THE PROBLEM OF THE SECOND CHAMBER.
ASUPERFICIAL study of the debate in the House of Lords on Monday might easily lead to the conclusion that there was no very great difference of opinion between Lord Lansdowne and Lord Rosebery in regard to the question of a Second Chamber. Yet in reality the attitude adopted by the two speakers was miles apart. They were moving on different planes. We do not hesitate to say that Lord Rosebery will be found to possess a much clearer and firmer grasp of the realities of the situation, and also that he has much more successfully diagnosed the feeling of the country. Lord Lansdowne, though he frankly admitted the willingness of the House of Lords to consider the problem of reform, apparently does not realise that the matter has passed far beyond the question of reforming the House of Lords. Lord Rosebery, on the other hand, understands that what is before the country is the problem not of the Lords but of a Second Chamber,—the problem of a single Chamber versus a bicameral system. The matter in dispute is whether we are to have what Mirabeau called "the most insupportable of all tyrannies, that of a single Chamber," or an effective Second Chamber which will be able to insist that it is the will of the people that must prevail, and not the will of a chance majority in A. particular House of Commons. Lord Rosebery also perceives that practically no one in the country is content with the House of Lords as it is. The Liberals .are discontented with it because they do not consider it an impartial body, but merely an enforcement of the power of the Unionist section of the House of Commons, whether that section is in office or in opposition. Conservatives and moderates are hardly less dissatisfied with the House of Lords, though on entirely different, or rather on opposite, grounds. They object to the House of Lords, not because it has too much, but because it has too little power ; not because it throws out too many Bills, but because it throws out too few ; not because it is an obstacle to party legis- lation, but because it is not obstacle enough. To take only three examples in the last Parliament. A strong and efficient Upper House would have insisted upon either the modification or the rejection of the Trade Disputes Bill, of the Old-Age Pensions Bill, and of the Miners' Eight Hours Bill. The House of Lords bad not the requisite strength for the task, and though strongly objecting to these three Bills in the form in which they were presented, allowed them, to the great damage of the true interests of the country, to become law.
The country, then, as a whole is agreed, though for reasons so very divergent, that the House of Lords cannot remain as it is. It is also agreed, as Lord Rosebery in effect told the Peers, that the chief change wanted in the House of Lords is that it shall no longer be based on the hereditary principle pure and simple and without modifi- cation. The Liberals dislike the pure and unlimited hereditary principle for one set of reasons, the Con- servative advocates of a strong Second Chamber for another set, but again both agree in disliking it. Into the Liberal reasons we will not go, but we may point out that the opposition of moderates and Conserva- tives is due to the fact that the pure and unlimited hereditary principle is not one upon which a really strong and efficient Second Chamber can be based. The men who sit in the House of Lords merely by reason of their birth have not sufficient confidence in their position to enable them to do what a Second Chamber must occasionally do,— offer an absolute and unyielding opposition to the Lower House. As Lord Rosebery put it, "I believe the country, while resolutely opposed to the hereditary nature of this House, is equally determined to have a strong and efficient Second Chamber." Lord Rosebery was not content to leave the matter here. He pointed out that this is a golden moment for the Lords, a, golden oppor- tunity which may not recur, and urged that they should avail themselves of it with as little delay as possible. They must put themselves in a position to resist attacks which may weaken, not the House of Lords, but the Second Chamber, which, he added, "is infinitely more important to the country." We agree with Lord Rose- bery, and hold that the Lords will make a capital error in tactics if they play the part which Lord Lansdowne apparently advises,—that of waiting to see what the other side propose in the matter of House of Lords reform. They must not be content with a critical attitude. What they should do, and. what they can do with enormous effect just now, is to let the country see that they realise that the need of the moment is a strong Second House, and that they are willing to sacrifice their own special privileges in order to secure it. They are not able as it is to do the full work of a Second Chamber, and therefore the basis of their constitution must be altered. All they should claim is to fulfil the trust which belongs to them,—to see that any change is sincere and honest, and made in the interests of the nation, and not merely of one party. If Lord Lansdowne could be prevailed upon to take up this attitude, and, without troubling as to what is happening in the Commons, to persuade the Lords to discuss and lay down the true principles on which a Second Chamber ought to be constituted, we believe he would be astonished at the amount of support which he would receive in the country. The House of Lords might indeed under his direction become a Constitutional Convention in which with due care and due deliberation the whole problem of the Second Chamber could be thrashed out in detail.
