THE SITUATION IN FRANCE.
FRANCE seems for the present to be wholly without eminent politicians ; but she is so far true to herself that she is not even now without interesting politicians. M.
Brisson has of late made good his claim to this subordinate distinction. Why he became Minister, and why, having become Minister, he has made so strange a use of his oppor- tunity, is really a puzzling problem. M. Brisson was long regarded as M. Grevy's inevitable successor. It is true that M. Grevy has never seemed at all in want of a successor. But he is old enough to make it natural to choose a younger man ; and it is possible that had M. Brinson still been the obvious heir to the office, M. Grevy might have kept to himself his wish to be re-elected. When, however,M. Brisson went out of his way to lead a Ministry of Affairs,—to do, in fact, what could have been done quite as well by any Under-Secretary who happened to have a seat in the Chamber,—his chance was gone. He has set a price upon himself ; and, as might have been expected, he has been taken at his own valuation. His conduct cannot be explained by ambition, for he took office at the worst possible time for his own interest ; nor by patriotism, for the Republic certainly does not gain by using up the last Minister, except M. Cle- menceau, who has not been tried and found wanting ; nor by the force of any appeal that M. Grevy could have made to him, for the crisis following upon M. Ferry's fall might have been met equally well by any one of half-a-dozen inferior men. Consequently, why the late President of the Chamber should have exchanged a secure place with a reversion of the highest position in the State, for an insecure place with no reversion at all, must remain a matter for wonder.
When, however, he had made his choice, he might have been expected to show some vigour in his new office. He had allowed the elections to go altogether unimproved. The Republicans went to the country in two sections,—the Opportunists and the Radicals. M. Brisson allowed M. Ferry to pose unchallenged as the Opportunist leader, and M. Clemenceau to pose unchallenged as the Radical leader. All that he himself did was to take a back seat in the Opportunist coach. If the declaration he made the other day had been made before the Elections, it might to some extent have affected the voting, for, though all the vices of Opportunism were latent in it, they did not lie on the surface. There was a false air of moderation about its phrases which might have won back some wavering Conservatives to the Republican side. But by keeping it in reserve until the Elections had shown that the real forces with which a French Government has at this moment to reckon are Radicalism and Reaction, he made it ineffectual for any other end than to prove that opposition to M. Brisson is the one point upon which it seems possible to get together a majority in the new Chamber. It is very much easier, however, to find fault with the course M. Brisson has taken than to point out a better one. The day of really Moderate Republicanism has apparently passed. If M. Brisson had preached it, it would have been equally distasteful to all three parties. The forcible and interesting personality of M. Clemenceau bars the way to the Radical leadership, and M. Ferry has a stronger claim on the allegiance of the Opportunist remnant. There is no longer any place among the Conserva- tives for Republicans of any shade ; besides which, M. Brisson's attitude towards the Church, though less defiant than M. Ferry's, is at bottom equally hostile ; and in the struggle between Conservatives and Republicans, the Ecclesiastical Question counts for more than any other. To all appearance, therefore, M. Brisson's liberty of choice, so far as it ever existed, ended with the return of the new Chamber. He might possibly hare influenced the electors ; he had no chance of influencing the Deputies. The publication of a manifesto was probably prompted by a sense of what was due to himself. He was but wrapping his mantle about him by way of preparation for meeting with dignity his political death. For the moment, however, death declines to come. Though the several groups in the Chamber could agree in picking holes in M. Brisson's declaration, they have not been able to agree upon anything further. The chaotic condition of French parties is clearly shown by the fact that what purported to be a plenary assembly of the united Lefts brought together only some 150 Deputies, and that even these were not of one mind as to the line the Opposition should take. A majority, however, resolved that it was inexpedient to provoke a Ministerial crisis until after M. Grevy's re-election ; and M. Brisson was thereupon informed that if he chose to do nothing beyond the necessary business of administration until the National Assembly had met and separated, he would be left alone during the interval. The discovery that some at least of his adversaries have a motive for delaying his overthrow, naturally suggested the possibility of making better terms. M. Brisson altogether declined to play the part assigned to him. If he remained in office, it should not be as a mere temporary clerk. Instead of keeping all disputed questions in the background, he insisted on bringing forward the most disputed of all, and this day week he asked the Chamber to vote the Tonquin Credits.
Although this is nothing more than all parties might have looked for, it seems to have thrown M. Brisson's adversaries into a state of singular disorder. They have, for the most part, been returned as declared opponents of the Oppor- tunist policy in Eastern Asia ; yet now that the oppor- tunity of carrying out the evacuation they have preached has really come, they are not at all pleased with the prospect. Evacuation has its responsibilities as well as its economies ; and, though the country has resented the want of frankness with which M. Ferry has treated it, and shown an unmistakable desire not to burden itself with fresh Colonial engagements, it does not follow that it would like to reap no fruit at all from the lives and treasure that have been spent. Immediate and complete evacuation would mean immediate and com- plete loss of Tonquin. The natives have no feeling either of sentimental or prudential attachment to their conquerors, and the disappearance of the French troops would re- move the solitary motive that keeps them faithful to the French flag. M. Clemenceau may possibly be ready to carry the courage of his opinions even to that length ; but he would secure no support in doing so beyond that of convinced Radicals, and convinced Radicals are not numerous enough to keep him in power. They would be able probably to place him in power, since for that purpose they would have the aid both of Opportunists and Reactionaries. To make your enemy a Minister has become the recognised mode of getting rid of him, and office is now the danger against which M. Clemenceau has to be most on his guard. But it is also a danger which, under certain easily realisable conditions, it may be out of his power to stave off. He might, indeed, support a Floquet Ministry, but M. Floquet sits in M. Brisson's seat and has M. Brisson's experience before him by which to take warning. In default of M. Floquet there seems to be no Minister whom M. Clemencean would not hold himself bound to overthrow. He could not remain neutral in presence of a Ferry or Freycinet Cabinet ; and when he had upset the last of the possible substitutes for himself, he would be bound not to leave the President without a Minister. Consequently, M. Clemenceau is at once M. Brisson's worst enemy and his best friend,—his worst enemy, because he is forced to oppose his measures, and is sure of re- ceiving ample support in doing so ; his best friend, because it is directly to M. Clemenceau's interest not to create a vacancy which he could neither leave empty nor fill at this moment, except by risking his own political future. That is the present situation, and a less satisfactory one for the interests of the Republic it would be hard to imagine.
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