Nixon: an end to ideology
The foreign policy pursued by President Nixon, with the aid of Dr Kissinger, is, in strategy and tactics, designed not to solve problems but to change a system. Four years ago President Nixon found himself confronted with a number of specific diplomatic problems or traps, most notable among them Vietnam: it was necessary to solve, eliminate, or abandon such problems. Both the President and his National Security Adviser were unalterably opposed to the tradition that has grown up since the war, that foreign policy and diplomacy were about solving specific problems or crises. Thus, when Mr Nixon speaks of his desire to usher in a "generation of peace," he means that he intends: to change the bases of the international system which has existed, with minor alterations, since the last war; to alter treaty and diplomatic arrangements to correspond with the emergence of new foci of power; and to take out of international relations the element of ideology which has been so corrosive for a generation.
It has been difficult to grasp the nature and significance of this ambition, both because of President Nixon's intensely ideological past; and because we have been so accustomed to the basic lineaments and dispositions of the cold war that it is extremely difficult to grasp what a new world system would look like. Then, too, the intensely dramatic nature of Mr Nixon's tactics encourages commentators to dwell on the nature of an action and a gesture, rather than on the policy which underlies and underpins it. The drama which the President has injected into diplomatic manoeuvre is not merely, however, something that appeals to his nature: it is also an essential part of his tactics. Dr Kissinger is fond of quoting Cardinal Richelieu — not generally known to be one of his heroes — who once said " Both experience and reason make it evident that what is suddenly presented, ordinarily astonishes in such a fashion as to deprive one of the means of opposing it, while, if the execution is undertaken slowly, the gradual revelation of it can create the impression that it is only being projected and will not necessarily be executed."
There is another maxim of Richelieu well worth attending to as we contemplate the prospect of the next four years. "He who negotiates continuously ", the Cardinal said, "will finally find the right instant to attain his ends, and even if this does not come about, at least it can be said he has lost nothing while keeping abreast of events in the world, which is not of little consequence in the lives of states." We may certainly expect, next year, a period of intensive American diplomatic activity in Europe. There are two specific ends which the Americans will want to achieve — the successful conclusion of stage two of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the holding of a successful European Security Conference, now confidently 'expected for next June. SALT, stage one, was more successful as a portent of the future than it was for its actual achievement: it has made little difference, for instance, to the defence budgets of either of the two great super powers; and it has done nothing very seriously to undermine their capacity to destroy each other. SALT One, moreover, was a bilateral agreement between the USA and the USSR. President Nixon's partners were kept informed of what was going on and in his final speech in Moscow, the President spelt out clearly the delineations of influence and responsibility h1 considers ought to exist between himself and his allies. But the second stage of the talks cannot be considered except ir very close relation to a security conference. This is because there are two purposes to Soviet-American diplomacy — the first is to remove grounds for suspicion and hostility between the powers themselves, the second is to remove threats of war arising through activities on the part of their smaller allies We have now come to the point where the first and the second purpose are very closely interlocked; and it will be President Nixon's objective further to advance towards the defusing of, the super power arms race, and also towards mutual and, balanced force reductions in Europe.
At the same time, and parallel to these military-political ex. changes; the Americans will be trying to work out what their relations with their European allies in the next four years and after should be. It will be' essential to avert the threat of all economic war, which is always present as long as the enlarged Common Market continues to stick to a high tariff policy. Not only would such an economic war be inadvisable in itself: i1 would also seriously affect the capacity of the President, and of his successors, to maintain that involvement in the securitY of Europe which will be necessary, for them and us, even after a thaw has set in in relations with the USSR. The thaw itself will encourage people to feel that the threat of war has vary ished, whereas, in truth, war is kept at bay only through ur ceasing vigilance; and peace is maintained only by an ambig' uous combination of force and desire. If we add to the groW• ing conviction that there never will be another major waf such an outburst of United States opinion against the Euro' pean powers as would certainly follow the outbreak of a trade war, we can easily see that it would be extremely difficult for the United States to maintain her role as protector of Europe, a role in which she has almost as great an interest as out selves and which President Nixon, for all the pressures that have been put on him in recent years, has steadfastly refused to abandon.
