BOOKS.
LETTERS OF SIR G. C. LEWIS.*
Tins volume will, we fear, give a severe blow to that cult us of Sir- George Cornewall Lewis which the Old Whigs have ever since his- death been endeavouring to establish. He was to have been their Premier, and they are never tired of exalting his sagacity, his- insight into affairs, and his clear, well-balanced judgment on all political crises. His utterances are quoted like political texts, and his speeches like " cases " which the Court is bound to con- sider final. In due measure, no doubt, some of this admiration is well bestowed. Sir G. C. Lewis was a man of fine, because- utterly unselfish, nature, of immense learning, of few prejudices,— he had some, particularly a most violent one against the Welsh,-- and of a judgment never disturbed by any heat of imagination. His decision on points on which he had to guess nothing and knew all the data, or on which no imagination or foresight was required, were usually accurate, and he was entirely free from a very com- mon vice of strong men,—the liability to get heated in argument till they say a great deal more than they mean. Interlocutors- constantly thought him wise when he was only tolerant. After due reflection and careful weighing of facts, he could infuse into. his summary of results an impression of common-sense so great, yet so entirely within the intellectual range of his audience, that his- dicta were often received as if they had been inspired, and his talk_ weighed with Cabinets more than other men's oratory. He was, however, for a politician too like a judge, restrained his mind too- completely to the evidence in Court, and was too much disposed to treat counsel's arguments as eloquent rubbish, of which he must clear his head. We suspect that he lacked sagacity to an unusual degree, and this book will certainly reveal to his admirers that he lacked political foresight. He had a habit of writing his passing impressions of current events to a few correspondents in a hurried, off-hand, and rather dogmatic way ; and two series- of these impressions contained in letters to Mrs. Austin. and Sir F. Head have been, as we think most injudiciously, published by his brother. The impressions are very poor indeed. They are all, like the letters in which they are imbedded, hastily written and hastily thought, and it is scarcely too much to say- that they are all wrong, that in them Sir G. C. Lewis, so far from showing sagacity, showed a want of perceptiveness quite unusual in a statesman of such mark. That he should describe the Pickwick. Papers as "an imitation of Theodore Hook's novels, with descriptive passages imitated, half in jest, half in earnest, from the descriptions- in Walter Scott's novels," and prophecy that their "popularity,. though rapid and extensive, would be shortlived," is, though sur- prising, quite intelligible. Sir G. C. Lewis, though he appreciated wit, was a little too thoroughly "sensible" to enjoy humour of the- kind which borders upon farce; he had a contempt for the amusing in literature as in society, and he was a bit of a prig, though his. priggishness was kept down by his fine social culture. We rather- wonder that Sydney Smith thought he would amuse him by any- thing so good as this :—" What shall we do when our friend Mrs. Grote returns from Italy ? We must get models of the Antinous • Letters of the Right Hon. Si, G. a Lexie, Bart. Edited by his Brother, the Bay. Sir G. F. Lewis, Wirt.. Carton or Worcester. Loncba: Longa:ans.
and Apollo. Common gestures and human postures will not do. You must look like a dying gladiator, and I must set up in my old age for a Sacerdos Belvidere. I am very sorry she is going; there will be no philosophy, but in pantaloons, till her return." We did not, however, expect to find his remarks on political events, and more especially his prophecies about them, so usually wanting in insight.
He writes, for instance, to Sir F. Head, in June, 1848 My expectation is that we shall see a succession of weak Governments in France, and a succession of men at the head of affairs for some time to come with no fixed policy or system, but living by shifts and expedients, sometimes putting down anarchy by force, some- times appeasing the popular anger by bribes and dishonest conces- sions. In short, I look forward to a state of things similar to that in Spain, varied by the difference of national character. The Italians have shown more good-sense and self-command than the French." The sort of prophecy one would have expected from Sir A. Alison,—that the Revolution, like all revolutions, must end in a military despotism, would have been nearer the truth than that ; Sir G. C. Lewis evidently did not see how firmly the social system in France is based on the small properties, or how impossible it is for a nation in which logic is an instinct to sink into the position of Spain. All he saw was external disorder, want of system, want of willing submission to "reason," as Whigs understand reason, and he could look no deeper.