The Lords as a preliminary might adopt a series of Resolutions embodying the essentials of the question. We suggest that, to begin with, they should insist on the need in any sound Constitution of an efficient Second Chamber, —a Second Chamber with powers co-ordinate with those of the Lower House in all matters of legislation. Next, they should resolve that the initiation of measures imposing taxation on the people must as now belong solely to the Lower House. This is the rule in France and in the United States, and though it seems a small matter, is in reality a very great limitation of the powers of the Second Chamber in questions of finance. It means, in effect, that the Upper House has no power to tax the people, but only to prevent taxation which it believes to be unwise. It means also that the Upper House cannot touch, or even propose to touch, old taxes, but that its assent is needed for all new taxes and the machinery required for them. That is the result in France of the rule of the Constitution under which taxation can only be initiated in the Lower House. The Senate cannot alter existing taxes, but its consent must be obtained for any novel financial project. The next Resolutions which we suggest that Lord Lans- downe should place before the House of Lords would deal with its constitution. The most important of these would embody the decision at which Lord. Rosebery's Committee on the reform of the House of Lords has already arrived,— namely, that the hereditary principle should not of itself confer the right to sit in the Second Chamber. We would therefore suggest that it should be laid down that the Second Chamber should consist of four hundred. Members, and that of these one half should be chosen for a period of, say, twelve years by the direct suffrages of all persons entitled to vote at Parliamentary elections, but under a system of proportional representation. Peers, like other men, would vote and be eligible for election. The next principle which we suggest that the Lords should adopt is that the other half of the Second Chamber should be selected from among the existing Members of the House of Lords. Here at once arises the question of the manner in which the selection should be carried out. The proposals that have been made as to selection resolve themselves into two divisions. The non-elected Peers who are to represent that continuity of tradition which practically every one is agreed is an asset well worth preserving can either be chosen out of the whole body by a system of minority voting, or else by what we may term a system of automatic selection. Under this system of automatic selection Members of the existing House of Lords can be selected because they are holders of or have held certain offices, a system which we may name the Senatorial system, since it was roughly that which prevailed at Rome. Which of these two methods should be adopted, provided that the object is to get the best and strongest Upper House ? On the whole we believe that the Senatorial is the better system.
What is wanted above all things in a Second. Chamber is independence of attitude, and such independence is more likely to be secured by taking Peers who have held certain offices than by election from within. Under a system of election from within it is almost inevitable that the men both on the majority and the minority lists would be strict party men, and not necessarily men of independence and. experience. The elected Peers would no doubt value their positions very greatly, and they could not therefore help being to some extent influenced by the thought of re-election. On the other hand, if the men who formed the non-popularly elected section of the Upper House felt that they owed their position, not to the goodwill of any body of men however distinguished, but solely to the fact that they had at some time or other held some great public office or trust, they would have a sense of personal inde- pendence obtainable in no other way. They could, and we believe would, be independent of party considerations. We cannot here give a list of the offices which should entitle a man to a seat in the Upper House, but for all practical purposes it is sufficient to indicate that all Peers who were also Privy Councillors would be found among the two hundred. These automatically include Peers who have been members of an Administration or who have held posts as Ambassadors or Governors, or, again, who have held the highest commands in the Army and the Navy. These at present number about a hundred. In addition there must, of course, be the Law Lords and representatives of the Established Church of England, the Established Church of Scotland, and the Free Churches, who would be named for life by the Crown. Further, we should like to add the holders of certain offices who are not now as a rule Privy Councillors, and to see any Peer who before succeeding to his peerage had twice been chosen by a constituency to sit in the House of Commons given a Senatorial position, and also any Peer who had for two terms of office been the Chairman of a County Council or Mayor of a great town. In this manner the two hundred non-elective Peers could be made up. Note that, though the number would be fixed so that the House could never be swamped, there would still be a certain elasticity. If the Ministry of the day wanted a particular Peer in the Upper House, they would only have to make him a Privy Councillor, provided there were a vacancy in the two hundred, for we would give the Privy Council Peers the first claim, and only complete the House by the senior Peers on a list of those who had twice been elected to the Commons, or been Chairmen of County Councils or Mayors of big towns. These, however, are all matters of detail. The principle would be that the two hundred persons chosen from the House of Lords would be chosen auto- matically, and would sit by virtue of the services rendered by them to the State rather than by the will and pleasure of any other persons. They would be freeholders, not leasehold tenants. That principle accepted, the details could easily be worked out. In addition to this state- ment of the principles under which the House should be constituted, we would add a Resolution making provision that deadlocks between the two Houses should be settled by the Referendum.
We do not of course suggest for a moment that we have been able on this occasion, any more than on the last when we tried our hand at the task, to sketch out a perfect Upper House. Again, we are well aware that our present suggestions differ in certain important particulars from those made in "A Skeleton Scheme," published a fortnight ago. What we do say, however, is that the Lords by discussing Resolutions of the kind we have foreshadowed would be able to arrive at the outline of a satisfactory House. In doing so they would confer a very great benefit upon the country, for they would help to clarify the public mind. on a large number of problems about which it is now hazy and confused. The country wants a clear, honest, and well-considered discussion of the whole matter, and since it is obvious that the House of Commons cannot and will not give it, it is the business of the Lords to supply the want. No doubt when they first set about the work they will be attacked with partisan fury, but they need not mind that. As soon as they have settled down to real discussion they will find an extraordinary change in public opinion. The country will rapidly get interested, and will follow their debates with close and sympathetic attention. The Lords have a great chance to take the stage and hold it. If they fail to realise this fact they will, as Lord Rosebery so well pointed out, miss a golden opportunity.
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