THE UNSEEN FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY.* WE have no hesitation in
saying that the Duke of Argyll's book is one of the most helpful and suggestive contributions ever made to the economic side of politics. With a mastery of phrase, and of the thought that lies below the phrase, which it would be difficult to overpraise, the Duke of Argyll deals with some of the most vital problems which beset mankind in their attempt to organise society, and to make the condition of man other than what it is in nature,—" nasty, brutish, short," disordered, and precarious. To describe the book, we must use an Elizabethan phrase. It is ripe in know- ledge and reason, The work is that of a man to whom age, and a long acquaintance with public affairs, have opened a vast store of wisdom, but whose intellect is at the same time in full vigour. Though the Duke of Argyll's criticism in this or that particular point may prove insufficient, we venture to predict that the book, as a whole, will ultimately be recognised as of permanent value to all investigators in the regions of politics and economics. In one instance, however, we wish it other than it is. The title is, in our opinion, somewhat inadequate. It hardly expresses what the book really is,— prolegomena to economic science.
The primary object of the Duke of Argyll is to " under- pin " the fabric raised by the political economists, and so to secure its stability. He points out that in many instances the plumb-line of reason and common-sense shows that the walls of this fabric are not built "true," are out of the per- pendicular, and that the " thrust " from the weight of deduction that has been placed on them, and which they have to sustain, is bringing them to ruin. lie proves further that this "settle- ment," this cracking of piers and tumbling of walls, is due to the fact that the foundations of the building were never properly pat in. From this, however, he argues, and argues rightly, not that there ought to be no building, but that the building must, as we have said, be "underpinned," and made to rest on a securer basis. The foundations on which economic science ultimately rests are certain definitions. These the Duke of Argyll examines, and, where necessary, makes good. In some parts of the building this is enough. In others, how- ever, it is necessary to entirely condemn and to pull down and rebuild. The metaphor we are using is more exact than most metaphors. Just as a weak foundation may seem good till the full weight of the building comes upon it, so the weak- ness of a definition is often not discoverable till the structure of a hundred linked syllogisms has been raised upon it. We only see how much the wall is out when we drop the plumb-line from the cornice-ledge at the top. The Duke of Argyll having shown that many of the conclusions of political economy are " out " when tested by common-sense, proceeds, as we have * The Uneeen Foundations of Socioty : an Examination of the Fallacies and Failures of Economic Science due to Neglected Elements. By the Duke of B.G.. It.T. Loudon: John Murray, Albemarle Street. 1883.
said, to examine the definitions. His first essential condition in regard to the definitions or foundations of the science with which he is dealing is that they shall be verbally well and truly laid,—that is, that the words of which they are composed shall be used in their true and real sense, and not in some special and arbitrary sense given them for the occasion. The words employed must bear the sense, the whole sense, and nothing but the sense, in which mankind actually uses them. That sounds a small matter, but it is all-important,— as important as it is for the builder to say, 'We will use real bricks, and not squares of wood which we will paint red and call bricks, for the purposes of this building.' Words are facts ; and unless this is recognised, the work will not be pro- perly carried out. All that the Duke of Argyll has to say on the true use of language cannot be given here, but we may notice one or two of his leading propositions. Excellent is his distinction between the two sorts of technical language:-
' One kind is natural, spontaneous, full of truthful perception —of subtle and appropriate meanings. The other kind is laboured and artificial, invented to express only some narrow and partial aspect of things, and intentionally shutting out truths far more important than those on which it seeks to lay special emphasis. The first, and the only good, kind of technical language is that which arises among workers whose minds are brought into touch with the unseen realities of nature, who instinctively recognise them, and who give to old words—generally by way of meta-
phor—some new and, often, some profound application But the other kind of technical language is that which is con- sciously and laboriously concocted by logicians and theorists of all kinds, whose minds are set upon some fragmentary conception about things, and who invent for these conceptions some jargon of their own. There are several ways in which this is done. One way is to seize on some familiar words of narrow meaning, and to use them as the equivalent for other words of rich and various import. Thus, for example, the idea of valuable things is squeezed into such common words as goods,' or com- modities,' or—worst of all utilities.' This is the lowering of a large conception down to the level of a small one. It is always easy in this way to eliminate the highest elements of thought which are involved in any science. Another way is to invent a new and pompous title for some one fact, or some one small group of facts, as if these facts indicated a special law applying to some special subject in economic science, when in reality these facts may be simply referable to one great general law which is well known and is equally applicable to the whole natural world."
