CABINET-WRECKING.
AGREAT deal of the criticism levelled against the Ministry for their past actions is thoroughly justi- fied. Yet in spite of that we deprecate the attempts now being made to overthrow the Cabinet. We believe that men who are sane as well as patriotic, who will take the trouble to think without passion on the Ministerial situa- tion, and will consider the question from all its sides and with all its possibilities for good and evil, will come to the conclusion that on the whole greater harm would be done by pulling down the Ministry than by leaving them to continue the conduct and management of the war. We will set forth shortly the reasons which have induced us to come to this conclusion. It is obvious that no wise man could wish for the overthrow of the present Ministry merely on vindictive or punitive grounds or in order to give another set of men an innings. The only ground which will justify swapping horses in war time is that there exists an alternative body of men capable of conducting the war better than those now in office. We see no such body of men available. This disposes of the notion of anew Cabinet in the true sense. If there is to be a change, it must be through a reorganization and a remaking of the Administration piecemeal. If it can be shown that there are certain members of the Cabinet who have done badly during the war, and that one has no right to assume that they will henceforth do better, who have, in fact, shown themselves incapable, they clearly should be got rid of. Again, if there are men in the Cabinet suffering from physical disabilities which prevent them giving their best work to the country, they also should retire. The same considerations would apply to men who have become stale through the long strain of office, and have lost alertness and elasticity of mind. In the cases suggested it would be right to risk putting in new men, even though there should be no absolute assurance that they were likely to prove ideal Ministers. The only ground which would at the present time justify acquiescence in the retention in the Cabinet of men not thoroughly efficient would be the ability of such men, if their removal were attempted, to wreck the scheme of reconstruction. It would obviously be absurd for the reconstructionists to defeat their own ends by attempting more than they could accomplish.
These considerations lead at once to the endeavour which is being made to get rid of the present Prime Minister. We fully recognize that the great majority of those who have come to believe that the Prime Minister is not equal to the task in which he is engaged, and that he should make room for some other man, unnamed, are inspired by no personal animus, or by any but the best and most patriotic of motives. They honestly think that the war has not been conducted as efficiently as it ought to have been, and as a result of this conviction they place the responsibility upon the Prime Minister, and ask their pound of flesh in amprdance with the implied contract between the Prime Minister and the country that he is responsible for the doings of the Ministry, and must answer for their failures just as he may claim approval for their successes. But even though we admit the theoretic right of those who are dissatisfied with the way in which the war has been managed to demand their pound of flesh, we would ask them to consider most carefully whether in existing circumstances it would be wise to do so. We are not playing a game of forfeits, or even engaged in teaching Prime Ministers their duties. What we have to think of is how to win the war, and all questions must be judged solely by that—i.e., whether any given change will improve or diminish our prospects of rapid victory. There is no other touchstone. Hero the first thing to remember is that Mr. Asquith, rightly or wrongly, has told the country quite plainly that he means to stick to his post, and will not vacate it merely because of criticism. This means, of course, that ho would fight, and fight hard, if any attempt were made to dislodge him. But in the present state of public opinion can it be said that it would be good for the country to deflect its energies to an internecine struggle of this kind ? If there were a universal feeling in the country that he had mismanaged the war, or if it were felt that he retained men whom it was his duty, however painful, to remove from office, or, again, if some great disaster were to overtake the country, no doubt he would become the subject of public odium, and there would be no difficulty as to his removal. But it cannot be said that such a state of things at present exists, and no one can wish it to exist, for that would be to wish for disaster. Possibly certain people might declare that if that state of odium does not exist, it may be necessary to create it by holding the Prime Minister up to obloquy. Into the abstract merits of such a proposition we do not intend to enter. It is sufficient for our purpose to say that we do not believe the attempt would be successful. The effort to secure a verdict from the country against the Primo Minister would fail, even though his position might be shaken by the attempt.
The only other way in which the Prime Minister might be forced to resign would be through the existence or emer- gence of some great popular figure—some man who would convince the country that the nation must be saved, and that he alone was capable of saving it. Suppose, for example, we had at this moment two great opposing figures such as we had at the height of their fame in Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Disraeli, and that one of them was in office and had failed to manage a great war successfully. In that event, no doubt, public opinion would call his great rival to the helm. But there is no such figure at present on the political horizon. If this is a sound view, and if again, as we believe, the reconstruction of the Ministry is necessary in the public interest, that recon- struction has got to be carried out with the assent and through the instrumentality of the present Prime Minister. But even though the persistent pressure of public opinion were to convince the Prime Minister that he must recon- struct his Cabinet in order to obtain the highest efficiency of administration, the task would even then be by no means accomplished. All Ministries are carefully constructed puzzles, and if two or three, or even one, of the pieces is withdrawn the whole thing is apt to fall down. A vacancy created by what in effect would be the force of public opinion, or even by purely voluntary resignation, might lead to internal difficulties of the most serious kind. When a great office becomes vacant it is by no means certain that the man best fitted to fill it can be given that post, unless we are assuming a Prime Minister of such ad 'tted weight, influence, and authority that his nomination will go unchal- lenged. It is far more likely that he will receive an ultimatum, not from the best man, but the man of most political power, to the effect that, though he is prepared to go on with the status quo, he is not prepared to see this or that man put over his head. Unless, then, there is some man designated by the weight of public opinion to fill a par- ticular vacancy, reconstruction may become a very poignant disappointment, and another square man may be put into a round hole. These are considerations which in the present state of feeling fret the ordinary man to fury. And no wonder ; but unfortunately such fretting will not surmount them. In a word, in order to avoid one series of evils we may fall into a greater.
