THE 1TNWORKABLENESS OF FEDERALISM.
MR. JOHN MORLEY, in his interesting speech at New- castle on Monday, asks the Spectator whether the Imperial law is obeyed in Ireland now, and whether the Empire is not weakened now by the existing feebleness of our Government there ? We should reply without hesi- tation in the affirmative ; but we should add that the feeble- ness resulted, first, from the timorousness of the Liberals in not uniting together heartily to pass Lord Spencer's pro- posed Crimes Bill,—and but for their internal dissensions
they would never have been thrown out,—and, next, from the cowardice of the Tories in accepting Mr. Parnell's dictation in relation to a policy which, on their own principles, they ought to have made conformable to Lord Spencer's requisition. We wholly deny that for the two years before Mr. Gladstone's defeat, the Imperial law was dis- obeyed in Ireland. Rents were regularly paid ; agrarian crime sank very low ; and nothing was requisite, beyond tenacity and steadiness in adhering to Lord Spencer's policy, to keep Ireland as free from crime as she was politically free. Is it to be seriously contended for a moment that if English statesmen on both sides of the House were resolute, we could not, in spite of Mr. Parnell and his eighty-six followers, pass again such portions of the expired Crimes Act as would be necessary to restore Ireland to quiet ? We are well aware that this cannot be done if Liberals in general join Mr. Morley in praising the Tories for refusing to connect an extended suffrage with a special law against agrarian crime. But in taking this line Mr. Morley appears to us to have not a vestige of principle to go upon, and to be doing all in his power to relax that fibre of purpose in politicians to which he makes so just and earnest an appeal when he points out the fearfully critical character of the situation and the dangers on all hands through which our statesmen have to steer. Let us grant freely,—and we do not only grant, but assert,—that every course open to us is full of difficulties, and especially that it is extremely difficult to pass a law repressing agrarian crime with eighty-six Irish Members all united to embarrass and discredit the Government which attempts it. Still, it is childish to treat such a course as impossible. So far from being impossible, it seems to us at least as prac- ticable in the present state of parties as any other course we can devise ; while, in our opinion, it leads to a far less serious crisis hereafter. No doubt, it would involve a very bitter struggle with the Parnellites. No doubt, it might even end in a suspension of many of the Irish representatives, if they tried, as they probably would, to paralyse Parliament by systematic obstruction. We are very far indeed from regarding such a struggle with a light heart. We re- gard it with a very heavy heart, with the heaviest heart possible to political foresight. But, then, as Mr. John Morley himself points out, there is no course open to us which is not full of perils ; and, in our opinion, there is no other course which is not even much fuller of perils than this. If we under- stand Mr. Morley aright, what he is looking for is either some plan of Home-rule which will leave Ireland as much to herself as a Colony, and give her no representation in the Imperial Parliament, or some plan of Home-rule which will involve a Federal system. Now, as to the former, it is, per- haps, sufficient to say that we do not believe it could last. It would leave Ireland free to ruin herself by a Protective system, and would endanger the only source of Imperial taxa- tion,--the Customs,—which we could control. Virtually, it would involve the sacrifice of every guarantee for the security of Ireland's share in the Debt of the United Kingdom ; and over and above this, it would be so illogical to tax Ireland for a share in Imperial expenses over the amount of which she had no control, that we should come back to Federalism after all, and probably come back to it under the pressure of English and Scotch, rather than of Irish, opinion.
