ITALY AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
MHE recent declarations of Baron von Aehrenthal in the Austrian Delegation, and of Signor Tittoni in the Italian Parliament, may fairly be regarded as a turning-point in the relations of the two countries which they represent. The successor of Count Goluchowski, while emphasising the continuity of Austro-Hungarian policy, has introduced a new spirit of conciliation, in which the influence of the mailed fist is no longer per- ceptible. The self-denying ordinance which the two statesmen have now definitely proclaimed before the world gains in impressiveness when we place their statements side by side. "We have declared," says Baron von Aehrenthal, "that we do not desire to step beyond the sphere prescribed by the Treaty of Berlin in any direction whatever, and therefore not in Albania either, and that we expect the same moderation from Italy." This assurance, he adds, has been given. The Italian Minister, after asserting that Italy is in entire accord with Austria- Hungary on the Macedonian and Albanian questions, declares the result of his discussions with Count Golu- chowski to have been that "if the maintenance of the status quo were no longer possible, Italy and Austria, Hungaryshould proceed jointly to a solution which should consist in the political autonomy of the Balkan Peninsula on the basis of the principle of nationality. I therefore reject the advice to consent to a partition with Austria-Hungary." Statements so precise and so firm in tone will doubtless afford keen disappoint- ment to the many unscrupulous fishers in troubled Balkan waters,—men whose advancement depends upon inter- national complications. But for that very reason the prospect of a really lasting entente between Austria- Hungary and Italy will give intense satisfaction to all responsible statesmen of South Europe, and not, indeed, to them alone. In view of this highly desirable result, a suitable moment seems to have arrived for the discussion of the relations of Austria-Hungary and Italy.
This self-denying ordinance (as we have ventured to call it) is nothing else than a recognition of the balance of power on the Adriatic,—and in some ways a reversion to the mediaeval situation when Hungary and Venice each had her sphere of influence on the Dalmatian coast. It is the logical outcome of the new situation created by Italian unity (the sole alternative being war, involving mutual bankruptcy). The Turkish conquest of Hungary in the sixteenth century left Venice for three centuries without a rival on the Adriatic, and when the Republic fell in 1797, Austria stepped into her place, and after the short Illyrian interlude of the first Napoleon, ruled supreme from Trieste to the Straits of Otranto. Indeed, the first fifty years of the nineteenth century were for all Italy a period of Austrian domina- tion. Firmly planted in Milan, Verona, and Venice, and all-powerful at the petty Courts of Parma and Modena, Austria controlled the Hapsburg Grand Dukes of Tuscany and pulled the strings of government (if government it can be called) at Naples and Rome. Thus from 1815 to 1848 the Metternich system was supreme throughout the entire peninsula. The great revolution of 1848-49 shook the Hapsburg dominions to their base, and from the chaos there emerged, in place of the old stagnant despotism of Francis and Mettenuch, the modified absolutism which found its chief exponent in Alexander Bach. Still true to the double-headed eagle in her escutcheon, Austria from 1849 to 1859 continued her schemes of expansion on a double front,—in Germany and Italy at the same time. This policy, based on the Con- cordat and Ultramontane support, received its deathblow at Solferino in 1859; and during the next seven years, while vexed internally by Constitutional experiments, Austria devoted all her efforts to the struggle for mastery in Germany. In 1866 the dream of a "seventy-million Empire" under Hapsburg overlordship was finally destroyed by Bismarck's untiring energy, and at the same moment Venetia was transferred by Francis Joseph to the young kingdom of Italy.
The results of Italian unity upon the situation in the Adriatic could not fail to be momentous. The days when it could be ruled as an Austrian or Venetian lake were over, and for the first time in history two Powers of the first rank in Europe faced each other across the narrow
sea. From 1797 to 1866 Italy had remained a negligible quantity on the Adriatic ; henceforth, however unpromising her internal situation might be, her wishes could no longer be simply disregarded. For fifteen years after Sadowa Italy's isolation was alarming, and the dangers from her Eastern neighbour were emphasised by the Ultramontane sympathies of the Viennese Court. Happily, financial necessities imposed upon both countries an attitude of sullen inaction. It was only the renewed prominence of the Eastern question, and the growing suspicion with which Austria-Hungary regarded Russia's Balkan policy during the "seventies," that outweighed the Hapsburg distaste for an alliance with the usurper of the Quirinal ; and the scale was probably turned by the strong Italian sympathies of the Magyars, then represented by the all- powerful Andrassy. Austria-Hungary needed assured peace upon her Western frontier that she might be free to pursue in the Balkans that policy of expansion which events had rendered impossible for her in Italy and Germany. The acceptance of a European mandate in Bosnia, by offending Russia, threw Austria- Hungary definitely into the hands of Germany, and the adhesion of Italy to this alliance became merely a matter of time, which the Tunis incident finally deter; mined. The fact that Italy failed to secure a share of the booty at the Congress of Berlin was probably due to the want of skill on the part of her Envoy, since neither Bismarck nor Disraeli seems to have been opposed to her occupation of Albania. In any case, her failure served to emphasise her isolation, and prepared public opinion in Italy for the Triple Alliance, What results would have ensued from an Italian occupation of Albania it would be unprofitable to discuss ; for with every year which elapsed since the Congress it became snore evident that the neutrality of that province was the only safe solution to the problem. This has now been publicly admitted by the Foreign Ministers of the two allied Powers, and the "three stages of Austrian advance "—Serajevo, Vallona, Salonica—can no longer figure in the repertory of the Servian Press. The future of Albania as a separate entity is thus assured, and since many observers regard her people as the most virile and capable of all the Balkan, peoples, the time may not be far distant when her magnificent harbours will become the portals through which the culture and commerce of the West can permeate the Balkan Peninsula. Vallona, as an Austrian war-port, would dominate the whole coast of Italy from Taranto to Venice ; or, in the hands of Italy, would supply her with a cork for the Adriatic bottle which would far more than compensate for her dearth of east-coast harbours. Until the neutrality of this port had been secured, the interests of the two rivals ran counter to Albania's emancipation front barbarism and anarchy. These latest pronouncements will, it is to be hoped, form a prelude to reform in this, the most neglected province of European Turkey. Nor can the Macedonian question supply material for a quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Italy if the former really has no intention of advancing beyond Novibazar ; and from this step she is precluded by Baron 17011 Aehrenthal' disclaimer of all schemes of expansion.