In September, 1850, he writes of Louis Napoleon :—" Louis Napoleon seems to be pacific—he is no captain—nor a man capable of leading armies, and he will probably limit his ambition to being Prince-President for life. It is clear that he intends to break through the restriction as to his re-election, and to become a candi- date at the end of his four years ; and as he will no doubt use all the influence of Government, as well as the prestige of his name, to secure his return, I do not see how any one can have a chance against him. It is clearly the best thing for the country that he should be re-elected quietly." And again, in September, 1860, after the Crimean war and before the Italian and Mexican wars, both of them fought for ideas:—" There never was so accom- plished a sphinx as Louis Napoleon ; for while one man sees in him a poisonous serpent, another sees in him a gentle dove, and both profess to be equally well informed, and to speak from in- dubitable authority. My conviction is that England is the last country he will attack. His wars will be made for territorial aggrandizement—for the Rhine province—for a slice of Switzer- land or of Spain. He cannot annex England, and the utmost he can hope is to inflict some loss or disgrace upon us. He must, however, be perfectly aware that this is a game at which two can play ; and that if he was to burn Portsmouth or Plymouth, we should never rest until we had done him some similar mischief. Besides, after all, wars are generally made for some supposed in- terest, and not out of mere passion." Again, in June, 1848, just before the restoration of the temporal power, he writes :—
"I confess that I have groat doubts whether the Pope will over re- cover his temporal power. This seems to me one of the changes which is likely to be permanent. The Pope cannot become a constitutional sovereign, negotiating with a Parliament, and he can hardly hope to recover his despotic powers, together with an ecclesiastical sot of Ministers. The interests now are exclusively political and socialist : the Church, as such, goes for nothing in the revolutionary movements of the Continent."
There is a sort of inability revealed in that sentence to compre- hend the political power of ideas, a disposition to ascribe every- thing to enlightened self-interest, which comes out again in some of his remarks on the American Civil War. He expected that war, it is true, four years before it happened, bat he expected it to lead to separation, and he laid down this extraordinary theory as to the comparative force of the motives in the struggle :—" The United States seem to me to have come nearer to a separation of North and South than they ever were before. I take for granted that Buchanan will win. The Southern States are thoroughly in earnest. They are fighting for their property. The Northern States have only a principle at stake : they will be less united and less eager." There must have been Weakness somewhere in the judgment of a man who after years of active life could form that estimate of the comparative influence of selfishness and enthusiasm on large bodies of men, who throughout history have fought passionately
for everything except their interests. There were points, too, on which prejudice seemed to deprive him of the benefit
of his knowledge. He, even with India before him, held that free labour was impossible in the South. At least, that is how we understand this sentence :—" However, so far the practical problem is clear. There is no doubt that free labour is preferable to slave labour, if the option exists. But there is a point at which the heat is such that white labour in the open air becomes impossible. I want to know what the Northern States propose to do from that point. What is their slavery legislation south of the Line, where none but uiggers can work in the fields ?" He believed that coercion would be useless. "Now, however, that six or seven States have virtually joined, coercion can lead to nothing but an armed struggle ; and an armed struggle will not hold the Union together. The means are inconsistent with the end. It is the most singular action for restitution of conjugal rights which the world ever heard of. You may conquer an in- surgent province, but you cannot conquer apeceding state." He, well as he knew history, could not even comprehend why the Americans, whom he admitted to be Englishmen, should wish to preserve their empire, and asked Mr. Lowe to put on paper the- arguments which influenced them. Mr. Lowe did so, and his rea- sons, and Sir Cornewall's comment on those reasons, are not the least wonderful passages in the book :— "1. They are afraid of each other. If separate, they must maintain, armies. 2. They find in federation some slight counterpoise to demo- cracy. 3. They have the advantage of a Zollyerein. 4. They can gratify their aggressive spirit by remaining one country as regards foreign States. 5. The South, separate from the North, would be in danger of extermination by a servile war. 6. The North would lose a, market for its manufactures. 7. The long rivers of America render- separation difficult. The Mississippi runs through ten states.--Pray toll me at your leisure whether you assent to this statement of reasons, and whether there are any other motives of importance to be added."
The very notion that Americans might feel an impulse of patriotism, or even of ambition, seems to have been foreign to his mind. The fact that the Mississippi ran through ten States was a motive, but human pride in an immense, and hitherto successful, experiment, —that was to Sir G. C. Lewis no motive at all. Ile dis- cussed the causes of war as he might those of a suit in Chancery, an forgot that even in a lawsuit for money temperament or imagination might play some part. It was the same with the Crimean war,. which he detested and which he thought would fail. In December, 1854, he writes :—
" The belligerents of this country rely upon the effect of fresh rein- forcements. But the Russians have greater facilities for sending reinforcements than the Allies ; and it by no means follows that the sending reinforcements will alter the relative strength of the armies- The battle of Inkerman saved the Allies from a desperate danger. If it had not been for the extraordinary bravery of the Guards, the Russians would have succeeded in occupying the heights, and in that case our whole army might have been destroyed. Even if wo take Sebastopol,. our object is not much advanced in effecting a settlement, for the Emperor would not negotiate. A permanent occupation of the Crimea is impossible ; and if we simply dismantle the fortress and depart, it will speedily be rebuilt. It seems to me that the entire expedition is a mistake, and that, whatever the event may be, it must cost us infi- nitely greater sacrifices than the utmost success can compensate. I fear that we are still at a long distance from the termination of our war to promote civilization by supporting the Turks."
