RUSSIA INTERVENES
By STRATEGICUS If the flank of the Caucasian armies was ill-protected, the same must apply to the force committed to redeeming Hitler's word at Stalingrad, since the northern flank of the Caucasian units is the southern flank of the Stalingrad armies. Purely military considera- tions might have suggested that a large-scale withdrawal would be the one counsel of safety ; and, as for prestige, nothing that can now happen will recover it at Stalingrad. It is presumably Halder's dis- approval of Hitler's impressionism in this, as in so many other direc- tions, that led to his dismissal. The enemy is now, beyond conceal- ment, beginning to suffer tensions and strains that must test even so powerful a military machine as that of Germany ; but its reaction to such conditions cannot be expected to be as formidable ultimately in the hands of Hitler as they would be under the guidance of the professional soldiers. Immediately, they may be more alarming to the Allies, since there is so much that the enemy has still the power to do. But the violent lunges in this and that direction, while they can startle, disconcert and alarm, are only possible by an expenditure of force that is finally to the Allied, rather than to his, advantage.
So it has come about that under the strain of an offensive that may have the gravest repercussions for him, if it is pressed through to its expected culmination, he has begun to make readjustments in the distribution of his forces, without apparently thinking of the invitation it must offer. He failed in his major purpose of this year's campaign. He did not crush the Russian armies ; and now, when winter is once again,beginning to lay its cold fingers on the German heart and when the Allies call for stronger treatment than mere jibes, he must pay the forfeit. Stalingrad has long been a wasted effort. As far as one can see there has been a belated attempt to withdraw some of the troops, though apparently he dare not abandon the project altogether ; but, whereas a month ago he might have re- adjusted his concentration with advantage, he is now doing it under the compulsion of a diversion.
The Russian success is, therefore, no mere accident, but the in- evitable counter-offensive after an abortive attack, clumsily carried out and prolonged beyond the point at which it even appeared to yield returns. There is, moreover, scarcely a feature lacking that might show up the German ineptitude. It was the north-western threat that the German staff affected to disregard ; and when there was no appearance of any movement in the south the communiqués were boring in their repeated references to attacks. Yet it was from that quarter, where surprise should have been impossible, that the most damaging blow came. The Stalingrad force depended upon two main lines of communication—the offshoot of the Kharkov line which runs through the Don bend by Nizhne Chirskaya to Stalin- grad, and the Kotelnikov line which joins. the Rostov-Baku railway at Tikhoretsk. The former has a small tributary which runs from Kalatch to join the main line at Krivomuzginskaya.
This small branch was not of much importance ; but upon the main lines the enemy force before and in Stalipgrad lived and fought. Russia is so parsimonious in this matter of railway-lines that wheeled transport must supplement the railway traffic ; and, of course, such ancillary transport must connect the railheads and the front. But it remains true that the railways are vital ; and if logic ruled the battlefield, a very considerable force in the neighbourhood of Stalingrad must either fall back at once, get the railways back, or be annihilated. For the Russians struck across the Kotelnikov railway, and now hold about 25 miles of it from Abganerovo to Tundutovo. They continued their way northwest to .the direct line to Stalingrad, and cutting it at Krivomuzginskaya, advanced up the branch line to Kalatch. Quite apart from the impressive number of prisoners captured, and the suggestion it provides of the total volume of casualties, this is a very brilliant and important victory ; and there is one very significant feature about it that cannot be disregarded: there were many German surrenders. That is a fresh symptom of a restiveness that showed itself last winter in something resembling mutiny.
The other arm of the Russtan scissors struck down through Serafimovich. By Tuesday it had covered some 70 miles, and at a distance of 8o miles from Stalingrad, within the Don bend, had . cut the direct railway at Serovikino, and trapped three enemy divi- sions with their staffs. One column has even joined hands with the city's defenders. It is not possible to say precisely where the easterly extension of the thrust within the Don bend has reached ; but it seems clear that no great distance separates the two heads of the advance. Logic, as I have frequently pointed out, does not invariably decide battles ; and if we wish to see what the Germans can face with some outward show of equanimity, we should glance at the position on the central front during the present spring, when the Russians had driven down toward the rear of Vyasma, 110 miles to the east, and were actually some 35 miles northwest of Smolensk. The net had been drawn more tightly about the German armies of the centre than anyone appreciated at the time ; and, if we praise Zhukov's masterful challenge, we must at least find some word of recognition of the amazing character of the German defence.
The German armies may then extricate themselves from this serious position ; but they can hardly do so without exaggerating their losses, and without the full if painful recognition that they can take no liberties on the Russian front. These points have their relevance in the discussion of the situation in North Africa. Hitler apparently intends to make a bid to retain a grip upon the Mediterranean Narrows, and, recognising the sterility of merely standing on the fringe of the bottle-neck at Bizerta and Tunis, his plan covers the occupation of perhaps the whole of Tunisia with the western end of Tripolitania. The Allied command in North Africa is so sparing of its news that it is difficult to see more than the vague outline of the operations ; but it seems to be established, as I suggested last week, that the enemy will depend upon his strength in the air to seize, extend and maintain his bridgehead south of the Mediterranean. When we wonder at the astronomical figures of Allied air construction we need to bear in mind that the air-factor intrudes everywhere ; and we can never have too many and too powerful aircraft.
Neither in Tunisia nor in Cyrenaica have we succeeded in bring- ing the enemy to battle. Rommel has still eluded Montgomery, and is apparently falling back towards El Agheila. Whether he has the power to stand there is a question the next few days will probably decide ; but if my suggestion about Hitler's plan is correct, he may still hope to fall back towards Tripoli, gaining such time as he can, and form the nucleus of the enemy concentration in western Tripolitania. The accession of French West Africa to Darlan's command is of immense importance, if it means what we hope it means. We are at present stronger on the ground, on the sea and possibly in the air. If we could count upon the accretion of the French forces in Africa, under that fine general Giraud, not only should we be sure of clearing the enemy out of Africa as swiftly as the occasion demands, but also of carrying the offensive to the weakest partner of the Axis.
Both east and west, for the present, the Allies arc proceeding with more caution than speed. This may not be altogether a bad thing. As long as Hitler thinks he has a chance to maintain himself in North Africa and deny us the control of the Narrows, with the splendid base of Bizerta, he will stand and fight. But he cannot do so with any chance of success without withdrawing forces from other sectors where presumably they have been put to effective use. He is, therefore, thinning out his concentration on other sectors to strengthen this ; and the final development of that process can be imagined. But that it is not merely imaginary can now be observed from the events in Russia.
There must be, as every German general well knows, a minimum density of troops necessary to hold any position. If the concentra-
tion is weakened beyond that point disaster is risked. It is obvious that the strain will not at present be felt directly in the ground forces ; but, as has been pointed out, no battle on land or sea can in future be entered upon with hope of success without air-co- operation that is superior in skill, dash and technique if not in numbers. There seems to be no doubt that the Luftwaffe has been weakened in Russia already. It has lost disproportionately in Africa and is steadily losing more. The breaking-strain is most likely to occur in that direction, though the effect will be first experienced outside Africa. Meanwhile we can rest assured that for the first time we are presenting Hitler with problems of a nature to tax a far more stable mind.
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