In insisting upon the proper method of analysis, the Duke of Argyll is even more helpful and convincing :—
" It would be an exaggeration to affirm that a true and complete analysis of the abstract words used in economic science would be enough, by itself alone, to clear up all its difficulties. But it is no exaggeration at all to affirm that such an analysis would go a very long way indeed to solve them, by reminding us of number- less elements which have been out of mind because they have been out of sight. And there is one immense advantage in this analysis, that it would tend to substitute pure matters of fact for mere theories, opinions, and assumptions. The analysis of words, such as value, wealth, labour, capital, and others of a like kind, ought to be exactly like the analysis of any material substance in a chemist's laboratory. It ought to be a report upon facts. More- over, it ought to be an exhaustive report ; that is to say, it ought to render a strict account of every element of meaning that exists in the compound of which the whole consists. And in doing this completely it will, almost of necessity, be doing something more, because itwill reveal not only what words mean, but also how they came to mean it. For the ideas which words express have had a history—sometimes a very long and a very curious history. And the history of a word is the history of an idea. Etymology, indeed, may not be in every case a necessary part of the analysis which breaks up the meaning of a word, as it is now used, into its constituent elements. It may be enough if we are able to see clearly what those elements now are in actual application. But in our Attest of this actual composition, etymology will often, of necessity, come across our path, and older meanings and applica- tions will greatly help us in identifying central thoughts. Lin- guistic science traces all words to roots ; but every root in speech represents also a root in thought. Germinal sounds represent germinal conceptions ; and therefore the work of close verbal analysis, unlike the work of laying down mere mathematical axioms, embraces the element of time. It searches the past as interpreting the present. It goes back to history. It takes note of all the elements of genuine evolution. The results thus brought to light are in the nature of facts, as distinguished from mere opinions concerning facts. One fact of this kind may be quite sufficient of itself to disperse the most obstinate fallacies by not only cutting away the very ground on which they grew, but by substituting a new soil in which they cannot sprout again. Elements which we had totally forgotten are remem- bered. Some which we may not perhaps have totally forgotten, but to which we attached but little value, are seen to be of primary importance ; whilst others, again, which had engrossed all our attention, and on which great edifices of argument had been reared, are shown to be, at the best, mere bits of truth on which nothing can stand securely. In short, the Idols alike of our private Den, and of our public Course, can be, by such pro- cesses of analysis, dragged out into the light of the day, and can thus be revealed to us as what they are."
The declaration that a true analysis of words is "a report upon facts," is one of the most important contributions ever made to the study of the sciences which deal with human relations. If this truism had been oftener remembered, we should hear far fewer complaints of the "mountains of sophistry" that are "heaped o'er our heads."
We must now turn to the constructive portion of the Duke of Argyll's book. Accepting the statement of the older economists, that economics is the science of wealth, he pro- ceeds to define wealth by "a report upon the facts,"—that is, by inquiring what people actually mean by wealth, not by what they ought to mean. Here is his definition :—
"Wealth is—(l) The Possession, (2) in comparative abund- ance, (3) of things (4) which are objects of human desire, (5) not obtainable without some sacrifice, or some exertion, (6) and which are accessible to man able, as well as anxious, to acquire them."
