tottno to t4o ettitlir.
FRENCH NAVAL ARMAMENTS.
Southsea, 21st June 1858.
Six—Is France arming her ships in the manner attributed to her ? or is she merely doing what we have done for the last six years, viz, converting her sailing-ships into screws, so as to be prepared for any contingency ? If the latter, (which I am inclined to think,) I do not see why we should find fault with her doing it as quickly as possible, whilst she remains at peace with every one. The French navy has periodically been allowed to fall so low as to call for measures of extra energy whenever the Government has determined to re- organize it and raise its numbers. In 1840, when we apprehended hostili- ties with France about the Syrian question, we each had ten sail of the line in the Mediterranean ; but the French had no large reserve of ships in their ports to fall back upon after an action ; so the next year a decree was issued fixing their line-of-battle ships at forty, divided into four classes- 120, 100, 90, 80 guns. At the breaking out of the Russian war, so little had been done to organ- ize the French navy, that (as I showed in a former latter) whilst we sent sixteen sail of the line into the Baltic at the end of April, the French navy was represented by the Austerlitz until the end of June.
It is a very difficult thing for private individuals to get a correct account of the French navy : their navy-list is a most voluminous book, giving you most accurate information on every point, except those of any interest ; the date of birth of every officer is given ; and the most interesting piece of in- formation in the list of this year is that they have an "aspirant de la pre- miere clam" on the active list who was born in February 1778; probably the most remarkable specimen of the class in Europe.
Up to 1852 the names and force of every ship, whether building, arms', or en commission de rode, &c., was given, so that it was as easy to know what force France had as it was to find out our own by looking through our Navy List ; but since that year everything relating to ships has been imp- ressed, and their navy-list has become to Englishmen a most uninteresting
But althoug difficult for-private persons to get accurate information as to French arm iments &c., there can be no difficulty for the Government from time to Cum making itself perfectly acquainted with the subject. I think there is always a tendency on this side of the Channel to exegete rate the value and force of everything on the other ; and I will give what I think is a ease in point. In September 1850, there was a grand review at Cherbourg, and the Admiraltyverykindly gave a steamer for the officers of the Royal Naval College and Excellent to attend it ; we were a week there, and had every facility given us to visit ships, arsenal, and, in fact, even. thing. The papers and magazineswere full of the astonishment created In the minds of the naval officers who visited Cherbourg, at the order of the French ships, their stupendous armaments, and their heavily-armed steamers.
Now, I beg leave to say, "that there was nothing of the sort; we found eight sailing line-of-battle ships, all in very good order, but not a bit better than the general order of our own ships ; we certainly, saw many things that we had not introduced into our navy, but I have no doubt that French offi- cers visiting our ships, would have found many things that they had ma: we found two large steam-frigates, the Descartes and *oondor, with ma.: chinery inferior to the general run of ours.
With regard to the armaments of their line-of-battle ships ; on our re- turn, I made a very minute calculation, comparing the Jemmappes of 100 guns with the Prince Regent of 90, and I found a most decided advantage to the latter, as to calibre, range, and power of double-shotting. Another point is worth mentioning ; where had these seven line-of-battle ships come from ? were they the French Channel squadron ? not at all; most of them came from Toulon, and were in fact their Mediterranean squadron, and the others came from Brest and the other ports to unite at Cherbourg for the review. I find on reference to our Navy List of that date, that had we chosen to do the same, and have united our Mediterranean and home squadrons at Spithead, we should have had twelve line-of-battle ships ; three of them steam-block-ships, (more than equal to a sailing line-of-battle ship,) and this without counting the eight line-of-battle ships doing duty at the four ports as flag-ships and ordinary guard-ships. In saying all this, let it be clearly understood, that I have no wish to undervalue the French navy, still less to underrate the importance of our being perfectly prepared for any sudden outbreak ; it is there that our only great danger lies—keeping up a Channel squadron was always of value, if only to exercise officers and men. Now it has become in myopin- ion of paramount necessity—there must always be a difference of opinion as to the number, but it seems to me, that if Sir Charles Napiees scheme of ten sail-of-the-line, including the flag-ships at each port, were acted upon, having only half the complement of Marines on board, and filling up with seamen, who would be available to man more ships if wanted, this country would have as good security as could be desired. I am, Sir, yours very faithfully, THOS. HODOXDISON, Commander R.N.
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