DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY.*
ANY one who lightly assumes that the Allied victory has made a new world to which the lessons of the past do not apply will be annoyed by Mr. Mackinder's thoughtful book. The dreamer does not wish to be awakened from his dream of a regenerate humanity content to labour peacefully under the guidance of the League of Nations. Yet Mr. Mackinder's cold douche of facts will be wholesoine for the enthusiast, bracing him for the stern conflict with realities that has indeed already begun. Mr. Mackinder lays down the proposition that great wars are directly or indirectly the outcome of the unequal growth of nations. As a geographer ho sees that this unequal growth is largely the result of " the uneven distribution of fertility and strategical opportunity upon the face of our globe," so that " there is in nature no such thing as equality of opportunity for the nations." The problem then is to guard against the influence of these geographical facts by a determined effort of human will-power, expressed through the Governments. But first of all the facts have to be understood by the plain man, who in a democratic country is very reluctant to look beyond the morrow. Mr. Mackinder, in a rapid sketch of history from the seaman's point of view, divides the globe into a World Island—Europe, Asia, and Africa—and lesser islands, of which North and South America and Australia are the chief. Fourteen-sixteenths of humanity live on the World Island ; nearly a sixteenth in Great Britain and Japan ; and the remaining sixteenth in America and else- where. There is no prospect of a change in these proportions, for Africa and Asia could support many more millions than they do now. Suppose, then, that the World Island came under the control of a single nation. What chance would the other islands have of competing with it in sea-power ? " Ought we not to recognize that that is the great ultimate threat to the world's liberty so far as strategy is concerned, and to provide against it in our new political system ?" From the landsman's standpoint, Mr. Mackinder bids us note the significance of the Great Lowland or Russo-Siberian plain, the " Heartland " of the World Island, constituting with Arabia and the Sahara " a broad curving belt inaccessible to seafaring people except by the three Arabian waterways." He finds a corresponding " Heartland " in Africa south of the Sahara. All these regions make up four-fifths of tho World Island but are inhabited by only a fifth of its people. He recalls the incessant migrations from the Northern "Heart- land" that made up ancient and mediaeval history to the rise of the Ottoman Turks. Germany meant, after defeating Russia,' to extend her rule over this vast territory, inaccessible to a sea Power, as a step towards world-dominion. How can such a danger be permanently averted ?
Mr. Mackinder credits Germany with having deliberately adopted Protection in order to develop her man-power, partly because a world-wide industry needed armed force behind it, partly because she Wanted vast armies to deal with Russia. He may not convince one readers that Germany's rulers looked so
o far ahead. For ne thing, the Germans made such childish blunders in their conduct of the war that we are less inclined than ever to attribute to them the superhuman intelligence which they were once thought to possess. Still, the effect of The highly organized German economic system was to increase population and trade very rapidly. The " Going Concern " acquired such momentum that its directors could not stop it when it was heading straight for war. Fortunately for us, Germany had to fight on two fronts : for Hamburg and her overseas trade lest her people should starve, and for Russia and Turkey—the " Heart- land " in which the Slays were revolting against her domination. She was unequal to the double conflict and, after crushing Russia, succumbed to the Western Allies. Yet it is clear that if she had left Belgium severely alone and stood upon the defen- sive against France, she might have overwhelmed Russia very quickly before Great Britain, to say nothing of America, had
• Dela9eratie Ideals and Reality. By it J. Mackinder, London : Con- ' stable. Fs. ad. net.] realized the danger. It would have been our turn next to be attacked, and a Germany controlling large Slav armies and all the foodstuffs of Russia would have been an even more formidable adversary than we had in the Germany of 1914. Mr. Mackinder infers that we must at all costs prevent this particular danger from arising again, and that the best guarantee lies in the establishment of the small States of Eastern Europe on a firm basis. If Eastern Europe is divided like Western Europe into self-contained nations, it may enjoy peace. Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece—only two of which are enemy nations—may form a solid barrier between Germany and disorganized Russia. Mr. Mackinder does not include the smaller non-Russian peoples of Esthonia, Lithuania, and Cour- land, but they must not be forgotten. The seven larger States, with a population of sixty millions, are, as he says, all vigorously self-conscious, and desire neither German nor Russian control.• If they are given time to develop naturally, they will be able to resist pressure from either East or West, and will become part of the normal European system. Germany of course foresees this. The reluctance of General von der Goltz to evacuate Lithuania and the aid given by Germany to the Bolsheviks reveal the German desire to destroy the barrier before it is set up. It is all the more the duty of the Allies to defend these States, whether against Germany, or the Bolsheviks, or Admiral Koltchak's reactionary advisers. Mr. Mackinder is perfectly right in saying that unless Eastern Europe is settled the League of Nations will stand little chance of achieving success.
In direct opposition to the internationalists, Mr. Mackinder holds that the future happiness of the world depends upon the development of small nations. He thinks that Germany may possibly become a real federation and that Russia will almost certainly do so, thus removing the danger of war between Pan- Slav and Pan-German. The British Empire and the •United States occupy exceptional positions in the world. So long as there is a reasonable balance of power on the Continent—the " Heartland "—and no one State is excessively large, peace may prevail. Mr. Mackinder attaches equal importance to a reason- able balance of trade. He thinks that both Free Trade of the Laissez faire type and Predatory Protection of the German type are principles of Empire, and that both make for war." He means that each nation ought to have its share of the higher industries, and that no nation should virtually monopolize any one trade. This of course involves the use of tariffs ; the author, with a confidence we cannot pcssibly share, recom- mends it as a way of peace. He goes on to advocate decentralization at home, for the purpose of infusing new vigour into the country centres, which are now drained of their best for the benefit of London. " You must base national organization on provincial communities." The Bolshevik would set class against class the world over and bring mankind to ruin. Mr. Mackinder would restore the old local life in which all classes mingled and co-operated for the common welfare. It seems to us an admirable ideal, because it is human and practicable. The organizer's ideal, the Socialist's ideal, is that of a vast multitude of units directed from an office in Whitehall. It would be refreshing to break away from that hopeless future, and to regain the variety and freedom that our communal life has lost.
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