BOOKS.
THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE.•
M. DE LANESSIN possesses all the qualifications necessary in order to enable him to write a valuable and instructive history of the Anglo- French Entente. Hole well acquainted with the past history of both countries. He has been at pains to understand all those perplexing, and often contradictory, currents of thought, which are not unfrequently puzzling to Englishmen themselves, and which constitute the despair of foreign observers who endeavour to generalize on the predominating features and proclivities of English public opinion. Himself a dis- ,tinguished member of the French Colonial Service, he is not only able to comprehend the leading principles of British Colonial policy, but, to his credit be it said, he has not allowed himself to fall a victim to that jealousy which the grandeur and extent of the British overseas Empire is eminently calculated to inspire. As an ex-Minister of the French Marine, he is able to estimate at its right value the importance of that sea power on which the might of Great Britain has rested in the past and still rests. He takes a broad and statesmanlike view of world- politics, and, from a study of the history of the last four hundred years, is able to arrive at the unquestionably sound conclusion that the social,
• economic, and political progress of Europe has been in direct proportion to the amity of the relations which have prevailed between the two nations. Undeterred by ephemeral ebullitions of Anglophobia and Gallophobia on either side of the Channel, he has throughout his political career been an ardent advocate of Anglo-French friendship. He himself took a distinguished and honourable part in the transactions which, to the great advantage of both countries, ultimately culminated in promoting, in the first instance, a relationship characterized by the somewhat elastic phrase of an Entente, and, more recently, in a close Alliance concluded in order to save civilization from destruction and to frustrate the unprovoked attack of a common and very formidable foe.
It has for long been a commonplace of absolutist politicians of the typo of Prince Bismarck to say that no reliance could be placed on British political fidelity or loyalty, not only by reason of that constitu- tional " perfidy " with which Albion has proverbially but very unjustly been credited, but also by reason of the fact that British Ministers were wholly at the mercy of every ephemeral wave, whether of hypocritical sentimentality or crude egotism, which passed over what was deemed a singularly unstable and vacillating public. Even Englishmen them- selves have at times been inclined to think, more especially since demo- cracy has successfully asserted its undisputed away, that the foreign policy of their country was governed by no very fixed or definite prin- ciples, but that it depended rather on the haphazard and fluctuating influences of the moment. Side by side with these explanations of the conduct of the enigmatical islanders, another school of Continental politicians has often credited the Governments and inhabitants of Great Britain with a fixity of purpose and a continuity of motive—as often as not of sinister motive—which most of them have been far from aware that they themselves possessed. Frequently, in the course of my own diplomatic experience, have I !mown instances of acts of the British Government, which admitted of some very simple explanation based exclusively on the merits of the special point at issue, being attributed to hidden, ulterior, and Machiavellian motives, which only existed in the minds of over-suspicious Continental critics. In truth, however, for many a long year the main principles of British foreign policy, whether directed by a feudal aristocracy, an oligarchy resting on the support of the middle classes, or a genuine democracy, have not undergone any very great variations. The only considerable transforma- tion of recent years has been the abandonment of tho policy of main- taining at all costs the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The change was not only dictated by circumstances, but was eminently wise. For the rest, the shrewd political instincts of the Anglo-Saxon race have led them, in spite of many vagaries and temporary aberrations, to cleave to three points of cardinal importance. In the first place, they have fully grasped the idea that their national existence is based on the maintenance of maritime supremacy. In the second place, they have very wisely resisted the attempts of any single Power to establish a European hegemony—a tendency which has rendered them liable to the unjust accusation that they have persistently and sedulously fomented discord between other Continental Powers. It was Prince
• Histoire de !'Entente Cordiale Franco-Anglaise. Par J. L. de Laneasan. Park; Llbrairie Bells Akan. (8 tr. 60 c. net.)
Bismarck, and not any British statesman, who of late years was the leading apostle of a disingenuous policy having this object in view.
In the third place, they have always recognized that the independence of the Low Countries was of vital importance to British interests, and that the acquisition of those countries by any strong European Power would constitute a standing menace to Great Britain.
M. de Lanessan dwells at some length on all these points, and more especially on the last of the three. He holds that British susceptibility as regards the political status of the Low Countries dates from the days of the Tudors ; that it was the abandonment by the French for a time of an aggressive policy in Flanders which led to.the sixteenth.century coalition of .France and England against Spain ; and that it was the reversal of that policy by Louis XIV., whose conduct he severely con- demns, which was the main cause of the long and devastating wars of the seventeenth century. In common with all the more recent and well-informed historians and political writers, he does full justice to the peaceful intentions originally entertained by the younger Pitt, and throws the whole blame of the Anglo-French War of 1793 on the insane and irrepressible Chauvinism which led the Convention to attack Holland and Belgium. The " insatiable ambition " of Napoleon was the main cause of subsequent wars. The Belgian Revolution of 1830 might, M. de Lanessan thinks, very probably have led to war between the two countries had the Government of Louis Philippe not wisely consented to the preservation of Belgian independence. " 11 y a," said Talley-
rand, who was at the time Ambassador in London, " une fibre anglaise qui, depuis si longtemps, appartient h in question des Pays-Bas qu'on ns peut is faire vibror impunement." Coming to more modern times, M. de Lanessan thinks that British intervention in the present war is mainly due to the German violation of Belgian neutrality. Ho may be right in thinking that, if Germany had not made the gross political blunder of attacking Belgium, publio opinion in this country would have pre- vented the British Government from taking part in the war until France had been separately crushed, and the hour, long foreseen and desired at Berlin, for an attack on Great Britain and the British Empire had sounded ; but this conclusion is, after all, mere conjecture.
