TIME TO TALK
MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S opening speech at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party had much of the air of a man masking moderate courses behind clouds of nuclear ex- plosion. That he should have chosen to do this is an indication of the curious way in which foreign policy is discussed in Soviet governing circles; but his abandonment of his ultimatum on Berlin, and the consequent humiliation of Herr Ulbricht, does imply a considerable slackening of international tension. This is all to the good; but the West should realise that its own resistance to Russian demands must have played a cony siderable part in bringing this about. And the continuing pollution of other people's atmo- spheres by Soviet atomic tests shows that Mr. Khrushchev is capable of a brutal indifference to world opinion which could manifest itself in further displays of brinkmanship, if it happens to suit his book.
Still, for the moment and despite local inci- dents, the sting has been temporarily removed from the Berlin problem. And it can now be seen in a longer perspective; it is more than a lever for forcing the West into negotiations on the German problem before the West German forces receive nuclear weapons. From the Russian point of view Berlin represents three potential advan- tages. There is the possibility of a diplomatic victory for Mr. Khrushchev, which would help him to silence his critics within the USSR. There is the rather remote possibility of separating West Germany from its NATO allies. And there is the opportunity of using moderation on the Berlin issue to extract concessions in other parts of the world. This last alternative has not received as much attention in the West as it deserves. Berlin is a highly vulnerable hostage, to which we have moral obligations that cannot be denied. Pressure at this point, so Mr. Khrushchev might believe, would lead the West to give up other positions in the world less easily subject to Soviet attack.
In this perspective a settlement of the Berlin question would have some advantages for the West. There should be serious examination of the various schemes that have been put forward, always bearing in mind that no plan would be acceptable which involves the risk of two and a half million West Berliners being absorbed by Herr Ulbricht's tyranny. The most cogent argu- ment in favour of moving the seat of the UN to Berlin is that it would afford a protection for its population which might prove to be more effica- cious than that provided by allied troops whose presence depends on the willingness of Western politicians to engage in all-out war.
For the time will certainly come when it will once again be useful for the Russians to switch on the heat in Berlin, and along the air corridors. One of the things which has emerged most clearly from the meeting of the 22nd Congress is that Soviet party politics have at least as much effect on Russian foreign policy as party politics do in the West. With the responsibility of governing Russia on his shoulders, Mr. Khrushchev must adopt a more subtle line than that which Com- munist purists might approve, but he is liable to find himself in a very exposed position wheneva there is a setback to Soviet interests.
If he were seriously thfeatened within the party, too, then he might find it necessary to out- bid his opponents in toughness towards the West. The process by which a Balkan squabble between Albania and Yugoslavia can become of impor- tance in bringing into the open deep-seated dis- agreement between China and Russia shows the complexity of the relationship between the development of international relations and the power struggle within the Communist world. During the congress Mr. Khrushchev has appeared to be urging the Soviet Union towards increased de-Stalinisation on the home front and a rather less intransigent attitude abroad, but no one can tell when he will find it necessary once again to resort to threats and blackmail. In these circumstances the only attitude for the West is one of firmness combined with a willingness to negotiate. A simple refusal to talk is liable to damage us in the eyes of the uncommitted world as well as having unpredictable effects on the Soviet power equation. We should talk, but talk firmly.
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