Well, as to the financial side of Federalism, we have said enough elsewhere ; and it seems to us that the argument we have put forth is of great weight. But what we now draw attention to is the effect of conceding Federalism, under such pressure as we have now applied to us, on the British Empire. We must remember,—what, indeed, we are not allowed to forget,—that a Federal system conceded for the sake of Ireland would very soon indeed spread to Scotland and Wales. Indeed, many of its advocates are already pressing this as one of its greatest advantages, that it would provide a means of giving self-government to Scotland and Wales which would be very congenial to the people of those parts of the United Kingdom. So that Scotland and Wales, which have never asked for Federalism, would be positively encouraged to ask for it at once ; while England, which has not the smallest wish for a local Assembly distinct from Parliament, would be almost forced by the 'mere law of symmetry to accept what she has never even thought of wishing for. Now, let us just consider the effect of breaking up the old historic Colstitution of England into these new, untried, pape7 tetrarch's, simply because eighty- s'sr Members returned by a particular section of the United Kingdom threaten us wit') open or veiled rebellion if we do not grant them their separate tetrarchy. It would be not only the embarkation on an unknown sea of which it would be almost impossible to anticipate clearly even the preliminary difficulties, but the embarkation on it under pressure so exceedingly inadequate to the occasion, that we should justly be regarded as having lost all that conservative instinct which is the first principle of national life. With four important and totally different Assemblies to determine the incidence of rates, and to wrangle with the Imperial Parliament whenever its central system of taxation hap- pened to interfere with their wishes as to the incidence of the rates,—who can imagine for an instant that we could have the smallest security for any continuity of national policy, or even of national character ? It would be beginning our history anew in the nineteenth century, and beginning it anew for a reason much more trivial and inadequate than those advanced to the Northern States for letting the South secede. And it is folly to say that if we give way in Ireland, nothing is likely to follow in Scotland and Wales. It is simply impossible, under a popular Government, to admit a fruitful principle and then refuse to apply its logic to all cases to which it properly applies. If we once admit that because the Irish Members show a large majority for Home-rule they ought to have Home-rule, it will be simply impossible to refuse it to a large majority of Scotch Members or a large majority of Welsh Members. Indeed, we do not see any reason why it should stop there. England north of the Trent is more distinct from England south of the Trent than England north of the Trent is from the Scotch Lowlands. Lmdon is more distinct from the rural districts of Southern England than the rural districts of Southern England are from the Midland Counties. The contagion of disintegration will spread rapidly. And that which began in giving Home-rule to Ireland would soon go forward into the formation of four tetrarchies ; while these would not exist for many years without further cellular sub-division of a like kind.
The truth is that the whole process proceeds from pure weaknes4, from want of tenacity. If we have not the strength to say to the Irish, 'Except so far as your special disorders call for special remedies you shall be treated as we treat ourselves,—and amongst ourselves also we should claim to apply special remedies to special disorders,—but we will not go further. We will not break up the United Kingdom into independant organisations, just because you hate us, any more than you would allow Ulster to break off from you because she happened to dislike your government.' If we have not the strength to say that, we have not the strength ta remain a nation at all. We are threatened, as it seems to us, with a political attack of that dangerous disease which the physicians call by the formidable name of locomotory ataxia,— the inability of the nervous centres to determine the muscular motions of the body. Democracy ought to be strongest of all in its insistency that properly represented parts of the body corporate shall not set the body corporate at defiance and set up for themselvee. It was found equal to this strength of purpose in the United States, and we trust that it will be found equal to it in the United Kingdom. There is no danger in the unanimity of the Parnellite Party to
compare for a moment with the unanimity of the Southern States in their wish for Secession. The trial was severe, and the conflict was long ; but the tenacity of the Democracy triumphed at last. We believe that it will be so with us. Difficult as the problem is,—and we know no problem half so difficult,—to treat the Irish crisis at once temperately and firmly, it is not by any means so difficult as that which the Northern States succeeded in solving in the great decade between 1860 and 1870. Now we are approaching, not, indeed, an equally dangerous crisis, but still one which is even more serious in one respect,—that so far as we can see at present, there is more chance of serious differences amongst ourselves in Great Britain than there was in 1861 amongst the electors of the Northern States. If we show indecision, if we show weakness, if we show that the spirit of determination to put down the Secessionist tendencies of the day is not high within us, we shall undoubtedly be giving the first serious signal of national decay. We do not believe that it will be so. We believe that Great Britain, directly the situation comes out clearly before her, will nerve herself to as strenuous a policy as that which secured the integrity of the American nation in the great crisis of 1861. If Mr. Gladstone ever made a great mistake, he made it in anticipating that the South had established their independence. We trust that he will not make a similar mistake in the present case.
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