The general account given by M. de Lanessan, of British foreign policy is, therefore, eminently fair and judicial. He appears, however, to be somewhat unduly severe on Lord Palmerston, whose polioy ho strongly condemns and whom he accuses of " megalomania." Lord Palmerston was unquestionably one of the most typically British Ministers who have ever held sway in this country. Ho was the most insular of islanders. He lived at a time when the whole of Europe was soothing with the discontent ()awed by absolutist and autooratio rule. Ho saw that the solidity of British institutions had enabled his own country to weather, not only the storms of the great Revolution, but also their desolating aftermath. Hence, he entertained a hardy, perfectly sincere, but exaggerated belief that all would be well if Greeks, Poles, Spaniards, and other restless or oppressed nationalities would only copy the Parliamentary and other fetishes which, it was thought, the experience of Great Britain held up as models for universal imitation and acceptance. Animated by sentiments such as these, he displayed an unjustifiable tendenoy to interfere in the Internal affairs of other countries, and to proffer distasteful advice as to how they should be treated. Moreover, his language was dictatorial, and at times even aggressive. He also, as in the case of the Pritchard affair, to which M. de Lanessan specifically alludes, often pushed the Civic Romtinus suns principle to extreme lengths. But he was far from being a megalomaniac in the sense in which that term is usually employed. His ambitions were in no way akin to those which in more recent times have exorcised a marked influence on the minds of German statesmen and their profes- sorial acolytes. He desired no expansion of British territory. He was quite guiltless of the offence of earth-hunger. On the contrary, his Memoirs show that he absolutely rejected the proposal made to him by the Emperor Napoleon III. that Great Britain should take possession of Egypt, and there can be no manner of doubt that his opposition to the construction of the Suez Canal, though ill-timed and based on grounds which subsequent events have proved to be wholly fallacious, had its origin in a prophetic instinct that the accomplishment of the great work of M. de Lesseps would ultimately foroo Great Britain, much against her will, into the adoption of an annexationist policy.
M. de .Lanessan's account of the more recent phases of Egyptian history, upon which Anglo-French relations mainly hinged for many years, and the recollection of which, it must be admitted, is somewhat calculated to rouse French susceptibilities, is also singularly fair, and. so far as I know, generally very accurate. Ho condemns the poliey adopted both by rL Gambetta and by M. do Froycinot on the ground that, when once the French Government, which was in 1882 struggling with internal difficulties and apprehensive of the real intentions of Germany, had decided not to take any part in the suppression of the Arabi revolt, the only wise policy to pursue was to " abandon Egypt to Great Britain." After events have shown the correctness of this view, but it can be no matter either for surprise or reproach that a proud and highly sensitive nation such as the French should have been for long reluctant to accept the hard and distasteful logic of accomplished facts.
On only two points of detail can exception fairly be taken to M. de Lanessan's account of Egyptian affairs. Speaking of the time of the Dual Control, he says that the British Controller devoted himself wholly to the furtherance of British, to the neglect of Egyptian, interests, whilst the French Controller adopted a different and far more altruistic line of conduct. I am confident that if my excellent friend and very loyal colleague, M. de Blignieres, were now alive, he would testify to the fact that there is not the smallest foundation for this statement. The truth is that both Controllers were at times accused by the extremists amongst their own countrymen of an excessive regard for Egyptian interests and a neglect of those of their respective countrymen. I have always looked upon those accusations as a valuable testimony to the fact that we did our duty.
M. de Lanessan is also in error in holding, as appears to be the case, that the Mandist rebellion in the Sudan was in any degree the outcome of the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. He says that up to that time "absolute tranquillity" prevailed in the Sudan. Such, however, was by no means the case. Long before the British occupation of Egypt took place, Egyptian misgovernment and oppression had produced a state of anarchy in the Sudan. A serious revolt was inevitable. It may very confidently be asserted that the two events were wholly dis- connected one from the other.
These, however, are very minor defects. On the whole, M. de Lanessan's work constitutes a valuable addition to history, and at the same time a very powerful and convincing proof of the solidarity of British and French interests. It may now be confidently asserted that Anglo- French amity has been placed on a more sure and stable foundation than at any former period recorded in the history of the two countries. It is to be hoped that M. de Lanessan's book will find numerous and sympathetic readers in this country. It is worthy of note that the principal criticism which he has to make upon successive French Governments is that they have been unduly neglectful of the naval
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