TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ANGLO-RITSSIAN CONVENTION.
THE Anglo-Russian Convention, on the conclusion of which we tender our hearty congratulations to Sir Edward Grey, might be described in the technical language of photography as a " fixing " solution. The situation in Persia, where the clash of British and Russian interests was continuous and dangerous, the situation iu Afghanistan, and that in Tibet,—all warned us that "anything might happen" if the two Powers chiefly concerned did not come to some precise understanding which would restrict the scope of their hostility. The Convention takes the problems of the Middle East at the stage to which they have already been "developed," applies its chemical, and " fixes " them. Or, to use another metaphor, it takes the clay, which was in a thoroughly plastic state, and hitherto was being modelled and remodelled without intermission by the agents of both Britain and Russia, and claps it into the oven. There it is baked and hardened. The form of the clay under that process is not, it is true, unchangeable ; but it is no longer sensitive to the finger-thrust of every meddler. The relaxation of the strain which is brought about by the Convention is thoroughly grateful to both sides. So desirable, not only in our own interests, but in those of the peace of the world, was such an Agreement that in the last resort we would not have shrunk from making even more sacrifices than have been made to achieve it.
The first point to notice is that the Convention concerns Asia alone. If it has any effect upon the equilibrium of Europe, it will be an effect wholly unpremeditated. Such results, of course, are conceivable' it is always con- ceivable that a European Power which restricts its anxieties far away from home will expend nearer home the reserve of political nerve-power thus set free. But, on the whole, we do not think that the Convention will have any directly recognisable influence upon what we call the balance of power in Europe. On our side, at all events, the Convention means chiefly a prospect of a less exhaust- ing military expenditure in India, and a new and most welcome sense of security in the Persian Gulf. The spectre of the Russian danger on our Indian frontier is laid. If the Convention had compassed nothing more than this, it would still be a memorable compact. For many years every soldier in India has had his ears filled with rumours of the schemings of Russian agents. These agents were in Afghanistan ; they were in Persian Baluchistan ; they pulled wires, they hatched plots, they were here, there, and everywhere. They supplied the mysterious background of the picture in which a con- centration of Russian troops could easily be, and frequently was, painted into the foreground on the slightest provocation. --The suspicions on the British side of the frontier were generally exaggerated, but that does not in the least alter the important fact that the suspicions existed. Armies are created and paid for, not only to defeat other armies in the field, but to ensure those who pay for them against quite vague perils,—to save them from the discomfort of perturbed or sleepless nights. The size of the army is in direct ratio to the alarms of the country. Now that Russia has promised to send no more agents to Afghanistan in order to sow wild ideas in the brain of the Amir, and has also promised to keep her hands off that triangle of Persian territory through which she might have turned the flank of our position in India, our expensive suspicions are ended. It is thoroughly satisfactory to think that the crisis of this long disease of anxiety about Russian intentions is over. For more than half-a-century Russia refused to give us the assurances we asked for—and suspicion broke out afresh with every refusal—but at last she has given them.
These assurances, as we said, have not been obtained without sacrifices. What are the sacrifices ? At first sight it looks as though we had agreed to recognise Russian predominance in far too large a slice of Persian territory. Her sphere of influence is roughly about two- thirds of the country, while our own is not only small but is the poorest district. The Russian sphere takes in nearly all the large towns, including the capital, and the line of detintr- cation dives arbitrarily towards the south to include Yezd, for example, which one might have thought would remain' outside. But, on the whole, the bargain only recognises,' or "fixes," the State of things as it actually was when the Convention was signed. Russian influence already pervaded practically all the district which is assigned to her. It may be said that we could have recovered lost ground; that the Persians trusted us, and would rather have us than the Russians controlling the larger part of their country. We cannot enter into the question whether we forfeited through lethargy trade interests which ought to be ours. The fact is that they were not ours at the critical moment, and if we have renounced advantages which. we might well have gained in the future—though it is very far from certain that we should have - done. so—we gain in security elsewhere as much as we have lost in material interests in the Russian sphere in Persia.
