Commonwealth and Foreign
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA SINCE MUNICH
By A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT Ir would appear from the recent interview between Herr Hitler and M. Chvalkovsky, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, that the Third Reich is by no means pleased with the attitude of the Czecho-Slovak people. The Germans of the Third Reich, having sworn eternal enmity to the Czechs in August, openly threatened them with war in September, partitioned their country, and annexed 3/4 million Czechs in October, appear surprised in January that their behaviour has called forth no deep and lasting friendship on the part of the Czech people.
Yet the Nazis have reason to reproach themselves. In October and November, 1938, an unrivalled opportunity pre- sented itself for a radical improvement in Czech-German relations. The resentment and confusion of mind caused by what will always be regarded in Czecho-Slovakia as the capitu- lation and betrayal of the Western Powers, created the psycho- logical basis for a Czech-German understanding. No advantage was taken of the opportunity. Within ten days of Munich, in spite of the correct behaviour of the German army, the Czechs realised that in every sphere, territorially, economically and politically, the aim of the Nazis was to pin them down to com- plete subservience. The Germans attempted to enforce by brutality what might have been won by tactful co-opera- tion. Once more, " to solicit by labour what might be ravished by arms was esteemed unworthy of the German spirit."
But the reviving antipathy of the Czech people for Nazi Germany by no means facilitates the position of the Czech Government. On the one hand, it is absolutely necessary for the Government to co-operate with Germany: on the other, it is fully aware that this policy arouses deep suspicion and resentment on the part of the great majority of the people. This conflict between political necessity and popular feeling, in a country all of whose traditions are democratic, colours the whole field of political activity.
Democratic and parliamentary government on the old party lines was obviously out of the question. A cryptic decree dissolved the Communist Party on the ground that dissolu- tion was " in the public interest." Meanwhile, in all the local councils on which the Communists were represented they were warmly thanked for their valuable services to the country. In the town of Chocen the Communists received a diploma in recognition of their public services. All remain- ing parties were transformed into a party of National Union —the Government Party—and a Labour Party in opposition.
These parties only very faintly disguised their basic characters of Agrarians on the one hand and Social Democrats on the other. Even this division, however, no longer repre- sents a division of interest between the two groups. The two parties were reformd in response to no popular movement, but were arranged among the leaders themselves. A member of the Government took an active part in the constitution of the Labour Party, and its formation was immediately wel- comed by a message of congratulation from the Prime Minister, M. Beran. All the former party leaders, whether members of the Government or the Opposition, continue the collaboration which they pursued in the pre-Munich Coalition Government. To this extent the two new parties are purely artificial formations, and nobody knows the attitude of the great masses of the electorate. Both the leaders of the Government and the leaders of the Opposition are con- siderably disturbed by the prospect of an overwhelming defeat of the present Government and its policy. Such a defeat would immediately provoke a serious crisis, since no other policy but that of the Government is possible in the present circumstances. The only means of avoiding this crisis is by close co-operation between the leaders of the two parties. Hence the Government frequently consults the leaders of the Opposition before taking important decisions : the Opposition considers in collaboration with the Government the means by which it may fail to win the next elections. But this co- operation does nothing to stimulate the confidence of the general public in their leaders. It is still difficult to ascertain to what extent the Third Reich is bringing direct pressure to bear on the Czech Government. The journey of Chvalkovsky to Berlin, and the subsequent reports made public through German sources, was the first public intimation of German dissatisfaction with Prague. Pressure may have been put directly on M. Chval- kovsky, or it is possible that the publication of such reports may be thought itself to achieve the desired effect in Prague. Indirectly, Nazi pressure is undoubtedly on the increase, and, as in Henlein's day, much of this is exercised through the German minority which has been officially, though secretly, encouraged by the Nazis to stay in Czecho-Slovakia. With the same perfidy as Herr Henlein's, Herr Kundt, the present leader, belies his former reputation for moderation and openly threatens the Czechs with total annexation by Germany if they do not comply to the full German demands. The Czechs, though covered by a fornial guarantee by both France and Britain can be excused an acute sense of inse- curity. The indifference of Britain and France to their en- gagements, and to the danger still facing the Czecho-Slovak Republic, can but facilitate the German game already tragi- cally easy, though almost universally opposed.
It is difficult to know exactly what Germany wants of Czecho-Slovakia, except favourable neutrality in the event of war in the West. Economically, Germany demands in- cessantly that the country shall be reorganised in harmony with the German economic system. At the same time, the access of Czecho-Slovak goods to free markets and the resul- tant acquisition of foreign exchange is an advantage Germany can only lose by trying to acquire it directly for herself.
Rumours of " military co-operation " are denied in Prague, and it is certain that co-operation would not be supported by the Czech General Staff. The legionary and democratic tra- dition of the Czecho-Slovak army is strong, and any attempt by Germany to enlist Czech regiments in a German war of aggression would be even more disastrous for the army con- cerned than were the Czech desertions from the armies of Austria-Hungary. Germany would undoubtedly like to insti- tute some sort of German control over the efficient and inde- pendent Czech army, for though its fighting days are over, it can still act as a powerful political force within the Czecho- Slovak Republic. In this sphere, as in every other, the Ger- mans come up against a stubborn, passive resistance and innate antipathy. Interference, though it may—and in many cases, even must, be obeyed, merely strengthens determina- tion to rebel in the future. The Germans, like the Czechs, realise that the last hand has not yet been played in Europe, and they are as afraid of future rebellion as they are of present independence. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is in the memory of both peoples and the Czechs are reverting to the tactics already once successful in destroy- ing an Empire.
In Prague, the dominating feeling is one of profound anxiety and the sense of catastrophe looming over Europe. Yet in this catastrophe lies the hope of the future. " Nobody can pretend," wrote the Czech legionary paper, Narodni Osvobo- zeni, of December 29th, " that we have saved world peace. . . . The world is marching towards madness. But let us not deceive ourselves, this march is the march of an old world. . . . "
And meanwhile the inimitable spirit of the Good Soldier Schweig has taken its place again on the Czech stage ; and with their vivid sense of irony and ridicule the Czechs are more than a match for the enticements of Dr. Goebbels' propaganda. The Germans, even in the day of their victory, meet with stubborn, though practically unseen, resistance to their two most powerful weapons—force and propaganda. It is the Czechs and not the Germans of Prague who describe President Hacha as " the First President of the Second Republic in the Third Reich." And the Germans are still wondering what exactly this means.
Previous page
