though under our scheme the Unionists might gain a great many Free-trade Unionist votes and also a great many moderate Liberal votes, such gains would be more than discounted by the loss of votes caused by the opposition of the enthusiastic Tariff Reformers. We do not believe a word of it. We are confident that the vast bulk of Tariff Reformers are also strong Conservatives, and that they would perfectly well under- stand and acquiesce in a temporary abandonment, as they would consider it, of their schemes in order successfully to punish the Liberals for their Socialistic schemes and their madhouse finance. The Tariff Reform voter would quite well understand that he was not being asked to give up his principles, but merely to prove the sincerity of his belief in them by allowing them to be put in a concrete shape before the people. " Give us the chance of constructing a tariff, and we will put a tariff before the people for their decision which will prove the greatest and most convincing winner of votes for our side that has ever been seen." That, we believe, would be the temper in which a vast number of Tariff Reformers in the country would. accept the suggestion we are now making.

There is one other difficulty which we must face before leaving this question. It is that a great many Free-trade Unionists and Liberals who have lost faith in the present Government, and are only too anxious to get rid of it if they can do so without having their votes used to pass a tariff, will say that our proposal is in effect one which must ruin the cause of Free- trade. The danger is, they will argue, and in a sense we sympathise with their argument, that, having a strong Tariff Reform Government—for such, of course, it will be— in power, the country will be half-way committed to Tariff Reform, and that in the circumstances it will be comparatively easy for the Government to produce a scheme which, though destroying our Free-trade system, will obtain the sanction of the voters. They will tell us that our pro- posal is really an insidious scheme for getting the Tariff Reform hook into the mouth of the electoral fish, and that once it is in the fish will be unable to escape. We admit the danger. We admit, that is, that we are expecting immense sacrifices from Free-trade Unionists in asking them to vote for Tariff Reformers, subject only to the tariff being put before the country before it is finally passed. On the whole, however, we hold that these risks must be run, and that in all probability the Free-trade Unionist voters will, though with some misgiving, be prepared to take the risk. Unquestionably we should advise them to do so, and so, we believe, would the majority of the Free-trade Unionist leaders. That the course we suggest has evils in it we recognise, but we are convinced that when there are two evils the lesser is the one we must choose, and, further, that the policy we recommend is the lesser evil.