THE LION'S HAIRS

By W. T. WELLS HERR HITLER'S teaching as to Great Britain in Mein Kampf is well known. Its main features are that just as the pre- War German's under-estimate of the Englishman was based

on delusion, so the Imperial Government's failure to avoid incurring the hostility of this country was the central defect in its foreign policy. Herr Hitler's criticisms of the pre-War Government were perhaps founded to some extent on an im- perfect appreciation of the fundamental difficulties confronting any attempt to make Great Britain view with favour or even with complacency any attempt to dominate Europe by force. How far his views as to either the possibility or the necessity

of procuring Britain's neutrality in a future conflict have been modified by his experiences since he has been in supreme control of German policy is, obviously, a question of outstanding importance both to Britain and the world.

Count von Pi cklees book suggests, in part at least, a solution of this problem. The Count was formerly the London correspondent of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,

and the publishers of the excellent English translation of the book inform us that he enjoys the patronage of Herr von

Ribbentrop, who is widely held to have influenced the Fiihrer to adopt an adventurous foreign policy on the grounds that British intervention, at any rate effective intervention, was unlikely. It is dear that the book would not have been allowed to circulate freely in Germany, as it appears to have done, unless it had received at least the tacit approval of personages highly placed in the regime ; and it is highly significant that it is entirely free of any trace of hysteria, of Anglophobia, or of pitying contempt for English decadence. " The mystic idea that Britain's might is something super-

natural is just as baseless as the idea that it is in a chronic state of collapse. . . ." It is not necessary to believe that

Britain's might is supernatural in order to think that it is very considerable, and this quotation sets the tone of the objective, dispassionate, well-balanced and closely-reasoned inquiry which the author very intelligently pursues.

The scope of the book recalls M. Andre Siegfried's England's Crisis, published in the period of the economic difficulties of the second Labour Government's term of office. The German's book is less feeling, less personal than the French- man's, but perhaps for that very reason it is the better calculated to convey to the German mind an understanding of the factors of which Britain's strength is composed. To have produced so comprehensive a survey in so limited a space is a memorable achievement.

Britain's strength, on the Count's analysis, is based partly on her financial position as a creditor nation, partly on the moral and economic cohesion of her Empire ; partly on her

strength as a naval and air Power, and partly on her industrial equipment. Her weakness is her dependence on the moral support of foreigners and the fact that her interests are so spread over the world that

"she cannot possibly exert her full power every time one of her minor interests is attacked. . . . It is quite possible to pull a hair or two out of the British Lion's tail without any very serious consequence resulting, and the problem of how many hairs must be pulled out in a bunch, or how often individual hairs can be Pulled out, before the Lion turns is almost a problem for a sophist, something like the problem of how many stones make a heap.

The question of what will make the Lion turn is of course linked with the question of what damage the Lion can do

and what are his powers of resistance.

Point by point Count Pilckler disposes of any contention that such a radical change may have occurred as to make the How Strong is Britain ? By Count Piickler. Translated by Edward Fitzgerald. (Routledge. 72. 6d.) formidable foe of 1914 a negligible factor in 1939. The Dominions, constitutionally independent, are in fact more closely tied to the Mother Country than before by her import- ance to them as a market, and by the consciousness of a com- mon ideal of an era of peace and justice in the world inaugurated under British leadership. The foreign investments lost during the War were restored by 193o. The British Navy, absolutely weaker, is relatively stronger. And Count Piickler shows a rare understanding of the fact that

our air power is linked with the smallness of our Army. We enjoy, he says : " a further important advantage from the fact that Great Britain has no large army. A considerable part of the air forces of all the Continental Powers is tied down to army co-operation. . . . The British Air Force, on the other hand, can concentrate its efforts on bombing planes and fighters. To this extent the total number of British aeroplanes represents a more powerful weapon of attack than the same number of aeroplanes in any Continental air force."

There are, of course, debit items—from the British point

of view—to the account. England, more than Germany, has to export to live. And while on the one hand the

policy of self-sufficiency is diminishing the market for our ex- ports, our chief industries, except the iron and steel, are not well organised to sell its products in those markets which still exist. But, says Count Piicider, the results achieved by the iron and steel industry are impressive, and there is no reason to believe that the others will not follow suit. Our mercan- tile marine is not so strong as before the War, and the demands of the home population greater, but on the other hand the demands of our Allies will not be so great. Further, with the shrinkage of world trade the international business of the City of London is less than it was, and our power to control other countries' policy by our money has diminished with it, but, even so, there will still be countries who will need British finance.

He regards it as certain—as unfortunately it seems to be— that in a future war we shall repeat our strategy of the last and raise an army of millions, which, of course, neither our industry — which in order to produce armaments and munitions in peace is already withdrawing from the Army many of the skilled mechanics, without whom the Army would be paralysed in War,—nor our finance, which in 1917 could not have stood the strain without American help, could support. In her industry, her Navy, her Air Force—relatively no burden in the last War—must lie Britain's strength, and in his failure to see that a huge army will only cripple out other efforts, the Count is probably overrating Britain's capacity.

His conclusion is that " Great Britain is still the richest country in the world and her military potential is very great." And this, it may be said, is a very reassuring conclusion, from our point of view, for a German to reach. But there is another side to the picture. Great Britain, we are told, is " no longer in a position to resist moral weapons." Hence her impotence on the Czecho-Slovak question—and doubtless on the Danzig question too. There are too many Germans alive who have felt the consequences of British power for the

"British decadence " propaganda to be effective. To say that Britain, for all her material power, is powerless before the moral tmassailability of the German case is a new and promising line of approach. The Fiihrer has already pulled a number of the Lion's hairs; with his infinite resourcefulness and skill, he may be relied on to pull a few more. And if the worst comes to the worst, and war breaks out, according to the Count, Germany's moral superiority will ensure her victory.