TOPICS OF THE DAY
• THE COMING DEBATE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
AN amazing amount of nonsense has been talked about foreign affairs during the past fortnight. Indeed, a record in fatuity may be said to have been reached. That seems a strong statement, but we make it deliberately and after the painful process of trying to find some scintilla of sense in the criticisms heaped upon the action of the Government during the crisis of the summer and early autumn. Unless we are very greatly mistaken Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues will emerge triumphant from the attacks of their confused and muddle-headed critics. Sir Edward Grey will be able to tell a perfectly plain tale, and that plain tale will put them down. In spite of the support which for the moment they believe they have found in the statements of the German Chancellor and of the German Foreign Minister, the case of the assailants of the Cabinet will dissolve into thin air. In these statements the old, old fable of the wolf and the lamb is once again set forth for all men to see. Germany is the injured innocent and France the wicked, provocative lamb who would stir up the water in the brook, and whose defence that whatever she had done was done below and not above stream is at once scouted by the wolf as a damning proof of her aggressive and hostile intentions. We are not in Sir Edward Grey's secrets and therefore do not know in the least what is the line he will take in his speech. But though we cannot anticipate his defence— strange as it may seem he has actually been put upon the defensive by a section of his own party—we shall have no difficulty in laying before our readers certain plain facts and considerations which will, we venture to say, destroy the case of the Government's critics quite as effectually as auy quotation from hitherto unpublished documents which Sir Edward Grey may care to make. All that is wanted to prick the bubble is to think the matter out and to draw certain very obvious conclusions from very obvious facts.
The main, the essential point in the diplomatic history of the last four months is that we have stood by France and have given her our complete support. That is the dominant fact. First, let our readers ask why we did this. Not because we wanted to injure Germany or the Triple Alliance per se ; not because we were bound by any entan- gling alliance with France which forced us to go to her aid, whether she was right or wrong, or whether or not British interests were imperilled ; not because we thought we could gain any selfish interests through a European quarrel ; not even because we were pledged in honour, though that, we admit, would have been an imperative consideration ; not because we were forced to keep our word, even to our own hurt. We supported France throughout and sup- ported her in the most persistent and emphatic manner out of sheer necessity. No other course consistent with national safety was open to us. To have taken any other action would have been to have overthrown those simple prin- ciples by which all sane men govern their conduct in private life, principles quite as applicable to the conduct of nations if the nations are to survive in the struggle for existence. These principles are crystallized in such homely phrases as : " Never let yourself be taken in detail " ; " Our turn will come next " ; " If you must fight, fight at an advantage" ; " Get help in a struggle and avoid isolation."
Last July, with a suddenness which shook all Europe, the German Government put strong pressure, though with an object not very clearly defined, upon the French Govern- ment as to the policy which France was pursuing under the various agreements existing in regard to Morocco. No one could tell exactly what was the extent of the pressure or where it would end. It might pass off or it might develop into coercion as violent as that placed on Russia two years ago in regard to the situation in the Balkans. The war-lord " in shining armour," that is, might be determined this time to draw the sword from the scabbard. France—it is no good to pretend otherwise—was, in fact, under the imminent menace of war. In these circum- stances our statesmen had to consider what would be their action if Germany, as seemed only too likely, pressed France so far that her Government could yield no further and war took place. If that had happened, and if France had been obliged to fight Germany alone, it cannot be doubted that the risk of France being over- whelmed and destroyed would have been very great. Ger- many has not only a more powerful and more numerous army than France, but in relation to France she now possesses the command of the sea—a tremendous asset which she did not possess in 1870. But looking at the matter in the coldest light, can we afford to let France be overwhelmed ? Unquestionably we cannot, for if France were overwhelmed our position as regards Germany would be utterly intolerable. Germany, flushed with victory and wielding a power such as even Napoleon never wielded, would be an impossible neighbour. For example, Germany might, as part of the terms of peace, have taken the whole French fleet. People here will say we could forbid it. We could only forbid it by war. But how utterly foolish we should look waging a war, not with the help of France, but with our possible ally crushed and dismembered. We should, in the supposed case, have postponed. action till the risk and danger had been multiplied for us a hundred- fold. In any event the war would have concluded with the certainty that our turn would come next, and come under circumstances involving the maximum, not the minimum, of disadvantage. Therefore the law of self- preservation told the Government that if it came to war we must stand by France.
