A HISTORY OF EGYPT"
Mac. WEICIALL, who is well known as a writer on Egyptian antiquities, now gives us a useful and interesting sketch of Egyptian politics. He begins with the French invasion in 1798, and in so far as Mehemet Ali, the founder of the present dynasty of the Khedives, was one of the soldiers who fought against Napoleon, there is some reason for his choice. But the chapters which will moat appeal to us to-day are those which deal with the scarcely intelligible rebellion of Arabi, and go on through the British occupation to the Pro- tectorate to which it has led. Readers of Lord Miner's England and Egypt will remember his description of that "most absurd experiment in human government," which yet "has been productive of one of the most remarkable harvests of human improvement." The long series of incongruities which constitute our relations with Egypt was seen perhaps at its worst when Sir Auckland Colvin had to waste his time and strength in trying to make Towfik Paella stand up against a rebel who was probably quite as frightened as his Sovereign. Tewfik's unfortunate timidity was the direct cause of the dangerous riot in Alexandria, and the far more destructive bombardment of the city by the British Fleet. In the end, however, Arabi did his country the only service that could be of real use to it. His rebellion was crushed by British troops, and when they had done their work they remained as an Army of Occupation. A British Agent was sent out to super- vise the government of the country, with the assistance of a number of Europeans who had to work hand in hand with the native officials in a nominally native Administration. So long as Tewfik lived this makeshift answered fairly well ; indeed, Lord Cromer afterwards spoke of him as a man to be remembered with gratitude as "the Khedive who allowed Egypt to be reformed in spite of the Egyptians." But there were constant difficulties with France. Though she had taken no part in the defeat of Arabi or in the subsequent military occupation, her prestige remained. Ismail Pasha "had im- plied a veneer of French polish upon the entire upper- class life of the Egyptians." French was the language of 4,4,i.u."5.a:ifs.E°!gfk,,Z1V4I.,1'14...B.yuct.rIthur E. I.' Brame
the Khedive's officials, the Code Napol6on was the law of the Khedive's Courts, and French ideals shaped the aims of the party which desired to modernize Egypt. With the French Government eager to undo the mistake they had made in allowing the occupation to be English and not Anglo-French, these various advantages were certain to be made the most of. Lord Cromer has exactly described the position which these conditions forced him to take up. "I bad to keep the Egyptian question simmeiing and to avoid any action which might tend to force on its premature consideration." But with French diplomacy watching every step that the British Consul-General took this was no easy task, and for one moment war between the two countries seemed almost inevit- able. The few opponents of the Entente Cordiale now left in England may consider with profit what might have been our fate in the present war if the French irritation which caused us so much trouble in Egypt had not been removed by Lord Lansdowne's action in 1904—action backed in the strongest and most helpful way by Lord Crosser.
Mr. Weigall does full justice to the work of Sir Eldon Gorst. He had held his post only four years when he came home to die, but they were years of strenuous work. When he entered upon office the country was greatly excited by his predecessor's vigorous dealings with the pigeon-shooting out- rages. Europeans were constantly insulted, and" massacre was openly preached in the villages." The Nationalist Party had become very powerful, and it had the open sympathy of the late Khedive. Several of the English officials happened to retire about the same time, and, as though purposely to increase the troubles of the new Agent, "a number of ill- advised British Members of Parliament preached open rebel- lion to the Egyptian hot-heads." Lord Cromer's retirement was represented as a recall from the Home Government, and opinions were divided whether this step was due to his treatment of the murderers of British officers or to that theft of many millions from the Egyptian Treasury with which he was openly charged. In those various ways "British prestige suffered a very palpable fall, and it was thought that the days of self-government were imminent." Sir Eldon Covet achieved an opening success in his improved relations with the Khedive. Abbas was soon "completely won over by the careful deference paid to his rank and by the cordial attitude adopted towards his person." Whether this change would have had any lasting result is very doubtful, but it did immediate good in separating Abbas Pasha from the Nationalists. Another gain in the same direction was the detachment of the Gupta from the Nationalists, which followed upon Sir Eldon Gent's appoint- ment of a Copt to be prime Minister. His nominee was assassinated not long after, and as the Nationalist leaders "swore that the murderer should not be hanged," the appear- ance of the black flag over the prison marked the turning. point in their attitude to the Agency, "for an Egyptian always knows when he is beaten."
Mr. Weigall describes three possible varieties of British policy in Egypt. The "iron grip" made the welfare of the eleven millions of peasants the chief object, and this could only be attained by a "very thorough sitting upon the upper ten thousand." The administration of the country must be taken as much as possible from the corrupt and tyrannical native officials and handed over to Englishmen. The objection to this system was that it ignored the repeated declarations of the British Government that our stay in Egypt was only temporary and educational, and an influential party in England specially insisted on keeping this policy constantly in view. They wished to follow the policy to which Mr. Weigall gives the name of "the velvet hand." It aimed at giving the natives every possible oppor- tunity of trying their hands at the task of administration, "whether their attempts involved the tyrannizing of the lower classes or not." The English officials were to hold only watching briefs, and to treat the natives "with courtesy, sym- pathy, and even deference, as being lords in their own country." On paper this principle looked exceedingly well; in practice it meant that the small upper class was charged with the government of "the eleven inarticulate millions," and the result was that the native administrators went on ruling a peasantry they despised and ill-treated in the very ways which the British oommation had been intended to suppress. The third policy, that of "the guiding pressure," was that adopted
by Lord Cromer. It laid great stress on the employment of capable Egyptians in the work of administration, but it treated every effort in this direction as an experiment to be continued or abandoned as the result proved good or bad.
The war between England and Germany brought with it a new, and happily a final, crop of inconsistencies in our position in Egypt. The country was an integral part of the Turkish Empire, and Turkey was a neutral Power in whose territory Germans had as good a right to live as Englishmen. As this would have been a highly inconvenient state of things, the Egyptian Government was persuaded to regard itself as in a state of war with Germany and Austria, though a treaty, "the integrity of which we had emphatically stated our intention to maintain, clearly said that Egypt, being a vassal State, was not allowed to declare war on any- body." A little later, when the Foreign Office asked why Turkish troops were massed on the Egyptian frontier, the Sultan asked by way of answer what so many thousand English troops "were doing in his province of Egypt." Later still, in answer to a question whether the Turkish troops were intended to invade Egypt, the Sultan ingenuously inquired how he could invade his own territory. The declaration of war between England and Turkey added more anomalies to the situation. Mr. Asquith spoke of the "law- less intrusion" of the Sultan into a part of his own Empire, and the commander of the British forces in Egypt proclaimed that England would not call upon the Egyptians to fight against the Turks, but would herself defend their rights and liberties against their suzerain. Happily "this anomalous and utterly irregular situation" was speedily got rid of, and a long chapter of Egyptian history closed, by the Pro- clamation declaring the suzerainty of Turkey at an end and making Egypt a British Protectorate.
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