The Arab world (2)

King Hassan's last chance

Joel Cohen

On high ground with commanding views over the hills of Rabat to the Atlantic, the finishing touches have been put to a magnificent mausoleum capable of accommodating several centuries of successors in what King Hassan II envisages as his long-lived Alaouite dynasty. Hassan's optimism is not universally shared. With the overthrow of Libya's King Idris in September 1969, Morocco was left the only monarchy in North Africa. Egypt, Libya and Algeria have each 'had a military revolution.

Indeed, King Hassan has not been without his share of army unrest. Within the past fifteen months the army has tried on two occasions to topple the king. The first abortive coup in July 1971 was organised by a group of military cadets led by General Medbou who, on sounding out the ,then Minister of the Interior, General Oufkir, about his intentions, received the reply: "If you succeed, I'm with you. If you fail, I shall have you shot." In the latest coup attempt General Oufkir, upgraded to the post Defence Minister, played a more central role in planning the air attack on the plane carrying the king. Yet it is precisely the army upon which the king has consistently relied to keep him on this throne at more than arm's length from the demands for social and economic reform voiced by the two opposition parties, the nationalist Istiqlal and the leftist Union Nationales des Forces Populaires.

The dilemma which has faced the king • in one form or another during the last decade has been how to devolve some of his power to a more popularly representative executive, thereby strengthening his regime, without at the same time losing complete control. In the early years of his reign, Hassan tried quasi-representative government but in 1965 he assumed all powers.

For the next four years Hassan ruled as an absolute monarch, relying for his governments on members of the so-called independent elite,' and for internal security on individual strongmen, notably General Oufkir. The first signs of some sort of return to constitutional rule came in 1969 when local elections were held.

Despite a boycott put on them by the Istiqlal and UNFP the officially announced results showed an apparently massive turn-out of voters and 83 per cent of the

seats went to a list of so-called 'neutral ' candidates presented by the government.

The opposition parties claimed that the 'neutral' candidates were not neutral at all but government appointees. A similar boycott was placed on a plebiscite held for a new draft constitution in July 1970.

The opposition parties suspected that Hassan's aim in holding these elections was to woo popular support and reduce his reliance on the army, and that it was not a sincere attempt to pave the way for social and economic reform which would, mean a diminution of his powers.

While his confidence in the army must be waning following this latest abortive coup, Hassan can rely, at least temporarily, on the support of the millions of hungry and illiterate peasants and their tribal chieftains in this largely rural and backward country. To them, despite his playboy image, he is the spiritual leader, semi-divine and beyond criticism. In the cities, however, the workers, the students and many intellectuals are increasingly angered by the deep-rooted corruption and the starvation level of a nation which has considerable economic resources.

This semi-divine image can clearly not last much longer. Already disapproval of the king's luxurious personal living style and of the corruption and favouritism associated with his regime is spreading beyond the politically conscious groups of the middle class and urban workers.

Hassan certainly realises that he must widen the support for the regime. Politically, he is a very astute man and despite the reverence with which he is treated by many of his countrymen the king is highly sensitive to the political forces at work in this country. He knows that he lives in a part of the world where monarchs are now distinctly unfashionable. This astuteness is nowhere more apparent than in foreign affairs. In the past four years he has solved three of the country's most serious problems in this field. He has restored normality to relations with Algeria, the Ben Barka affair is now officially forgotten and relations with France are good, and he has abandoned Morocco's long-standing claim to Mauretania — a claim which could not conceivably be won. His own image as an important statesman has been boosted domestically as well as internationally by Rabat being the venue of several meetings of the Arab heads of state as well as of this year's meeting of the Organisation of African Unity.

Whether Hassan's political skills will enable him to resolve the principal dilemma of his country's domestic policies is in doubt. If the king ceases to rely on the armed forces and becomes a limited constitutional monarch he will eventually be at the mercy of opposition forces which have in the past suffered from his dicta. The King's rejection of Istiqlal's policy of establishing a homogeneous government headed by a political figure has alienated temporarily both opposition groups who this week refused to join a national govern ment. In the less immediate future, the opposition parties may be willing to com promise their positions for fear that they would be suppressed if an army regime took over.

The best chance of survival for both the monarchy and the political parties seem to be in a recognition by both sides that they have a common aim in forestalling an army dictatorship. Such an objective could

be reached by a reduction in the powers of the king and by the willingness of the opposition parties to compromise in their

demands. Without such action the magnificent mausoleum overlooking Rabat is unlikely to have many — if any — occupants.