" But do you really mean," we can hear our critics say, " to put us off with talk of this kind, and blandly to inform us that it is useless to attempt to bring about any better management of the war than we have at present ' Our answer to such criticism would be that which we suggested at the beginning of this article. Unless we have a list of men of first-rate ability and of fresh and vigorous mind to recommend to the country for the administration of its affairs, we believe that on the whole it will be safer and better to go on with the present Cabinet, subject, however, if a vacancy or vacancies should occur, to a strict and serious effort to fill those vacancies with the best possible men. Beyond that, we would try to have outside criticism focussed so as to be co-operative rather than destructive. You will never get the best work out of any body of men who are perpetually told that they are dolts and fools or self-seeking charlatans. You are far more likely to do good to the nation's cause by insisting that no man should despair of the republic than by constantly threatening the servants of the State. Good work is seldom done by those who aro perpetually reminded that they have ropes tied round their necks, and that the hangman is always in attendance in the basement.
What is vital just now is that the war should be carried to a finish with the maximum of energy combined with foresight and strong common-sense, and above all with resoluteness, not in the conventional sense of men who stamp their feet and talk about their wills being supreme, but true resoluteness. By " resolute " men we mean men who see the object before them steadily, and then pursue it, not like a mob of mad bulls, but with a persistence as quiet and reasonable as it is rigid—men who are not always starting new hares and hunting them by mistake for the old ones. But this quality of quiet resoluteness, though so desirable, will never be attained by men who are con- stantly being attacked with what they feel is unfairness, especially, as often happens, if they cannot defend them- selves against it, because to do so would be to betray to the enemy plans which it is essential should be kept secret. We are not great believers in what may be called the mechanical view of administration. You may have on paper the most perfectly designed system of government, and yet be very little advantaged thereby if the men who work the machine are not fit for their job. On the other hand, if you have got really efficient men they will manage to work what is apparently the most cumbrous machine in such a way as to secure from it the best results. In the last resort it is always the man behind the gun, the man behind the machine, that matters. In spite, however, of this essential truth, it is of course of great importance to have the best machine you can. And here one may usefully note one deficiency in the criticism which has been applied to the Government. A month or two ago we were all clamouring for a smaller Cabinet, but now that we have got it, in effect, through the War Council, the public appears to be forgetting its new toy. We still believe that if a triumvirate could have been established, formed from the heads of the two fighting Departments, presided over by the Prime Minister, and kept in touch by ad hoc consultations with the heads of the other great Depart- ments of State, we should have obtained the ideal machine for war purposes. But once again the man is the thing, and should it turn out, as has been whispered of late, that the present Secretary for War is wanted to discharge functions elsewhere which are specially appropriate to him, public opinion should be concentrated on seeing to it that the vacancy is filled, not merely to suit Parliamentary or political convenience, but by the very best man obtainable. We are fully conscious that what we have written above will seem but cold comfort to a great many of those who are burning with an earnest desire to infuse greater vigour and energy into the conduct of the war. The country, we believe, is absolutely resolute and absolutely determined to make every conceivable sacrifice to attain its end, and naturally such an attitude of mind leads to fierce impatience. But such impatience, though it may be morally justified, is a very dangerous mood to encourage, for out of it may grow rash action by means of which we shall defeat our own ends. The true attitude which the nation ought to endeavour to rise to is one of ceaseless vigilance, and vigilance without fuss. We must not let Ministers believe that blunders, or want of resolution, or, worse still, supineness and inactivity, will ever pass unobserved or will be forgotten. At the same time, we must let them feel that we are not going to be so unjust as to visit mischance as if it were the result of conscious faults of commission or omission. To do that is to create a sense of injustice under which no man can put forth his best work. In existing circumstances the best thing is to be as generous as ,possible to the Cabinet, and to give them every opportunity to fulfil the tremendous responsibilities that rest upon them. The man who is always swearing at his servants, and asking his friends whether they ever saw such a set of careless, incapable ruffians as those in his service, will never have an efficient household.
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