Turning from problems of the Nearer East, we find the most fruitful source of difficulties between Austria- Hungary and Italy in the Irredentist movement (the Italian counterpart of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism; Jingoism, and other racial extravagances), which, strangely enough, reached its high-water mark at the very time when reasons of State dictated the Triple Alliance. The Irredentists, at the height of their pre- tensions, claimed Southern Tirol, Trieste, and the entire Istrian and Dalmatian coasts, as belonging of right to the unified kingdom of Italy. But the nineteenth century has been marked on the Eastern Adriatic coast by a gradual ebb of the Italian population before the advancing tide of Slav Renaissance. Ragusa—Italianised, if not Italian, in the days of its independence—has now long been a focus of Slav culture; Serbo-Croat has become the official language of Dalmatia, and even in 1890 was spoken by ninety-six per cent, of the population. Only Zara and Fiume hold their own desperately against the inroads of Croatian and Magyar Chauvinism and the Drang wash Osten of German commerce. In the entire coast provinces, from the suburbs of Trieste to Cattaro, there are now little more than a hundred and fifty thousand Italians. Thus even the wildest Irredentists have come to recognise the hopelessness of reclaiming provinces where the Italian element is in a minority of one in seven, and confine their aspirations to Trieste and its littoral, and to the Trentino (the Italian portion of Tirol). In the case of the former, sentiment rather than interest dictates the attitude of the Trieste population. Since 1382 the city has formed part of the Hapsburg dominions, and owes whatever prosperity it has enjoyed in the past entirely to its position as outlet to the Austrian hinterland. Now that Austria is becoming a manufac- turing country, and forms the connecting link between the industries of Germany and the Mediterranean, Trieste is more necessary thau ever to the Austrian Empire, and will reap an ever-increasing benefit from the connexion. The new harbour works which have been so much discussed in the Reichsrath prove the truth of both contentions. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Venice sought to recover Trieste, as a means of checking Hapsburg development, and her success would have meant the commercial ruin of the city. In the same way, to-day the union of Trieste to Italy would mean her abdication in favour of Venice, whose commercial position is now strengthened by the opening of the Simplon Tunnel. So long as the two cities remain the feeders of Lombardy and Austria there is room for both as prosperous and pro- gressive sea-ports. The inclusion of both within the same system must be fatal to one or the other (as the history of Venice from 1800 to 1866 clearly shows), and this time the victory would not rest with Trieste. The permanent danger to the peace of Europe involved in the exclusion Of Austria from her only good sea-port is too obvious to require comment. Hence the Municipio of Trieste (whose telegram at the death of King Humbert caused such a sensation) may continue to demonstrate in favour of the King of Italy ; but motives of self-preservation will restrain them from ever putting their theories into practice.
The Irredentist claim to the Trentino rests on a much firmer basis, since the Italians of Tirol form a compact taass of three hundred and seventy thousand, and since, moreover, the racial boundary corresponds with the geographical and strategic frontier. But racial fanaticism accounts for most of the friction, and has been fanned among the Italian population by the activity of the Deutsches Schulverein and other instruments of Germaniaa- tion. The impolitic attitude of the Austrian Government served to make matters worse, and the regrettable incidents of Innsbruck in 1903 contributed more than any external event towards loosening the Triple Alliance, and smoothed the way for If. Loubet's visit to Rome. Happily, the Government of Vienna has shown far more consideration for the Italians of Austria in the last three years ; and its impending recognition of Italian University diplomas will go a long way to smooth their ruffled feelings, even if no University is founded at Trieste. Under the new Parlia- ment of universal suffrage German Chauvinism will never, It may be hoped, reach the same lengths as in the evil days Of the Badeni Ministry.
Twenty-five years ago Baron Sonnino wrote as follows :
"The possession of Trieste, under the existing conditions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, is of the highest importance to it, and it would struggle to the death sooner than yield it up. Besides, it is the most favourably situated port for the entire Germanic trade. Its population is mixed, like that which adjoins our Eastern frontier. To reclaim Trieste as a right would be an
exaggeration of the principle of nationality Trentino, on the contrary, is without contest Italian soil, and would complete our defensive system, without having for Austria the importance of Trieste. But our interests in the Trentino are too trifling, in comparison with those represented by a sincere friendship with Austria."
These words apply with equal force to the situation of to-day, and the subsidence of Irredentist feeling in Italy which has been noticeable during the last three years suggests that their wisdom has at last impressed itself upon public opinion. No two countries in the world stand to lose so much by war as Austria-Hungary and Italy. Each is still emerging from a financial situation bordering upon bankruptcy ; each requires every effort to develop its nascent industries. While in Austria and Hungary alike the jealousies of rival nationalities would be a source of weakness in foreign complications, in Italy the grinding poverty of large masses of the people, the still unsolved problem of the temporal power, and the disasters of the Abyssinian Campaign are danger-signals which her states- men are too far-seeing to neglect. In an entente between Austria-Hungary and Italy lies the chief hope for the future of Southern Europe, and no country has a greater interest in its attainment than Great Britain, who is bound to them both by traditional ties of friendship and sympathy.
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