BOOKS.
GERMAN SEA-POWER.*
GERMAN sea-power cannot fail to be a subject of interest at the present time. Its latent possibilities were shown more than four centuries ago by the success of the Hanseatic League, but its limitations were equally seen when the Thirty Years' War almost entirely effaced the results of that co-operative movement. Political unrest and struggles on land destroyed the naval development. The colonial expan- sion initiated by the great Elector during the latter part of the seventeenth century died away from the same cause. His successors directed their gaze inland. The Continental wars of Frederick the Great, the partition of Poland, the rivalry between Austria and Prussia, the Napoleonic wars, continued to absorb the whole energy of Germany. The attempt to create a national navy in the year 1848 ended in failure. However much her people may have desired one, a German navy was found to be impossible until her political union was completed in the year 1870, after which one was evolved out of the existing small navy of Prussia. It remains to be seen whether the pressure on the Continental frontiers will in the future any more than in the past permit the con- tinued maintenance of a powerful fleet. Germany may risk as much on land by diverting too much strength to the sea as Great Britain may hazard at sea by committing herself prematurely to Continental enterprises beyond her power.
In the development of the German navy two different policies have been competing for control. In the one the protection of the coasts occupied the front place, in the other the destruction of the enemy's main fleet was the primary object. The blockade of the German ports by the Danish navy in the year 1848 powerfully influenced public opinion and gave a stimulus to the former policy, as was seen in the building programmes for the years 1849, 1805, 1872, and 1883. At the two last-mentioned times the Minister of Marine was a Prussian general—von Stosch—who, influenced by the military success and naval failure in the war with France, held that their army was the chief offensive instru- ment, and that the defensive role was proper for the navy. The result was that under his auspices a great development was given to the torpedo-boat flotillas, which experience has since proved to be very imperfect instruments of war. It was the Hohenzollern Prince Adalbert who championed the latter policy. He held that "Germany must build either no ships of the line, or so many that she can act towards her neighbours as an independent sea Power." He assumed that twenty ships of the line would be the minimum that would be able to act against the Russian Baltic Fleet, and that such a number would make Germany fourth among the sea Powers of the first rank at that time, and place her incontestably in a position to play a great role at sea. For with her twenty ships of the line she " would be able to throw an enormous weight into the scales, turn the balance by her adherence to an alliance, and consequently be as much sought after as an ally on account of her sea power as on account of her land power." It is this policy which has been developed by Admiral von Tirpitz in the several Navy Bills submitted to the Reichstag since he became Minister of Marine in the year 1897, and fully explained in the various memoranda attached to them. That issued with the Navy
• German Sec-Pmeer: Its Rise, Progress, and Economic BOAC By Archibald Hurd andHenry Castle. Loudon John Murray. [10s. 6d. net.] act of 1898 set forth its military meaning to be that against 'the greater sea Powers the battle fleet would be used as a sortie Beet, that is to say, that being the weaker it would have to wait favourable opportunities to make sorties against the enemy's detachments. In that attached to the Act of 1900 that -idea was discarded as being altogether inadequate, since the blockade of the weaker navy in port would only be a question -of time. The rile of the battle fleet was distinctly held to be not to confine itself to sorties, but to meet that of the enemy on at least equal, if not superior terms. This was thought to be possible even against a superior naval Power, since such :an one A!ould not always be able to concentrate all his fighting strength, and Germany might be able to select her own time to attack. Another marked feature pointing to the same policy was that the demands for home service were kept quite separate from those for foreign stations. The Home Fleet was given by law a military organization, and its numerical strength was fixed by law, while the size and type of each class of ship were left to be settled by the Marine Depart- ment as military necessity and mechanical improvement demanded. The Home Fleet was treated as a complete military whole to do the primary work of beating the enemy's fleet, while the foreign service ships were provided to reap the fruits of victory, whether won by diplomacy or war, as is explained in the memorandum. The relative importance attached to the two services was shown by the fact that in the year 1900, when money could not be found for the whole requirements, the foreign service was sacrificed and the demands for it were only completed by the law of the year 1906. A third military feature was the stress laid on the importance of training the personnel, and the steps taken to improve that by keeping a large number of ships in full oommission. The law of the year 1912 provides that the battleships and large cruisers of the Home Fleet shall ultimately be maintained thus :-
Active fleet in commission with full crews ... 33 Reserve fleet in commission with reduced crews 5 Reserve fleet not in commission... ... 15 53 The eight large cruisers of the foreign service fleet are not included. Thus certainly thirty-three and possibly thirty- -eight capital ships will be ready to act at the shortest notice, and the fleet which will ultimately issue into the North Sea will number fifty-three, or nearly twice as many as were under Nelson at Trafalgar, without mentioning small cruisers, .destroyers, submarines, &c. The number of the personnel will reach 107,000 in the year 1920, and thus future naval ;battles may witness numbers engaged such as have not been seen since the days of Rome. A further mark of the new policy is to be found in the increased coal supply given to the ships laid down since the year 1898, as this indicates that they are not to be used as mere sortie ships.
