27 JANUARY 1939, Page 4

THE SHADOW OF CRISIS

IN the past week the situation in Europe, bad enough already, has visibly deteriorated ; nothing is gained by disguising that. The dismissal of Dr. Schacht may be variously explained—its immediate cause, no doubt, was his hostility to economic expedients which passed the limit of what he believed the economic structure of Germany could stand—but the broad truth regarding it is that it removes from Herr Hitler's immediate coun- sellors (even though the ex-President of the Reichsbank is still a member of the Cabinet) one of the few relatively moderate men remaining in high places in Germany. More, indeed, might be said than that; for it would be hard to find anyone now in Herr Hitler's entourage to whom the term moderate could be rightly applied. Field-Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch have gone from the Army ; foreign affairs are in the hands not of Baron von Neurath, but of Herr von Rib- bentrop, and despite various rumours current recently Dr. Goebbels has returned to his desk, and made it his first task to direct a virulent stream of laboured sarcasm at the United States. Seekers after representatives of moderation in the Germany of 1939 are reduced to deriving what satisfaction they may from the contem- plation of Field-Marshal Goering—a fact sufficiently indicative of the position the extremists have attained.

These are sinister omens, and the new decrees bring- ing every German between 17 and 45 under a semi- military regime are of the same tenor. When they are combined with such speeches as that delivered by Signor Mussolini, to an audience of farmers in Rome, on Saturday, and such attacks on France as were published the same day in the semi-official Relazione Internationale, with the new freedom claimed by Germany under the Naval Treaty to build submarines up to the British level, and with the announcement of a still more imposing pro- gramme of submarine construction by Italy, the immi- nence of a new display of power-politics by the two Axis-Powers must be reckoned among the certainties. The process, indeed, began at Munich, and it has never ceased or slackened since. Its objectives are only partly clear, for Herr Hitler enjoys the immense advantage of being able to achieve his immediate ends systematically without, so far, revealing his final aim. The result of Munich is not yet completely realised in this country, though a glance at a map of Europe should make it plain enough. Since the absorption of Austria the Axis- Powers have divided the continent in two from the Baltic to Sicily ; every communication from east to west or west to east must pass through their territory. And since the elimination of Czecho-Slovakia as an effective force Russia loses an advanced base and Germany gains an advanced bastion.

This would matter less, though it would still matter greatly, if undisputed command of the sea gave Britain and France the assurance of being able to reach South- Eastern Europe by way of the Mediterranean if overland communications were cut. That assurance no longer exists. Whether the air-forces and submarines of the two Axis-Powers, based on such strategic vantage- points as the Spanish coast, Majorca, Libya, Pantelleria and the Italian mainland, could bar communication through what it pleases Italy to call Mare Nostrum depends on a number of factors whose value and validity have not yet been tested. But that the possi- bility is there is undeniable. If anyone in this country is blind to the strategic advantages this situation confers on the Axis-Powers, that infirmity is shared by no statesman of intelligence in Europe east of the Axis line. One by one the countries in that section of the continent are bowing before the recognition of German strength without waiting for the strength to be exerted. Hungary has joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and is now being taken to task because she so far conserves some relics of political freedom as to permit the existence of an opposition party. The same charge is levelled against Czecho-Slovakia—with what justice an article on another page of this issue indicates. And this week in Warsaw Germany's diplomatic power is being put to a more exacting test. The results of Herr von Ribbentrop's conversations with Colonel Beck are not yet known, though their purpose is. Herr Hitler has far-reaching aims in Eastern Europe, and aims of as yet unrevealed scope in conjunction with Italy, in the West. If Poland, in spite of her alliance with France, can be prevailed on by bribe or menace to remain acquiescent while Italy, with German support, forces her demands on France, then the West will be the theatre of diplomatic—and perhaps military—activity in the immediate future. If not, talk of the eastward drive and the Greater Ukrainian movement may be revived.

What is to be the answer of the Western Powers to this methodical mobilisation or subjugation of half Europe ? Can they do nothing but expedite armament construction and air raid precautions and wait to be shot at? Rearmament and A.R.P. are essential, but there are other fields in which initiative may still be fruitful. In two capitals in particular, Moscow and Ankara, diplomatic activity with a purpose is very much to be desired, and they happen to be capitals in which newly-appointed British Ambassadors have just arrived. After the rude shock the balance of power in Europe has suffered since Munich every conceivable effort should be exerted to maintain and consolidate re- lations with Russia. No one knows what Russia's real potentialities are, but there is little convincing evidence to support the belief that political purges have made her army or her air-force valueless. As regards the latter at any rate the evidence is all to the contrary. The regime existing in Russia is utterly alien to our own political ideas, but that is Russia's concern, not ours. What matters to us is whether in the event of a trial of strength in Europe, Russia—which has access to the Mediterranean—would be found in the same camp as ourselves or in the other or in neither. That will obviously depend largely on what our relations with Russia are before the test comes. It would be reassuring if there were more signs of a realisation of this in Whitehall. Prejudice against Russia may be intelligible, but indul- gence in it is a dangerously expensive luxury at a juncture like the present.

Against Turkey no similar prejudice exists; very much the reverse. The country occupies a strategic position of the highest importance in South-East Europe and exercises great influence over the Balkan League. Friendship with Turkey. should be one of our most valuable assets, and the new Ambassador in Ankara, Sir flughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, can be counted on to do everything to cement it ; so, it may be confidently pre- dicted, can Dr. Tewfik Riistii Aras, the former Foreign Minister of Turkey, who is now on his way to take up his post as Turkish Ambassador in London. If friend- ship with Turkey and Egypt can be consolidated, some solution reached that will end the unrest in Palestine, and a serious effort made to remove the quite genuine grievances of the Greeks of Cyprus—a most important matter in view of the geographical situation of the island —anxiety regarding our position in the Eastern Mediter- ranean will be largely allayed. But none of these things will happen of themselves ; considered and purposeful diplomatic initiative is needed. Of such initiative there is so far little outward sign. That may be all to the good so long as opportunities are not being let slip, but it is very necessary to be assured that they are not. Negligence in the diplomatic field is as culpable as neglect of A.R.P. at home.