HOW ULSTER COULD RUIN BRITAIN

Andrew Alexander on the

catastrophic results to be expected from an independent Ulster

THE farce of the Glenholmes affair at the weekend should not be allowed to divert attention from the real problem about Ulster at the moment — which is not to do with extraditing terrorists but with facing calls for independence. The attempt by the Government to rule in defiance of the will Of the majority has produced the loudest demands for independence that the pro- vince has ever known. And in Britain itself there are more than the usual number of Pious declarations that, after 18 years of trouble (mainly caused, in fact, by West- minster bungling), patience with the-pro- vince is running out. An independent Ulster is a terrifying Prospect. The outlook is made more dis- concerting by the fact that no one seems to have bothered to think what that inde- Pendence would mean or what horrors it far bring in its wake. Jettisoning Ulster, ?al' from saving Britain a problem, would be the beginning of a nightmare which ',you'd soon reduce this country to the Lebanon of Western Europe — torn apart Y strife, with the army on the streets, rival Private armies at war and all political stability at an end. Let me explain how it would come about. As soon as independence was ack- nowledged to be in prospect either because Ulster was intent on taking it or because British 'patience' was exhausted — and as soon as a date was foreseen, however vaguely — certain things would inevitably follow.

In Ulster itself the majority would at once look to the moment when it could rid itself of its large number of disloyal citizens: the IRA by force (inevitably), the more passively hostile by persuasion or intimidation. Unless that was achieved the `Quid to save you a place for the Royal Wedding, lady?' new Ulster state would not be seen by its majority as viable.

In the run-up to independence, there- fore, the tensions within the province would be extreme and perhaps uncontroll- able. The majority would arm and train and prepare for Der Tag. The IRA — by no means reluctant to see the day which would set all Ireland ablaze and precipitate the revolution it has long sought — would do likewise. Arms would be smuggled in, defences prepared.

Thus a swift consequence of any declara- tion that an independent Ulster was actual- ly in prospect would be, ironically, that Britain would have to provide far more, not fewer, troops. And not just troops. The smuggling in of arms would be by land, sea and air. Massively increased numbers of troops on the border would have to be matched by elaborate air and sea patrols as the green sympathisers from the US and elsewhere dispatched military largesse to the IRA. Whether British troops would be able to maintain law and order during this time, whether they would be able to prevent the first pre-emptive strikes by the IRA or by the majority's unofficial militias — especially with the RUC and the UDR by now little inclined to assist the other forces of the Crown must be open to doubt.

But let us suppose that they could. Let us suppose, too, that Britain sticks to its decision and makes the withdrawal (though it would probably be little more than an undignified scuttle). Once Ulster was independent, the settling of scores would proceed. The Republican areas would be attacked and would fight back. Volunteers would rush in from the South; areas like Fermanagh and Tyrone would try to secede and would call for Dublin's protection. The Republican areas would after a while be overwhelmed but the battles would be bloody and a stream of appropriate horror stories would inflame feelings on all sides. Dublin could not possibly stand by. Only those who know no Irish history could imagine that neutrality by the South would be possible during such a struggle.

War between North and South would follow. Given that the Irish army has no battle experience beyond providing extras for Henry V and contingents for the United Nations and given that its senior officers have never conducted campaigns (unlike the retired brigadiers and colonels who teem in the North) the initial battles would end in defeat for the South. An Ulster army might even march on Dublin.

But the war, given the numbers and the geography, would be essentially unwinn- able. And it is in the rush of aid to both sides that the real perils for mainland Britain would lie. Volunteers as well as gifts of arms, money and equipment would come from the US and from Canada and Australia, too — there are Orange Lodges in many parts of the Old Commonwealth. As for Britain, the number of people of Irish or Ulster descent runs into several millions. Other possible sources of rein- forcement for both sides range from fer- vent anti-Catholics to rabid left-wingers who might wish to join in the struggle or at least offer financial assistance and public demonstrations of sympathy.

The two sides in Ireland could be sup- plied by sea or air. The main bulk of assistance, whether in arms, men or mate- rial, would come from, or at any rate through, the British mainland. What could the British Government do? Adopt total neutrality? Try to cut off supplies to both sides, one side, impose sanctions, call in a United Nations group to enforce sanc- tions? .

The imagination reels. The consequ- ences in Britain itself would be ghastly. It is not necessary to have an elaborate know- ledge of military tactics to know that attacking the enemy's supply line is an essential step in winning a war. The target on the British mainland would be the known centres of support or recruitment or supply for both sides. Shipments to Ire- land, probably of anything, would be physically attacked. Ulster sympathisers would attack Republican centres like Kil- burn. Glasgow, Liverpool and Birming- ham would see bombings and counter- bombings, assassinations of recruiting officers and prominent supporters of both sides.

Non-Irish politicians, local or national, who came out strongly on one side or the other — and it is easy to see who some of them would be — would also be in real danger. Rallies or marches by one side would be regarded as legitimate targets for violence by the other. The communal violence which Northern Ireland saw in 1968 would be transferred to British cities where there are substantial northern or southern Irish communities — and the police would be as powerless to control that there as they were in Belfast and Londonderry in 1968. The army would have to be brought out.

It is all too easy to see how how these troubles would start and would spread, but difficult to see how they could be brought to an end — even if some peace were patched up between North and South. And would that last, anyway, or would it be little better than a truce, during which both sides would frantically prepare for the next round?

There would also be the little matter of the other nationalisms. As soon as Ulster's independence was announced, the more extreme Scottish and Welsh nationalists would argue — perhaps correctly — that Westminster was on the run and it would only need a few bombs here and a few acts of sabotage there to have the Government offering them independence, too.

If Mrs Thatcher does not want her legacy to be the destruction of the United King- dom, then she needs to end the Hillsbor- ough Agreement, which her instincts told her not to sign, but her civil servants persuaded her to agree to. (What is it that dooms British prime ministers to be given suicidal advice by civil servants called Armstrong?) Mrs Thatcher has little time. If something is not done soon, demands from Ulster for independence could be- come fierce. And what is the Government to do then — use the army to try to hold down the province?

It scarcely bears thinking about. Hills- borough is as pregnant with danger for Britain as Munich once was, an act of folly which also received spectacular bipartisan support in Parliament.