It is evident that Admiral von Tirpitz thoroughly under- -stands how to prepare victory. With such a great force at disposal he cannot but intend that its principal effort shall be directed to destroy, or neutralize the action of, the main fight- ing fleet opposed to it. No ships will be detached for any purpose other than to create diversions which may facilitate this main enterprise. Our own Government certainly seem to have bad no appreciation of this intention, seeing that in November 1910 an official communication was published which began: "The really serious danger that this country has to guard against in war is not invasion, but interruption of our trade and destruction of our merchant shipping." Not a word was mentioned of the possibility of our fleet meeting any difficulty in holding its own, or of being worsted, as may occur if it is not properly used. We arrive at this antithesis : the German admiral evidently thinks that by careful pre- paration he may be able to defeat the British fleet; the British -admiral holds that to be so unlikely as not to be worth mentioning. This inability to realize the changed conditions -and face the facts causes the onlooker to have doubts.
The authors have much to say on the shipbuilding policies both of this country and of Germany, but on such a technical matter they are not reliable guides. They reproduce state- ments long recognized by the naval profession to be crude and -wanting in accuracy. Much stress is laid on the delay of two years caused to Germany by the advent of the 'Dreadnought' in the year 1905. It is difficult to see that this has resulted in
any disadvantage to that country. What are two years in the development of such a navy ? The principal, if not the only, result of that ship's appearance has been that all nations have built, or are building, larger and more costly ships, but the relative position is very much the same as before. Thus the claim put forward at the time, that other nations would not follow suit, has proved to be quite wrong.
Turning to the question of the armament of capital ships, the statement on p. 139 that certain German ships "embody the all-big-gun principle in association with a powerful secondary armament, consisting of a dozen 5.9-inch guns and sixteen 24-pounders," is misleading. The all-big-gun principle embodies the idea that the main armament of a ship shall consist only of large guns, such as 12-inch, and shall not include secondary guns, such as 59-inch. Smaller guns, such as 24-pounders, do not form part of the main armament, and are outside the controversy. Thus to say that the all- big-gun principle is associated with a powerful secondary armament is downright nonsense. As a matter of fact, Germany has never accepted the all-big-gun principle, and has always adhered to the two natures of gun principle for the main armament, to which we ourselves are now returning by reintroducing the secondary battery. The orthodox explanation is that the 6-inch guns are anti-torpedo-boat guns, but the real one is that the all-big-gun principle provides an insufficient volume of fire at some possible lighting ranges. The tendency in this country now is to return to the ' Majestic' type, with two primary turrets at each end in the centre line instead of one, and with a secondary battery; but this is accompanied by an increase in the size of the primary guns, in the thickness of the armour, and in the size and cost of the ships, all of which are still subjects of controversy and not governed by any accepted principles.
Not the least interesting part of this book is the account given of the means taken by Admiral von Tirpitz to achieve his ends. First and most important was his correct under- standing of the naval problem, and the care taken to set forth his plans so clearly that the lay minds in the Reichstag could grasp them. But behind this were his reputed adroitness in managing the politicians, his press bureau, which supplied gratis naval information of all kinds and thus moulded the opinion of the press, the naval annual Nautieus, and the monthly, Die Marine Rundschau, which shaped professional and expert thought. The German Navy League also helped the propaganda to some extent. Started in the year 1898 under august and princely patronage, it is said to be partly financed by the armament firms and to bo largely recruited from the numerous class open to official pressure, but it is important to note that three-fourths of its million members are said to belong to societies who have joined it en masse and are not to be counted in the same scale as if they had joined as individuals. The Boer War, the international friction about Morocco, and other matters, together with the very indiscreet speeches, articles, and official memoranda published in this country, have each and all helped the Admiral to develop German sea-power.
The later chapters show the great growth in population and wealth now taking place, and point to considerable possible increases in each case. They also indicate the complex political situation and the uncertainty in regard to the future. The industrial development is undermining the power of the Junker class, and the Socialist vote is rapidly increasing, being in the year 1912 nearly 35 per cent, of tle total number cast. Of much interest are the facts relative to the Colonial development, which show that, although up to the year 1908 a sum of about £57,000,000, of which one-third was a war loan, had been spent on the Colonies, their German population, exclusive of officials, was not more than 12,000, and her trade with them was still comparatively small. Again, her mercantile marine is steadily growing, but the facts show that up to the present its actual size and its actual decennial increase are far below those of our own.
On the whole the reader will gather from this book that a continued increase in the German sea-power is to be expected, and must be accepted as a permanent factor in the inter- national situation likely to last many years. The correspond- ing effort required from this country must be made on sound business principles, which means a central administration
so organized that the use of the Navy in war is separated from its supply; a body of officers imbued with a true spirit of self-sacrifice and devoted to the study and practice of their profession ; a sound fleet organization based on well-thought- out tactical and strategical ideals.
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