THE BOMB
HE pillars of fire that rose over Hiroshinia and Naga- saki illuminated once and for all the nature of total war at its extreme and warned the world, without ambiguity, that it was moving into an age in which the whole- sale destruction of urban civilisation would all too soon be a present possibility. This was something which intellect could grasp without strain, and the fearful symbolism of the mush- room, clouds hanging over the consciousness of the world and the conscience of the Allies had no lack of interpreters who spoke with all urgency. But human beings, as Mr. Eliot says, cannot bear very much reality, and in time the realities of atomic warfare were simply set aside by the imagination as unmanageable, and buried deep. Against a background of passive incomprehension the governments entered the arma- ments race which became inevitable the moment it was clear that international control was out of the question. As the international political climate worsened, all tentative move- ments towards a genuine sharing of responsibility were bound to wither. One consequence of this was that the atomic bomb dwindled in apparent significance from being a melodramatic symbol of universal annihilation into the status of a military weapon different in degree, certainly, but not in kind from " conventional " weapons. The general acceptance of this attitude was confirmed by Russia's successful manufacture of the bomb, and later by Britain's. It was in the nature.of things that this should be so.
By September, 1951, research in the United States had reached such a point that the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission could say (about a week, as it happened before the announcement that Russia had exploded a second atomic bomb) that America was working towards a situation where it would have atomic weapons in almost as complete variety as conventional ones, and that among these would be artillery shells (which have since been successfully tested), guided missiles, torpedoes, rockets and bombs for ground-support aircraft. There was no doubt, he asserted, that the atomic bomb could be used as a tactical weapon. A week or two later he developed his thesis in a speech at the University of Southern California. As it was proved that atomic weapons could be used tactically as well as strategically, when a situation arose where " in our carefully considered judgment the use of any kind of weapon is justified, we are now at the place where we should give serious consideration to the use of an atomic weapon, provided it can be used effectively from the military point of view and that it is no more destructive than is necessary to meet the particular situation in question." Thus, he con- tinued, the concept of atomic warfare in terms of inter- Continental bombers striking at great cities and industrial centres was no longer the whole truth. This being so, he argued, coming to the point in his conclusion, the atomic bomb might now be divested of its " awesome cloak of destruction " and used in the same manner as other weapons.
But meanwhile America, spurred on by the knowledge that Russia would not stop short at the fission bomb, of the sort which exploded over Hiroshima, was already within reach of the hydrogen or fusion bomb. By late 1952 such an engine of vast destruction had been manufactured and exploded. Russia has now caught up, as she was bound to catch up sooner or later, and another monopoly has gone. We are a long way from the days when America saw it 8 her duty to hold her terrible secret in -" sacred trust." Whatever advantage the West now holds it must be assumed that it will be cancelled out in due course by the gathering momentum of the Russian atomic industry. In all but the actual size of their stock piles, and beyond a certain point this is a matter of academic interest only, the Great Powers are racing almost neck and neck. Towards what ?
Perhaps the time will soon come when the large questions should be asked again, and more insistently. If governments could have collectively the sense of the absurd which may yet persist gamely in the individuals of whom they are composed, the atomic armaments race might be seen for the reductio ad absurdum that it is, and it might yet conceivably resolve itself into, if not a laughing matter, at any rate, an dccasion for relief. But such is not in the nature of governments, democratic or otherwise, and the farce which the world has forced upon itself during the past decade remains of a tragic character. The hydrogen bomb has presumably not yet been developed to the stage when it can be delivered against a target by a bomber or a rocket, but such development is only a matter of time, and—on the showing of the past few years —not much time at that. The recent RAF exercise showed that the bombers can still get through to their targets in appreciable numbers; and while the Minister of Supply's later statement on the development of ground-to-air guided missiles capable of speeds of two thousand miles an hour pointed plainly to the coming obsolescence of the bomber as we know it, there remains the problem of effectively countering the long-range offensive rocket which comes at still greater speeds and gives virtually no warning of its approach. In the race between attack and defence in the field of atomic warfare, attack is always the more likely to have the lead.
When the ordinary man comes to consider such matters it is not surprising that a cloud of unreality should settle upon his thoughts. A single "nominal " bomb of the modest and old-fashioned variety which brought the Second World War to its close would, say the Home Office experts, if exploded over a large European town, kill or wound 60,000 people. In March the Civil Defence Staff College made its first large tactical study of atomic defence problems, taking Sheffield as the city under attack and assuming an atomic burst seven hundred feet above the Bramall Lane football ground. The experts' estimate was that 10,000 had been killed, 9,000 seri- ously injured, and 165,000 made homeless. While one expert has gone on record as saying that atomic weapons have brought no new problems that cannot be dealt with by our scientists, firemen, wardens and doctors (this is the inevitable concomitant of the suggestion that the atomic bomb should be aivested of its " awesome cloak of destruction " and regarded as just another weapon), the man in the street will in his ignorance be forgiven if he arrives at conclusions somewhat different. What would have been the findings of the Civil Defence Staff College's tactical exercise if the participants had assumed the burst of a hydrogen bomb over Sheffield ? We know little about this weapon, but the little we know is enough to prompt some questions not without their interest for the man in the street. It is cold comfort to learn that although the hydrogen bomb is, in terms of energy released, a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bomb, its radius of flash damage is only thirty times greater, and that of its blast damage only ten times greater. Saturation point is far behind, and it is neither defeatist nor alarmist to question at this stage the two main assumptions that governments have been obliged to make—first, that the atomic bomb is a weapon different Only in degree and not in kind from lesser weapons, and, secondly, that an effective system of passive defence against the effects of its use in war is feasible. Given the armaments race, it is clear why such assumptions had to be made; the question is, how long can the pretence be maintained ? In the kind of warfare which is now possible all countries are vulnerable, and relative degrees of vulnerability soon cease to be of any great importance in the face of the real possibility of mutual destruction achieved by minimum effort. That would be the most logical end of the reductio ad absurdum, and whatever else may be uncertain in this most obscure of matters it is certain that no country can consciously seek such an end. Yet all drive as fast as they can towards the edge of it.
This is not rearmament comparable with that, say, which preceded the outbreak of war in 1939; for it cannot be said strongly enough that if this particular piling up, of weapons ends in the offensive use of these weapons, at the outbreak of war each side will have the power to paralyse the other. Are we to hope in desperation, then, that when effective parity between the powers has been reached atomic warfare will be so manifestly absurd as to become a 'practical impossibility ? This, in fact, must be the hope lurking behind present policies, for none of these can truly be said to be'directly aggressive in the sense that Nazi Germany's policy was aggressive. Such forced optimism is no doubt inevitable, the making the best of a bad job. But the risks which attend such a situation are enormous and obvious. The only alternative to the present policies of make4belidve is a re-examination of the whole question of international control of atomic armaments. To raise this matter at the moment is like crying for the moon, but the armaments race grows faster every day and governments may soon (and the sooner the better) be compelled by circum- stances to reconsider their attitudes. The questions discussed so urgently in the months after Hiroshima are with us still.
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