We wonder if it was this contempt for all but concrete ideas that twenty years before (1838) had led him to write with such scorn- of the Italian Liberals. "The Italian Liberals are for the most part a most imbecile and odious race ; nothing, indeed, would induce- people to tolerate them, except the sanguinary ferocity of their stupid Governments." The imbecile race preserved for years the- flame of nationality under that oppression, though they were unable alone to shake off their conquerors, but Sir Coruewall never could restrain his contempt for worldly inefficiency. He- literally hated the Welsh, apparently for no better reason. "George Clive ended a letter to me not long ago with the follow- ing pious and benevolent ejaculation, writing from the depth of Wales:—' fhat the Devil would fly away with this miserable race- of Celtic savages, is the fervent prayer of yours sincerely, G. C—.' I need not say how heartily I repeat 'Amen' to the above petition—reckoning, of course, that Wales begins just beyond New Radnor. The gradual action of boards of guardians, railroads, and other opportunities of intercourse, may civilize theme in about three centuries." There was surely some narrowness in, the mind which could thus condemn a whole people, as well as some want of imagination and foresight in the man who in 1849k could write thus of the Queen's visit to Ireland and the Irish Land Question :—" I am rather sanguine as to this visit giving an im- pulse to the Irish mind in the right direction, and in assisting the disposition which now exists towards an acquiescence in the Union with England, and to a final abandonment of the Repeal move- ment. The first number of the new Nation,' which has just appeared, confirms the idea that the Irish agitators will now apply their exertions to snore practical objects, and that they will cease to pursue the phantom which impoverished the whole nation for the sake of filling the purse of one man." "The land question has now been pretty well exhausted in Ireland, both by inquiries and legislation." "The measures of last session will require patching, and assisting where they are deficient, but the neck of the question has been broken." "The only great Irish question now remaining unsettled is the Church question." We are bound, however, to state that apart from a little contempt for priests because they advocated early marriage, a subject upon which he would scarcely condescend to argue—his views on Ireland were most just, and our review is so hostile, that we must extract one paragraph, which, written as it was, in 1848, is full of prescience :— "All the social elements of Ireland are now in an unsettled state ; they are all moving shoat as in a great seething caldron of impurities. The conviction that Ireland never can be settled until the priests receive an endowment is gaining ground, and, strange to say, notwithstanding Exeter Hall and the Dissenters, I am inclined to think that, as far as England is concerned, the question might be pushed through. The great difficulty is the hostility of the Irish priesthood themselves. No doubt their opposition would, in the great majority, be insincere ; but they are so committed, so wrong-headed, and so afraid of offending their _flocks without making sure of their endowment, that they will declare against it as a body, and thus put an almost irresistible argument in the months of the English Anti-Catholics. The Irish Protestants are beginning to look upon Catholic endowment in the light of an insurance for their -estates, and many people see that we should soon save the amount in the army and police, to say nothing of prestige abroad. It is curious to observe what a Nemesis oppressed nations have it in their power to inflict. The Irish not only torment us at home, but carry a hatred of England wherever they settle, and thus fill America with enemies of our Government. So the Poles are scattered over Europe, and furnish revolutionists to every Continental state. I understand that they have been most active both at Vienna and Berlin; and they are in league -with the Rouges in every metropolis in Europe. If the Government had seen any reasonable prospect of carrying the question of Catholic endowment this session, they were, I believe, quite prepared to make any sacrifice of power or party connection for the purpose. But to pro- pose it without a fair chance of success, would be to gain no present advantage, and to increase the difficulties of a settlement hereafter."
It may be said that it is unfair to form an opinion of any man's capacity from letters like these, and we partly agree ; but then it is also unfair to give such letters to the world as materials upon which judgments are to be formed. The fault, if anybody's, is not ours, but that of Sir Frankland Lewis, who has given perma- nence to letters meant only to record the opinions of the hour. Sir Cornewall is, however, credited generally with precisely the kind of insight which these letters show that he did not possess, -and one or two passages in them, like the one we have quoted on Ireland, show that within his own range he could record observa- tions of remarkable force. He knew Sir Robert Peel also and his measures, he had all the data necessary for an estimate of his career, and we doubt if a more accurate one was ever given to the world :—
" Peel's death has been a very sad event. He leaves a groat blank in public life ; his great experience, his extensive knowledge, his long official career, and his practised habits of debate and power of speech gave him a position in the House of Commons which nobody else tilled. He had, it is true, lost his party, and he told for little in a division, but his voice had great weight in the country, and no speech of his was a matter of indifference even in the House. I cannot say that I prized his judgment very highly, nor do I think that as a guide in public affairs, when he had ceased to be an administrator, he was of great value. He .did not see far before him ; he was not ready in applying theory to practice ; ho did not foresee the coming storm. But, when it had come, there was no man who dealt with it so well as he did. For concocting, producing, explaining, and defending measures he had no equal, or any- thing like an equal. There was nothing simile ant secundum. When a thing was to be done, he did it better than anybody. The misfortune was, that he saw the right thing too late ; and wont on opposing it when men of less powerful minds saw clearly what was the proper course. Latterly, when he became more of a reformer, he was sometimes too bold, as in his scheme for planting Connaught, which really was very wild and fanciful."
What has become of that scheme ? The probability is that it was neither wild nor fanciful, but the very best thing that from Sir Robert's point of view could possibly be tried.
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