THE NAZIS AND THE GERMANS
By A LATE RESIDENT IN GERMANY
FOR a few days after the Munich Conference the German Press contrived, as in recent years it seldom has, to reflect faithfully the feelings of most Germans. Relief and satisfaction; and a scarcely concealed astonishment that circumstances had so developed as to justify them, were coupled with glowing visions of a future in which the spirit of Munich would speedily produce reunion all round, and in which innumerable hatchets, perhaps even other and more dangerous weapons, would be buried. Hitler's speech at Saarbriicken put an end to this optimism, and now it maybe said that, in Germany as in other countries, specu- lation concerns itself no longer with the question whether more foreign adventures must be expected or not, but merely with the question when, and in what direction, the next adventure will begin.
If this sorry shift of expectation is justified—and only an optimist, or a Cabinet Minister, could deny it—it is due in the first instance to the inherent impossibility of any development in the direction of lasting moderation within the Nazi system, having regard to its ideology, structure, traditional aims and methods, to the tempera- ments of its leaders and to the expectations of their followers. The Nazi leaders have in the last analysis no alternative, even if they had the wish, but to proceed in the style which has brought them so much success and reputation. They have chosen a path by which, for them at least, there can be no return; and if it is to lead to the contentment and prosperity of the German people, there is a long way yet to go. A torch once lit must burn itself out, or be put out: it cannot turn into an olive branch. And those who hoped, if any did, that they could quench the Nazi flame by kindness, have had their fingers burned.
But, even if lasting reform of the offender is not to be hoped for, there is still some reason to be surprised at this almost instantaneous recidivism. Why are forebodings of disaster expressed now not in terms of years, but of months or even weeks? First of all, because the German Govern- ment believe that the Munich settlement has given them a great strategic advantage in Europe, which must be exploited while it is at its maximum. Secondly, because the economic situation of Germany is so unsatisfactory as to call for desperate remedies. Thirdly, because of the temper of the German people. It is with this third incen- tive to speedy action that I shall concern myself here. For though nothing annoys the Nazi Government more than any suggestion in the foreign Press that the German people do not stand solidly behind their leaders, the time has come when the important fact• that they do not should be clearly recognised, together with such conclusions as may legitimately be drawn from that fact.
One of the reasons why Germany may soon embark on a fresh foreign adventure is not that there are too many Nazis in that country, but that there are not enough. A foreigner who spends any length of time in Germany will find himself wondering, with some astonishment, where the Nazis are to be found. Unless he talks to officials or active members of the party formations—and even their obser- vations may sometimes impress him as being the product of prudence and discipline rather than of conviction—he will in general find that reactions to the pressure which the system exercises on the life of every individual range from a cynical apathy, through irritation and indignation, to hatred. The enthusiasm which was to be met with a year or two ago is rare today; and justification, where it is attempted, is half-hearted and apologetic.
The last year has brought to Germany diplomatic suc- cesses without parallel in modern history, together with a steady deterioration in public confidence and morale. Achievements which, had they been so ardently desired by the German people as German propaganda claims, should have produced delirious enthusiasm and gratitude, were greeted in Germany with short-lived satisfaction or listless apathy. The rejoicing that followed Munich was due not to triumph in an expanding empire, but to relief at the preservation of peace. In the four or five days when it seemed that peace would not be preserved, a mood of sullen dejection and helpless indignation weighed upon the German people, a mood due in part to a just estimate of responsi- bilities and in part to an expectation of early defeat induced in the ignorant by too complete a disbelief of propaganda about German strength. But whatever its cause it was almost universal, the only exceptions being those numerous Germans who hope for a war as the only way of getting rid of a regime which they regard as more disastrous than any misfortunes war or defeat could bring.
The Jewish persecution of the last months has had a profound effect on German opinion. Few Germans approve of it; very many are disgusted by it; but perhaps its most striking effect has been the creation of a general sense of insecurity. If such a fate can overtake the Jews, then it can overtake other classes or confessions as well. It may be that the persecution was in part a deliberate demon- stration of the party's ruthlessness and of its readiness and capacity to act without mercy against its enemies. If so, the lesson has not been lost; but tempers have not been sweetened by learning it. And as those who feel insecure cannot remain apathetic, there has been a shift upwards along the scale of disapproval from apathy to indignation and hatred.
The economic situation of Germany is only of interest, in a political analysis, from the point of view of its two limit- ing factors, the military and the psychological. With the former this article is not concerned; but the difficulties of German economy have the most important effect on public feeling. There is a severe shortage of eggs and fats; meat is poor in quality and sometimes scarce ; flour is very inferior ; coffee has recently been rationed, and fuel is short. Prices are under control, but cheapness cannot compensate for absolute scarcity. Hours of work tend to grow longer, wages are rigid and low. Farmers suffer from a scarcity of labour and unremunerative fixed prices ; everybody suffers from excessive bureaucratic control. Complaints are general and surprisingly loud ; in every sphere and on every sub- ject reticence in the expression of discontent seems to be diminishing. Discontent and the expectation of war have created an atmosphere of depression and anxiety which is said to be reacting adversely, in part at least owing to deliberate slowing down by the workers, on the level of industrial production. There is thus in Germany to-day, among members of every class, discontent and apprehen- sion which are becoming more widespread and more intense, and which the elimination of Dr. Schacht and Captain Wiedemann can have done nothing to allay.
What follows from this situation? Before this is con- sidered, it is necessary to qualify the above appreciation to some extent. First, a foreigner's impression of German opinion is likely to be influenced by the fact that the outlook and experience of most persons he meets differ from the average. Second, Berlin and other large cities have a more hectic atmosphere than the rest of Germany; but if their opinions are eccentric, so is their influence disproportionate. Third, although perhaps there are not enough Nazis, there are still plenty; and there is little to suggest that Nazi education is failing to produce the obedient automatons at which it aims; most openly dis- contented Germans are over trenty-f ve. Fourth, the great domestic achievement of abolished unemployment is not forgotten, and compensates for much. Fifth, Germans take a relative view of individual rights, and are ready to condone much persecution and injustice if they are convinced of the goodness of the persecutor's aim. Subject, however, to these qualifications, the general picture given above is substantially true; and it is also unfortunately true that these conditions of opinion can have, in peace- time, no effect whatever on Nazi policy, save to hasten its progress towards new extremes. Organised opposition is impossible, and scarcely exists. Individual martyrdoms are useless, and dangerous to more than the martyr.
What would be the effect of these conditions in war- time? It would be stupid to be dogmatic on so difficult a question, for German patience and patriotism are great and elastic, and it must be admitted that the Nazis are adept in the handling and calculation of opinion. They are under no illusions as to the state of feeling, do not expect solid public support for a war policy, and have efficient means for dealing with resistance on the home front. Moreover, it takes more than surreptitious hostile opinion, however widespread, to handicap the action of an air force. But it may be doubted whether the point has not been passed at which war would consolidate opinion behind the Government. The reaction of Germans to war, and its effect, will vary with circumstances; but it can be stated with some confidence that the consequences of the intense reluctance of the German people to embark on any war in which they have reason to suppose that they will meet with powerful opposition would be serious.
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