THE BALKAN BALANCE.
IN spite of the extreme and unnecessary slowness of the Concert in imposing its will on the Balkan States, events are not shaping themselves so unsatisfactorily as at one time seemed likely. The chief point to the good is that a kind of balance has already been struck, and that at the moment at which we write there is no fighting. Greece is the only combatant which remains in a noticeably pugnacious mood. One is therefore justified in hoping that the final peace is not very far off. The members of the Concert are in a steady and placid mood. There is not much thunder in the air. But this very slowness to act is wrong, and must be remedied. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the Powers are under an obligation to draw up a final settlement of the whole Balkan question and secure respect for it before they can pretend that their task is accomplished. Any- thing short of this will leave the Balkans restless and unstable and the Concert itself shorn of all respect and, what is worse, deprived of the means of being useful in future. Indirectly the Great Powers caused the war between the Balkan Allies by declaring (quite rightly, of course) that Albania must be an independent principality. Servia, being thus deprived of the territory which she had always intended to acquire, was thrust back for compensa- tion on the territory newly acquired by the Bulgarians. It has been said that the great wall of China caused the fall of the Roman Empire, because the Huns, being unable to get past the wall, were deflected to search for conquests in a direction they would not other- wise have contemplated. Similarly Albania caused the downfall of Bulgaria. Since we wrote last week the obligation on the Concert to intervene and bring about a speedy settlement has become stronger than ever, because the Turks have violated the Treaty of London and reoccu- pied Adrianople. The Powers cannot possibly allow the work which ended in the Treaty of London to be stultified. Ground that has been " made good " cannot be abandoned. It seems to us that intervention in the present instance ought to be comparatively easy, because in conveying a definite warning to the Turks the Great Powers have not got to decide what their common base of action is. They know that already. They have all agreed that the Turks must not exercise any rule in Europe outside the Enos- Midia line. We refuse to contemplate the possibility of any change in that decision.
The words which Mr. Asquith used at Birmingham on Monday prove that he at all events has no thought of going back on what he said after the decisive Bulgarian victories against the Turks. The Turks can never be allowed to take back from Christian States what they have already lost. On Monday Mr. Asquith said :— " As regards Turkey, we ourselves, we here in Great Britain, and I believe all the Powers, were disposed on the basis of the recently concluded Treaty to regard as accepted facts her reten- tion of her European territory within the lines laid down, and, subject to reasonable safeguards for good government, the integrity of her Asiatic Empire, and we were ready and anxious to givo her such assistance as we could in the prosecution of the heavy tasks which still lay upon her. If—and I wish to bo per- fectly explicit upon this point—if Turkey is ill-advised enough to set the provisions of that Treaty at naught, she must be prepared —and I will say no more at present—she must be prepared for an opening up of questions that it is by no means in her interests to bring into debate."
Lord Morley uttered a similar warning in the House of Lords on Wednesday. If Turkey re-opened the question of the Enos-Midia line, he said, her action must inevitably react unfavourably on other questions in which Turkey is closely interested. There appears, then, to be no doubt whatever in the minds of the Cabinet as to what British policy ought to be, and there appears to be no factitious ill- will towards that policy in the Concert. Why, then, is there such dismal delay in declaring what the final settlement shall be, in finding the exact balance which shall hold the Balkans in a condition of equipoise, and in imposing this balance as the decree of civilized Europe upon the Balkan people ? It is not that the Young Turks cannot be coerced if necessary, because it is always practicable and easy for a fleet to close the Dardanelles. A blockade there is as simple as a blockade of the Montenegrin coast. Nor could Turkey follow her immemorial pastime of playing off the Great Powers against one another, since the Enos-Midis line is a matter already decided. We take the explanation to be that the Great Powers were under the delusion from the first that if they provided half a settlement the remain- ing difficulties would settle themselves. They have not yet changed wholly from this frame of mind, though it is obvious that they will have to change. Our readers know that we have urged for many weeks that an adequate settle- ment must be a full settlement. It was a mistake to let the Balkan Allies try to settle their own differences after the war with Turkey. The sooner the mistake is repaired the better. The Concert must draw not only the line round autonomous Albania, but the lines between Bulgaria and Servia, Bulgaria and Greece, Servia and Greece, and Bulgaria and Roumania. As for the Enos-Midia line, the Concert need not be in two minds as to what to say to Turkey. When the Turks agreed to sign the Treaty of London they were offered help in the reorganization of their country, and were told plainly enough that their Asiatic Empire would not be tampered with. Those promises will be deprived of all meaning and validity by the action of the Turks themselves if they persist in trying to re-establish themselves outside the Enos-Midis line. They have only got to be reminded of this. And if advice so conspicuously framed in their own interest does not avail, the exercise of pressure must be proclaimed to be the logical sequel. We trust no pressure may be necessary, as we desire to see the Turks treated in their misfortunes with every kind of consideration.