That being so the next step was clear. It was much wiser and safer to let France, Germany, and the whole world know the fact than to conceal it. Doubt on the subject might easily have provoked the Germans to make war, or, as they would say, to get the inevitable war with France over. They would argue, in effect : "The English, distracted in their home affairs and governed by men of peace, will not at the moment go to the assistance of France. If we wait another year or two the situation may have entirely changed and they may be willing to fight. Let us therefore take advantage of circumstances so peculiarly favourable to us. It is true that France would hate to go to war with us, but if we really intend war there are plenty of ways, as Bismarck found, of making it." Having decided on the ground of self-preservation that we could not leave France to face Germany alone, the best interests of peace were clearly served by our making our position perfectly clear, as the Government made it in a speech in which Mr. Lloyd George became the mouth- piece of his colleagues. The Government stood by France in order to preserve the peace of the world, and they achieved their end. No doubt now the danger is past people are saying that Germany never meant to attack France. When they say this there is only one answer to them. They are living in a fool's paradise. The danger was imminent, and it was avoided, and only avoided, by the firmness of the Foreign Secretary, or, rather, of the Cabinet, for we have no wish to appear to filch the credit from his colleagues and bestow it only on Sir Edward Grey.
The next point of criticism seems more substantial, but is in reality not so. It is sometimes alleged that in stand- ing by France we were in effect inciting France to provoke Germany to war. If France had been an aggressive Power there might be something in this argument. But our Government were not acting in the dark. They were perfectly cognizant of the spirit of the French people and of French diplomacy. They knew well that they could trust France not to take aggressive action even though they knew that we were behind them. We say, ' then, without fear of contradiction that not only did our Government never attempt to urge France to stand out on points where she would not otherwise have stood out, but that the French never used our promised aid to take up an unreasonable or an aggressive attitude towards Germany. What we said in effect to France was : " If war is forced upon you we shall stand by you ; but the last thing we want is war, and if by timely concessions you can avoid it there will be no Power happier than Britain. We are your loyal friends, not diplomatic agents provocateurs." Here is the common-sense of the whole situation, and this is how the Government saved Europe—by following the path of self-preservation.
But even those who have reached this point are not always satisfied. Curiously enough, what seems specially to stick in their throats is, not that we promised to help France, but that we promised to help her by sending at once an expeditionary force of 150,000 men to support her army and to prevent the invasion of her territory. These critics would not have objected to war by sea, but they are immensely horrified by the idea of war by land. That appears to them something wicked and aggressive. They want war with limited liability. Apparently at the back of their minds they have an idea that by contemplating or threatening a naval war only we could help France and at the same time curry favour with the Germans. The idea is ludicrous. The Germans would have been just as hostile to us, just as determined to get their revenge, if we had only given or promised France naval help. The rulers of Germany are not woolly-headed theorists or sentimentalists, and do not divide hostility into water-tight or wind-tight compartments, or under- stand half-measures in war. The Cabinet realized, like sensible men, that if you are in. for war the only sane plan is to fight that war as hard as possible and get it over as quickly as possible. Confucius is said to have made only one remark about war, but that was comprehensive and sufficient : " If I fight I win." If anything so terrible as war is undertaken it is absolutely essential that the Power undertaking it should strain every nerve to bring it to a conclusive issue—should play to win. If we are at war we must fight to win and not conduct those cruel and inhuman and also futile operations of which men were fond in the eighteenth century when it was often thought good policy not to press wars too strongly. If we had gone to war to help France the only safe plan would have been to give her every pound or fraction of a pound of moral and physical pressure which we could get out of the national steam engine. By sending 150,000 troops of better physique, better training, and better equipment than any troops on the Continent, we could, in spite of the ap- parent smallness of the numbers, have materially helped France. Therefore no sane man can have a doubt that if war had taken place it would have been our duty to send that force abroad in the first week of the war and to make every preparation possible to double it later.