Such policy as the United States follows in the Western heini' sphere is closely linked to policy in the Far East. It is 11° secret that the Government of China looks with favour on the Common Market, because in Peking it is believed that the solidification of Europe brings into potential existence anothe1 Great Power which can serve as a check on Russia in the West, thus relieving the strain on China in the East. The Americans are convinced — rightly in our judgement — that China's is not an aggressive government.
What President Nixon will be concerned to prevent, hay,' ever, is too great an intimacy between Japan and China. CO' tainly, as Europe acts in the Chinese interest as a check 00 Russia, Russia acts in the American interest as a check or China — a great Power, whatever its dispositions, must al ways be subject to checks. Were Japan to grow close t° China, the United States would be well on its way to exclusion from the Pacific. For this reason we may expect that, unless there are severe pressures at home, President Nixon will not be as anxious as the Europeans are to overcome Japanese protectionism. The President certainly realises that his rapprochement with China came as a severe blow to Japan, and unseated a Prime Minister. The theme of the next four years Will be the binding of wounds, and the attempt to involve Japan more deeply in American policy in Asia, notably in South East Asia.
There remain four other areas to be fitted into the puzzle: Africa, the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent, and the Indian Ocean. It seems fairly clear now that the main brunt of the American effort for peace in the Middle East will be directed towards persuading the Jordanians and the Israelis to sign a bi-lateral truce. Movements in this direction have already excited the suspicion and animosity of Egypt, Libya and the Sudan. At the same time, the British Foreign Office, and the Foreign Secretary personally, have been convinced for some dine that the Government of President Sadat does want peace. It is unlikely, however, that Arab amour propre Will allow Egypt or any other Arab country to offer anything more than secret good wishes to the American effort in Amman. It will therefore be the role of Britain and France to continue their own separate efforts in Cairo, thus contributing to other parts of the mosaic of an Arab-Israeli settlement.
The United States has little to offer in Africa, the Indian Ocean, or the Indian sub-continent. In retrospect, it seems that the excessive American enthusiasm for Pakistan, during the late Indo-Pakistani war, was due to a fear of offending China — an ally of Pakistan — at a time when delicate negotiations with that country were under way. But the vigour of the American stand then has certainly irreparably damaged the American position in New Delhi, to the advantage of the Russians. Neither the United States nor her allies can look with any degree of comfort on an expansion of Russian interests in India, at a time when the Russians are vigorously developing their naval power in the Indian Ocean. Here again, it will be necessary for the middle powers, and particularly those of Europe, to become ever more closely involved in the periphery of Asia, and in the Indian subcontinent especially. It is fortunate that Mr Heath grasps the importance of that fact, and that we have the suspicious nature of Lord Carrington, who shows no diminution of his old distrust of the continued Russian arms build up, to reinforce him. Ft seems certain that one of the objects of British policy inside the Common Market Will be to make such common foreign policy as develops for all the powers look like old British policy.
The essence of the new system which the President is hoping to create is that in foreign policy and international relations an end to ideology is in sight. Statesmen will be more prepared seriously to examine the international system of states as a delicately interlocking mechanism of power and disposition. Gradually, the place of small — even very small — states Within the scheme of things will come to be studied objectively. They will not be favoured for their system of government, or for their positions as bastions of the free, or of the communist world, but for the place they occupy in the structure of power. This does not mean that war has been permanently avoided, that big powers may not from time to time become aggressive and attack their neighbours, that even bigger powers may not then have to go to war to defend small friends. But it does mean that these eventualities will be less likely; and that it will be more easy to localise them. Regional conflicts will be understood not necessarily (because not ideolbgically) to involve the super powers. That this welcome development is coming about is due more than anything else to the wisdom and creativity of President Nixon, the ,onte ugly American ideologue now turned pragmatist.
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