No one of the Great Powers is thrusting itself forward in any officious or selfish attempt to fish in the troubled waters. It is a splendid opportunity for Sir Edward Grey to assume again the leadership of Europe which was so successful in bringing about the Treaty of London, and was so handsomely accepted and acknowledged by all the Great Powers. No doubt the lesson of that experience has not been lost on Sir Edward Grey. We can only hope, then, that we shall see some very visible result of his efforts within a few days. At present the mischief is that, owing to the attempt at a partial instead of a full settlement, the labours of the Concert are dissipated, and consequently ineffective. There are ambassadors still sitting in con- ference in London, while representatives of the Powers are holding another Conference in Paris on the financial side of the Treaty of London; meanwhile the Balkan States which are at war are arranging for a conference of their own. Surely it should be possible to draw these scattered negotiations to a head, and produce a settlement which shall enjoy the clear sanction and prestige which belongs to the voice of united Europe. The settlement must aim at a perfect balance. Bulgaria, no doubt, deserves to be penalized for her folly, but she emphatically does not deserve to be crushed. As a correspondent who knows the Balkans as intimately as almost any Englishman living points out in a letter printed elsewhere, the Bulgars are not apt at presenting their case plausibly to the world, and it may be that the general disrepute into which Bulgaria has suddenly fallen in English eyes may not after all be justified by the facts. At all events, the Bulgarian stroke for the liberation of Macedonia and Thrace was an heroic one. Our correspondent makes the astonishing statement, which we have no doubt is true, that the Bulgarian casualties in the campaign against Turkey were equal to the number of the whole Greek army. Bulgaria must not be shattered. She has earned her due place nobly. Roumania, as well as Greece and Servia, should remember that this will not be the last transaction with Bulgaria. All have got to live together as neighbours, and not one of them is big enough to swallow the rest. Therefore a balance of strength is the only solution. Ethnological difficulties there will be in the division, but they must be faced and vanquished. The scheme of an autonomous Macedonia, though attractive at first sight, would, we fear, settle nothing. It would be a Naboth's vineyard to all the Balkan States.
A few words in conclusion as to the effect on the Mohammedan subjects of the British Empire of ordering the Turks back behind their line. It is said that the effect would be deplorable, particularly in India, and that we must act with the strictest caution, admitting the reasonableness of the Turkish plea that the Treaty of London collapsed with the collapse of the Balkan Alliance. We admit nothing of the sort. If we allow the feeling of Indian Moslems to be the test of our foreign policy we shall abrogate the right of judgment altogether. We have always behaved justly and sympa- thetically to the Indian Moslems and shall continue to do so. We shall also try to secure justice for the Turks. Beyond that we can enter into no undertakings dictated by timid considerations of expediency. No doubt Moslem feeling throughout the British Empire is oftea stirred by entirely illusory causes. We must take note of it, and so far as possible allay it, but we must never weakly palter to it. After the Crimean war it is recorded that an Arab chief explained in his Mesopotamian tent the genesis of that war. The Padishah, he said, had sent for his subject allies, the Queen of England and the Emperor of the French, and had ordered them to help him to crush those Christian vermin, the Russians. What better proof could there be of the power of the Moslems and their Khalif ! This kind of talk doubtless spread through India, and with it the belief that Mohammedans could beat Europeans—witness Turkey's victory over Russia. Why, then, should not a mutiny and an insur- rection restore the Moghul Empire at Delhi ? We cannot be guided by misconceptions, even though they be less fanciful than this one. If we join the other Great Powers in taking a firm line with Turkey there will be no danger in India. The greatest danger is not a Turkish disappointment but a Turkish success. In the curious story related above it was the supposed success of the Turks which inspired the arrogant fantasy of the Arab chief.
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