The wise man will reflect what was likely to have happened if this Convention had not been made. Was there any immediate prospect that our trade would get concessions in Northern Persia at the expense of Russia.? We think not. The Contention only bows to the facts. At the same time, we confess that the British trader who still resolutely believes that he could surmount all the hindrances put in his way by Russia in the North may have to stifle some of his aspirations. "Equal oppor-_ tunities " for all there will be in the Russian sphere, but the Russians alone will influence the granting of concessions by the Persian Government, and how that will work out for British traders remains to be seen. 'The persons with whom we cannot sympathise in this matter are those who for the purpose of reinforcing a humanitarian argument against the Convention—the argument that Russia is a monster with whom decent countries should not associate themselves—have no scruple about dealing out ammunition to Jingo irrecoucilables. Let us, however, consider the extreme Liberal objections to the Convention, for it is certain that more will be heard of them. Is Russia too infamous for us to have any dealings with her ? The answer to that question seems to us to be twofold. First, wicked persons are not made more wicked by the company Of good persons,—if we may justly look upon ourselves as 'filling the latter role. And, secondly, if we habitually refused' to strike any bargain with people whose character was not above reproach, our foreign policy would come to a stand- still altogether. There are bargains and bargains. If we made an alliance with the Russian Government—which we have not done—and tied ourselves to them by bonds of the closest intimacy, we might indeed be held to have given a sanction to their horrible persecu- tions and their intolerance of the people's desire for Constitutional freedom. But all we have done is to strike a bargain, which is a mere matter of cold business, in order to end a dangerous dispute. Does one refuse to buy a horse from a man who is not demonstrably above the average in virtue ? Do the extreme Liberals deny that a dispute existed ? If not, do they deny that it was worth ending? So far as we can judge from the reasons they give, they are inexplicably content,. as the Westminster Gazette h s well said, to sacrifice the greater morality to the less.Another objection made to the Convention is that PersiaL as not been consulted, and that the "partition " of her territory is unjustifiable. The. Convention, however, recognises her independence, and the regularising of the spheres of influence is but, once more, a " fixing " process. Of course, it is sad that Persia should decliae—the decline of every country, the death of every man, is sad—but the existence or non-existence of the Convention makes not a jot of difference to her con- dition. She was already mortgaged and controlled. Her illness was obvious'. All that has happened now is that the doctors have told her the truth. At the satins time, they announce that they are applying a remedy which they believe will check the inroads of other, and perhaps worse, diseases. Persia, in a word, knows where she stands, and we cannot think, unless we are to attribute illicit designs for the future to our own Foreign Office or to Russia, that she is injured by the avowal. .
Only one matter remains to be mentioned,—our rights in the Persian Gulf. For a hundred years we have acted an the conviction that we had fundamental interests there, nnd these have been jeopardised by the policy of Russia over and over again, yet no mention is made of the matter in the Convention. The explanation is contained in a brief despatch which Sir Edward Grey sent to Sir Arthur Nicolson on the day the Convention was signed. This despatch not only makes it clear that our interests in the Persian Gulf are not affected by the Convention, but that they are definitely recognised./ this is a point of the first importance. In the recent negotiations the Russian Government "explicitly stated that they do not deny the special interests of Great Britain, in the Persian Gulf." And to make quite sure that Russia understood the full meaning of what she said, the British Government drew attention to "previous declarations of British policy." These declarations are clear enough. Lord Lansdowne, for example, said in 1903: "We should regard the estab- lishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal." There is no equivocation there. Henceforth, we may take it, there will be only one policy: in the Persiaizil-uff for both the great political parties in Britain. o doubt in the last few months Sir Edward Grey has tried to get more concessions from Russia than he has got. We suppose he reached a point when he had to say to himself : "Is the credit side of our account full enough now to make it worth while to sign a Convention, and relieve ourselves of most of our harassing anxieties in the Middle East ? Or shall I haggle further and risk not coming to an agree- ment at all ? " He decided that the moment had come,—that the great ends to be served justified his sacrifices. On reviewing all the circumstances, we cannot resist the same conclusion.
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