After asking our readers to note that " possession "is inserted here as one of the essential elements of wealth, and to remember that possession is one of the hitherto "neglected elements" which it is the prime object of the Duke of Argyll to bring to light, we will quote the following in support of the definition :— " Our demand has been that the definition of the abstract words which express any aggregate of ideas, ought to be a pure matter of fact, and not at all a matter of opinion. We have no right to intrude our own opinions upon them. A higher authority than our own has made them what they are—namely, the speech- making faculty in man. Our demand has therefore been that the analysis of an abstract word, in the reasonings of philosophy, ought to be a process as accurate and as faithful as the analysis of a compound mineral in the laboratory of a chemist. It is the duty of a chemist to give a complete enumeration of all the elements which a stone or an ore contains—nothing more and nothing less. Exactly the same duty lies on us in the analysis of a word like wealth. It is our business to bring out, into the light of separate recognition, every distinguishable element of thought which it contains. We should leave out none that can be recognised as distinct ; whilst, on the other hand, the presence of each one of these, when it has been pointed out, ought to be instantly apparent, as an element undoubtedly contributory to the meaning of the whole. This, accordingly, is the claim we make for that definition of wealth which we have now reached. It is a pure matter of fact that the element of Possession is always present. It is a pure matter of fact that the element of comparative abundance is present also. It is a pure matter of fact that the 'things' which are the objects of possession in wealth, are not mere lumps of matter, but include all those relations between outward things and our- selves, which, in boundless variety, are habitually referred to under the wide use of that common word in the English language. It is a pure matter of fact that the one only limitation upon this category of,the things in the possession of which wealth consists is the limitation that they must be objects of legitimate desire to other men. It is a pure matter of fact that the quality of this desire must not be that of more faint wishes or aspirations, but such a desire, in measure and in kind, as to impel men to exertion and to sacrifice for the obtaining possession of the thing desired. It is a pure matter of fact that this kind and measure of desire— constituting a market or an effective demand—resides in the tastes, in the aspirations, in the character, in the aptitudes, in the energies and needs, bodily and mental, of the society in which we live.
We now come to our only point of disagreement with the Duke of Argyll. We accept his definition of wealth in its entirety and as a final definition, but we think he has not gone back quite far enough. We think that it would have been safer and clearer had be begun by stating what was the subject of economic science. The effect of starting, as he seems to do, with wealth, is to make it appear that wealth alone is the subject of economics, whereas, in fact, this is not the ease. We venture to suggest the following as the truer exposition :—Economics is the science which deals with things that are exchangeable. What makes things ex- changeable P Things are exchangeable for which men will give up the possession of something else. What are the things for which men will give up the possession of something else? Clearly, not things which men do not desire. Clearly, too, not things which they can obtain without giving up the possession of something else. The things, then, for which men will give up the possession of something else are things which men desire, and which they cannot obtain without giving up the possession of some- thing else. But the things which men cannot obtain with- out giving up the possession of something else are things of which the supply is limited. Therefore, things are exchangeable which are at one and the same time desired by men and of which the supply is limited. But we must go on to note that every- thing which is exchangeable has a value. What is value P Value is the measure of a thing's exchangeability. But since it is a.
measure, value varies. As what does value vary? Clearly, it must vary as that which is variable in. the elements which make things exchangeable. But that which is variable in the elements of exchangeability is the intensity of the de- sire, and the degree of the limitation of the supply. Hence, the value of a thing varies as the intensity of the desire and the degree of the limitation of the supply. That is, the value of a thing varies as the relation between the desire, or demand, for it, and the limitation of the supply. We know, then, what makes things exchangeable, and what gives them their greater or lesser value ; and we may define wealth as the Possession, in comparative abundance, of things which have value,—i.e., are exchangeable. It seems to us that this is a somewhat clearer and more comprehensive way of arriving at the definition. At the same time we are free to confess that it may turn out that the Duke of Argyll's is the better. On one point, however, we are clear. It is better not to treat wealth, which necessitates the notion of comparative abun- dance, as the subject of economics, but rather "things that are exchangeable." In this way, a wider horizon, one which takes in poverty as well as wealth, is secured.
Space, unfortunately, will not allow us to notice the thousand- and-one wise and significant things said by the Duke of Argyll in the course of his book. We cannot even notice his brilliant chapters on "The Ricardian Theory of Rent." All we can do is to advise all men of sense and sincerity who are engaged in discussing the social problem to read the Duke of Argyll's book. Be their principles and prepossessions what they will, they cannot but carry therefrom fresh means of illumination for the dark corners of Economic Science.
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