The notion of confining our operations to the sea when we might have afforded immense help to France on land can, indeed, be nothing short of a, nightmare to those who have any knowledge of what war means. One has only to ask this simple question : What would have been our feelings, what would have been our situation, if ultimately France had been beaten on land, but only beaten. narrowly, and in such a, way that our aid would have been sufficient to have turned the scale ? Should we not have stood before the world as guilty of folly unexampled in the history of man- kind ? Truly we should have deserved the fate in store for us. Having land power of a small but very potent kind, we were bound to use it, and therefore the verdict must be that the Government were abundantly right in making, as it is now no secret that they did, every preparation for despatching an expeditionary force to the Continent. Where that force should have been landed is a point much debated. We will only say one thing in regard to it. If you are going to help a friend your first duty is to ask him where he would like that aid applied. Had we gone to the aid of France we should of course have asked France where our extra 15 per cent. would be most useful. They would clearly have been sent to the place indicated in the French answer. If we knew where that place was our readers may be sure that we should not state it in public.
We have yet another consideration to set forth. It is this, and it really puts the matter in a nutshell. Our fluttered and bewildered pacificists—we do not call them pro-German because we have no objection, but rather the reverse, to their being pro-German so long as they will keep their heads clear and face the facts—must make up their minds on this fundamental point. Are they prepared to abandon. all attempt to maintain the balance of power in Europe ? Are they ready, that is, to let Germany obtain by statecraft, aided by the threat of physical force, com- plete domination over Europe ? Are they ready to allow her to take the Great Powers of Europe by the throat in turn and reduce them to satellites ? If they are, that is a clear and coherent policy, and from the point of view of those who believe in it nothing more is to be said. If, however, they are not prepared to go thus far, and regard the notion with as much horror as we do, and obviously as does the present Cabinet, then we say that the action of the present Government can be justified at every step they took. They did not go one inch in the wrong direction : they did not go one inch too far in the right direction. Instead they followed an absolutely necessary policy and were guided by the law of necessity founded on the law of self-preservation. This, we are convinced, is the funda- mental, the essential defence of the Government, and we have no more doubt than that the sun will rise to-morrow that if it is placed before the British people and the British House of Commons it will be accepted by them, with regret no doubt, for the facts disclosed are in a sense intensely regrettable, but also with the conviction that in the circumstances nothing else was possible, and that at any rate the Government may claim that they by their action have preserved the peace of Europe, and so the greatest of British interests.
There is left over yet one more plea. "Why not let Germany have her full share of colonial expansion ? " By all means let Germany have such expansion. Not only would we not hinder Germany in expanding, but we would do our best to find her ground for colonial settlement. By expanding she gives hostages against breaking the peace of Europe, and therefore on that plea alone we would do everything to meet her. It must not be sup- posed, however, that by this policy, though it is a right one, we shall put down German rivalry or German ant- agonism. We tried it when we gave Germany Heligoland ; yet ever since that cession of territory the hostility to Britain among German politicians and the German governing class has increased by leaps and bounds. National goodwill is not bought by lumps of sugar, but only by a community of interests. That is a fact to remember, though, let us say again, it is not a fact that should be used to prevent Germany from pursuing her wished-for policy of expansion. For ourselves we would gladly see Germany in possession of the Belgian Congo and the greater part of Portuguese Africa, nor, if she can arrange matters with her special friends and allies, the Turks, should we object to her carrying out her desire to establish a protectorate in Asia Minor.
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