Slow boat to Europe
In the eyes of the Foreign Office, it is all cut and dried. Two successive govern- ments, one Conservative and one Labour, have committed themselves to the cause of European unity in general and to the task of negotiating British membership of the Common Market in particular. The overwhelming support of parliament has been pledged by the massive 426 majority secured when the issue was put to the vote in May 1967. The only obstacle was the arch-enemy, the wielder of two vetoes, General de Gaulle; and now that he has departed the scene—and the Foreign Office's policy of patience, of keeping our application 'on the table', has been triumphantly vindicated—it should all be plain sailing. True, there will still be some hard bargaining, and the French will as usual be bloody; but they can always be isolated, a prospect that the General's heirs will not find as splendid as the old man did.
But for the political leaders of both parties, those who recognise both that Britain's political and economic future lies as part of a developing European entity, of which the present Common Market is the nucleus, and that a third failure to join it might well, in Mr Heath's own words, 'prove to be a shipwreck', the way ahead is a deal less simple than the FO would have us believe. Indeed, the General's abrupt departure has been a positive embarrassment, raising as it does the question of Britain and Europe once again as a live issue at the worst possible time. Hence the notably circumspect tones in which Mr Heath and, still more, Mr Wilson (with his studied agnosticism about anything with a 'federalist tinge') pledged their renewed faith in British membership of the European communi- ties at this week's Guildhall dinner.
Their caution is wholly understandable. They know that the House of Commons vote of two years ago is of little relevance to the situation today, an event—perhaps even an historic event—of the recent past but one that, for the parliamentary rank and file, carries a fast-diminishing com- mitment for the present, let alone the future. It is a commonplace that opposi- tion to the European adventure is growing on both sides of the House, and probably (insofar as they have a view on it at all) among the electors at large. The state of feeling on the Labour benches was ex- emplified well enough by last week's row over what Mr Stewart was alleged to have said at a confidential meeting of M Jean Monnet's European Action.Committee at Brussels. Here, they felt, in the bogy of federalism. was a convenient stick with which to try and beat the Government out of its Europeanism.
And Labour's anti-Europeans can, after all, reckon that this may not be as difficult as it seems. Certainly the Prime Minister is no dedicated European. He embraced the cause in 1967 simply because he couldn't think of anything else to do and because when in doubt he always attempts to emulate Harold Mac- millan—and anyway George Brown had been bullying him about Europe ever since 1964. In fact, it seems unlikely that he would actively renege: there would be serious trouble in Cabinet (where Roy Jenkins is now playing the George Brown role), and his delight at stealing any of the Tories' clothes he can lay his hands on is such that he could scarcely bear to give back even the shop-soiled garments of Europeanism. But, equally, he can be counted on to stall if and when the Six do try and put Britain to the test with a positive approach. To embark on an initiative that would split his bitterly- divided party still further, and to do so when nothing can possibly reach fruition and be stamped with the seal of success this side of the general election, would be madness, and he knows it.
Nor has Mr Heath any inclination to force the pace. He, too, has no wish to divide his party in front of a general election. At present the Tory anti- Europeans are leaderless and divided among themselves, with the Atlantic Free Trade Area lobby ranged against those who resist all entanglements. But the temptation for Mr Enoch Powell, given the chance, to espouse this cause and gain the parliamentary following that has so far eluded him must be a strong one. Nor are Mr Heath's present shadow cabinet colleagues nearly as European- minded as he is himself. All his instincts must be to play it as quietly as possible until he himself is safely established in Downing Street.
Yet however narrowly party-political these calculations may seem, however ignoble the consensus of inaction to which the arguments on both sides lead may appear, the conclusion is the right one. In a parliamentary democracy it is both inevitable and right that the chang- ing views of both parliament and the electorate should be heeded. The cause of Europeanism has inevitably lost its pris- tine appeal, the mixture of trendiness and genuine idealism which once caught the imagination of the younger generation. With this gone (and the zeal of the young technocrats for bigger markets is a poor and limited substitute) it is inevitable that eyes turn to the balance sheet. And here, while fears of rising prices are grossly exaggerated, the balance of payments cost of accepting the Community's Common Agricultural Policy (together with its financial regula- tions) is a real and significant one. Any precise figure put upon it now must of necessity he fraudulent, since (among other things) that policy is itself at pre- sent under review among the Six, but it cannot be small.
As a nation, we have during the 'sixties allowed ourselves to become obsessed by our balance of payments. It has become difficult to imagine any objective of national policy that could transcend it, hard to conceive of any gain for which this kind of price could be justified. Yet in the perspective of his- tory it is clear that there are things which matter to a nation infinitely more than its balance of payments (pace Sir Val Duncan and his colleagues); and no doubt when we have escaped from our present obsession (by curing the disease which has led to it) we shall rediscover them: and rediscover, too, the national self-confidence which the deficit years have sapped, and without which any major change is seen as a threat. When that time comes, parliament and the public will be able to see more clearly the immense political advantages to Britain that the European adventure offers, as well as the genuine dangers (far more serious in the long run than a series of payments deficits) that exclusion could bring. But until it does come, our friends in Europe, who know what is at stake for the continent, too, will have to show patience and understanding. A third botched attempt would benefit no one.
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