LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON AND "IGNOTUS."
(To THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR."] Sia,—As I am the originator of this controversy, perhaps you will allow me to state my case in my own way. Lord George Hamilton's long and bewildering letter is but a clumsy attempt to lead your readers away from the points at issue. Those points are as follows :-
1. That Lord Lytton was bent on the absorption of Afghani- stan " into the Indian Empire, at any cost, by fair means if possible, by foul if necessary. If the Ameer yielded his inde- pendence with a good grace, well and good. If he refused," there was to be " au understanding with Russia," based on the policy of " bringing the frontier of our Indian Empire up to the Hindu Kush." By absorbing Afghanistan iuto the Indian Empire, I explained that I meant reducing it to a state of vassalage, like the territories of Scindia or the Nizam.
2. That, before the repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, Lord Lytton made preparations for invading Afghani- stan, in the event of his terms being refused by the Ameer.
3. "That, soon after the arrival of the Russian Mission at Cabal, Lord Lytton had evidence that Shore Ali was more hostile to a Russian than he was to an English alliance; that he dreaded the idea of coming to terms with Russia, and was anxious to come to an understanding with the Viceroy." To this I now add that Lord Lytton applied to the three most competent men then in India for information on this point,— namely, Sir L. Cavagnari, Dr. Bellew, and Colonel Jenkins, and I assert that their answers arc at the India Office, and confirm my statement to the letter.
These are the three assertions which Lord George Hamilton has characterised. as "deliberate fabrications" and a "compact mass of falsehood." Very good. Let me confront them with the proofs :- 1. In Lord Lytton's Minute (paragraphs 54, 53, 51) will be found the following declarations of policy :—" That we ought to be prepared to give a territorial guarantee to the Ameer if it is pressed for ;" " that a territorial guarantee will probably entail some ultimate control over the aaministratiou of Afghani- stan ;" "it is true that such territorial guarantee practically hastens contact between England and Russia ;" the necessity of extorting " an engagement on the part of the Ameer to enter into no diplomatic relations with foreign Powers without first consulting us."
This is what I called the absorption of Afghanistan into the
Indian Empire "by fair means." In paragraphs 23, 28, 40, 59, 00, 02, your readers will find a description of the " foul means," in the event of the "fair" failing. The following quotations will suffice :—" Both Russia and England have now weak frontiers nt which they cannot willingly accept contact with a great rival Power, and are both equally urged. forward by considerations of military and political expediency, and by the instinct of self-preservation, towards the Hindu Kush, the great natural boundary between India and Central Asia. Long- continued inaction, under such conditions, is impossible." " It is difficult to imagine a more commanding strotegical position" than " the triangle formed by Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad, with the possession of the Passes over the Hindu Kush. And whenever the moment of collision with Russia arrives, it must find. us in possession of it, as friends and allies of the Afghans
if possible, but firmly established there, in any case." (Lord Lytton was then confessedly meditating war with Russia.) " The strongest frontier we could take up would be along
the Hindu Kush and thenca southwards by the Helmund, G-irishk, and Candela; to the Arabian Sea." " If we could thereby [i.e., by " maintaining our threatening position in the Koorum Valley "] secure an overwhelming influ- ence at Cabul, giving us at the same time the command of Herat and of the Passes of the Hindu Kush, this would probably be the best solution of all for us. But failing this, there still remains the course indicated, of coming to an amicable under- standing with Russia. Russia has before this suggested a par- tition of Afghanistan." But " a most important point to be considered in any such understanding with Russia, is that we must be prepared to act [the italics are Lord Lytton's] on it immediately." Lord Lytton himself states here very succinctly the two alternatives of "fair means" or " foul " by which Afghanistan was to be absorbed into the Indian empire.
These quotations prove to superfluity my assertion No. 1. Now for my assertion No. 2. The following quotation is from paragraph 79 of Lord Lytton's Minute :—" But if it appears that we cannot find, in a kiendly alliance with the Ameer, the necessary security for our North-Western frontier, we must then be prepared to take immediate steps for making the security of that portion independent of him. The military measures proposed for this purpose have already been indicated, viz., the advance of a column to the head of the Koorum Valley and the assembling at Quetta of a force sufficient to threaten,
and if necessary occupy, Candahar orders have already been issued [the Minute is dated September 9th, 1878, i.e., some weeks before the repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission] to detail these forces."
So much for the "deliberate fabrications" of my assertions Nos. 1 and 2. There is no confirmation of No. 3 in Lord Lytton's Minute. I have never said that there was. But I repeat that there is full proof of it in the India Office, and I challenge Lord George Hamilton for the fourth time to put a question to Lord Hartington on the subject.
In justice to the officials of the India Office, let me add that I have not got my information from any of them. The truth is, Lord Lytton made very little secret of his intentions and plans during the paroxysm of the Jingo fever. It is only since the ignominious collapse of his policy that he and his friends have set themselves to explain it away. This letter will be accom- panied by a guarantee of its genuineness ; but I trust you will allow me to keep my name secret even from you.—I
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