Belgrade and Moscow
Apart from its incredible length and its intolerable tone the further Note addressed by Moscow to Belgrade on Monday contains nothing new that is important and nothing important that is new. Its clear purpose, following the lines Russia has been pursuing throughout, is to incite the people of Yugoslavia against Marshal Tito—an attempt which could only succeed if Marshal Tito chose to allow the Russian Note to be published, and in all probability not then. But for this there could be no point in the long-drawn con- tention as to whether Yugoslavia herself abandoned her claim to Carinthia or the Soviet Union gave up sponsoring it. All this is in fact irrelevant. The root of the whole business is Tito's refusal to take orders in all things from Stalin—a piece of malignity which can manifestly not be allowed to succeed, lest other satellites, whose secret views on Russian imperialism are not very different from the Yugoslays', should be tempted to follow Yugoslavia's example. How far Russia is prepared to go to impose her view is still matter for speculation. In spite of fresh news of Russian armoured divisions in Hungary and Rumania near the Yugoslav frontier it appears unlikely that Stalin will attempt direct invasion, though it would be going much too far to assume definitely that he will not. He has the great advantage of not needing to show his hand till the last moment, for even a considerable concentration of troops is likely to be regarded as no more than a demonstration (by the State which has been conducting a Peace Conference in Moscow and denouncing balf the rest of the world as aggressors) till a blow is suddenly struck. Apart from the fact that his own life is in obvious danger Marshal Tito, who depended on large supplies from Russia, is in serious economic difficulties, which the Western Powers cannot do a great deal to relieve even if they would. Tito, a genuine Communist, is certainly not predisposed towards the West, but he will need all the support the Western Powers can give if, as seems possible, Russia's . menacing words and acts are brought before the Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations. The decision to despatch to Lake Success two Ministers so important as Mr. Djilas and Mr. Kardelj, the Foreign Minister, may mean no more than that Marshal ,Tito is preparing for any eventuality, but it certainly means at least that. It is a wise precaution, for if Russia does not in fact intend war she is likely to stop only at the last inch short of it. She is feeling some need to make her authority felt in Eastern Europe. Hence, no doubt, the Communist challenge to the Govern- • ment of Finland and the belated announcement in Prague of the failure of a plot against the administration and the penalties suffered by its authors. There will be no relaxation of the rigour of Corn- muniw-t control from Tallinn to Trieste—but in Yugoslavia it may be Communist without being Muscovite.
